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Abstract
In the last few decades, the way humans engage in payment transactions and the
tools they use to transact with each other have evolved dramatically. Advancement
in cryptography, information security, computer networking, distributed computing,
etc. provides the required tools for modern day payment solution providers to design
payment technologies that can be used to carry out convenient payment transactions.
Yet, the financial loss associated with financial fraud, payment related attacks and
data breaches that directly affect the financial institutions, merchants and consumers
is significant. Because of this, an important development in the payment evolution is
the consideration towards security of payment transactions.
The main focus of this thesis is to enhance the security of both EMV (Europay
MasterCard Visa) based centralised payments and Bitcoin/blockchain based distributed
payments while showing more emphasis on new and emerging payment technologies
such as: mobile payments, tokenisation and distributed ledger technology.
EMV is a standard that provides interoperability to Chip & PIN, Contactless and
Tokenised payment transactions in a global scale. The thesis, investigates the current
EMV payment architectures to identify potential weaknesses that pose a threat to the
security of payment transactions. In our research, we were able to identify five main
issues related to EMV Online PIN Verification in two deployment methods and three
main issues related to EMV Tokenisation that raise security concerns. We discuss
potential attack scenarios, and propose solutions that address the identified issues and
enhance the security of payment transactions. The proposed solutions are subject to
mechanical formal analysis and practical implementation was carried out to obtain
performance measurements.
The thesis, also investigates payments in distributed payment systems such as Bit-
coin and blockchains. We identify issues such as fair-exchange related to distributed
payments and propose solutions to improve security and anonymity. Furthermore, we
explore how blockchain technology can be leveraged to enhance the security in other
payment transactions such as: donation payments, humanitarian aid and SMS-based
mobile payments. Finally, the thesis provides conclusion of this research and suggesting
future research directions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Aim and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The innovation that comes out from payment technology not only helps im-
prove the economy but also enhances the quality and security of consumer-
merchant transactions. This chapter, sets the scene by explaining the mo-
tivation and challenges behind this thesis. Following this, the main contri-
butions on improving the security of payment transactions are briefly dis-
cussed. Finally, the chapter concludes by outlining the structure of the thesis
for the remaining chapters.
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1.1 Motivation and Challenges
Modern technological advancements have dramatically boosted how technological knowl-
edge is shared globally within a very short period of time than it used to be. This has
led to introduction of systems that provide global interoperability. One industry that
has harnessed this opportunity is the payment industry.
In the last few decades, how humans engage in payment transactions and the tools
they use to transact have evolved dramatically. One significant development in the
payment evolution is the consideration towards security of payment transactions. Ad-
vancement in cryptography, information security, computer networking, distributed
computing, etc. provides the required tools for modern day payment solution providers
to design payment technologies that can be used to carry out convenient payment
transactions. Most of the widely used centralised payment systems are standardised
and regulated with stringent security controls. Yet, the financial loss associated with
financial fraud, payment related attacks and data breaches that directly affect the
financial institutions, merchants and consumers is significant. This applies to both
centralised and distributed payment systems.
Furthermore, planned/unplanned changes to payment architectures such as: intro-
duction of a large number of intermediaries to payment channels, technological ad-
vancements available to adversaries, identified vulnerabilities, etc. pose a new threat
to the security of payment technologies that were considered secure in the past. Tak-
ing these concerns into consideration, we raise the following research questions in this
thesis.
Are modern day payment transactions secure and provide the expected security
guarantees? Are there still shortcomings and weaknesses in widely used payment sys-
tems that we consider secure? Finally, is there still space for improvement to enhance
the security of both centralised and distributed payment transactions?
Investigating and finding answers to the aforementioned research questions will be
the main aim of the thesis. Even though, it is extremely difficult to provide absolute
security, every effort must be taken to address the current threat presented against
the security of a payment technology at a given time. Addressing such issues will
enhance the security of payment transactions and prevent unnecessary loss associated
with financial fraud.
The research carried out will explore current and emerging payment technologies
such as: EMV (Europay Mastercard Visa) Chip & PIN, Contactless Card/Mobile Pay-
ments, Tokenisation, Digital Currencies and Blockchain. In particular, current payment
technologies such as: Chip & PIN and Contactless Card/Mobile Payments were given
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more emphasis then other payment technologies, because of global usage, industrial
adoption and the significance of the number of stakeholders that would benefit from
our proposed improvements, etc. Emerging payment technologies such as: EMV To-
kenisation, Digital Currencies and Blockchain were given more emphasis because of
innovative technologies used by these payment systems, increased adoption in the pay-
ment industry at the time of writing and the potential of being a disruptive technology
for providing secure payment transaction solutions, etc. In this thesis, a number of
payment technologies are investigated to identify weaknesses/vulnerabilities that could
potentially lead to security concerns and propose solutions that address the identified
issues and further enhance the security of payment transactions.
The proposed solutions are expected to strengthen the security of associate payment
protocols, in order to enhance the security of payment transactions.
1.2 Aim and Objectives
The main aim of the thesis is to enhance the security of centralised and distributed
payment transactions. This include finding answers to the research questions that were
raised in the previous Section 1.1 by investigating security aspects of both centralised
and distributed payment transactions and proposing improvements that address iden-
tified security concerns and limitations.
In order to achieve the main aim of the thesis, the following three main objectives
of the thesis are identified:
Objective-1: Investigate payment transactions in both centralised and distributed
payments while showing more emphasis on new/emerging payment technologies.
Objective-2 Identify potential weaknesses and concerns in payment technologies that
pose a threat to the security of payment transactions.
Objective-3 Propose improvements that address these identified weaknesses and con-
cerns to enhance the security of payment transactions.
1.3 Contributions
In this section, we briefly discuss our main contributions of the thesis.
In this thesis, we propose improvements to enhance the security of both EMV based
Centralised Payments and Bitcoin/Blockchain based Distributed Payments. In partic-
ular, we show more emphasis on current and emerging payment technologies. We first
investigate a number of payment technologies, their underlying payment architectures
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and operating environments. By doing so, the current mechanisms that provide secu-
rity guarantees of each payment system was established with the aim to understand
what aspects can potentially be enhanced.
The thesis provides six main contributions in subsequent discussions. The contribu-
tions are divided into two main categories: Improvements for EMV based Centralised
Payments and Improvements for Bitcoin/Blockchain based Distributed Payments. The
contributions of the thesis are presented in Part II to Part III of this thesis.
Under the Improvements for EMV based Centralised Payments in Part II, we first
investigated the EMV Online PIN Verification (OPV) process in the current payment
architecture. In the first OPV deployment method that we investigate, the OPV pro-
cess is carried out separately to the online transaction authorisation. We call this
the Segmented Authorisation. We were able to identify a number of potential attack
scenarios that pose a threat to the security of OPV process in the Segmented Autho-
risation method. Addressing the identified security concerns, our first contribution is
the proposed protocol and improvements that enhance the security of OPV process.
Following this, we extended our work on enhancing EMV OPV by investigating
another method that OPV process can be deployed in the current payment architec-
ture. We call this second method the Unified Authorisation method. We then identify
potential issues that can be used by an adversary to compromise the OPV process in
the Unified Authorisation method. As our second contribution, we propose improve-
ments and a protocol that addressed these issues to enhance the security of OPV in
the Unified Authorisation method.
Next, we focused our attention on another aspect of the EMV payment architecture,
which is the Transaction Authorisation. In our discussion, we explained about an
inherent weakness in the current payment architecture which is the Primary Account
Number (PAN) Compromise that has lead to significant financial loss for the financial
institutions, merchants and the consumers. EMV Tokenisation is increasingly being
adopted by the payments industry as a solution to PAN compromise. The background
research and introduction to Tokenisation was given in Section 2.1.4 of the thesis. In
our investigation of the current tokenisation architecture, however, we identified that
the lack of support for making oﬄine tokenised payments as a significant bottleneck in
tokenised payment transactions. We then explained benefits of having the capability
of making and accepting tokenised payment in an oﬄine enviornment for both the
merchants and the consumers. As our third contribution, we proposed a tokenisation
based payment protocol which provides capability of making tokenised payments in
oﬄine environments.
Following on this, we extended our work on enhancing the security of tokenised
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payments by investigating the current tokenisation payment architecture. We were
able to identify five potential attack scenarios that raise security concerns on tokenised
payments, especially when a static-token is presented to the terminal during an EMV
transaction. The security concerns include: over charging for a payment, capturing
token related data, capturing the unpredictable number generated by the terminal,
replay attack on authorisation response sent by the issuing bank and replay attack on
the authorisation response even when the payment related data has been authorised
oﬄine before reaching the issuing bank. For our fourth contribution, we proposed
a contactless mobile payment protocol that provides: mutual-authentication between
the terminal and the mobile, security against the identified attack scenarios by using a
proposed Dynamic Transaction Token (DTT) that is unique to a particular transaction
and end-to-end encryption between the terminal and the payment authorisation entity
as well as the terminal and the mobile. The improvements we proposed enhance the
security of tokenised payment transactions and provide control for the authorisation
entity to detect, prevent fraud and make informed payment authorisation decisions.
The proposed protocols under this category are subject to mechanical formal anal-
ysis for their security, where no feasible attacks were identified. Furthermore, a number
of proposed solutions were implemented to obtain performance measurements.
Under the Improvements for Bitcoin/Blockchain based Distributed Payments in
Part III of this thesis, we first explored the e-commerce market in an attempt to
understand current trends and increased use of alternative payment methods such as
digital cash that provide anonymity as an additional property. We then explained
why it is difficult to guarantee fair-exchange in an e-commerce payment transaction
compared to a traditional Point-of-Sale (PoS) payment transaction.
In our research, we identified a potential concern in anonymous payments such as
Bitcoin when it comes to guaranteeing fair-exchange between a merchant and a con-
sumer in an e-commerce transaction. The background research on anonymous payment
protocols, fair-exchange payment protocols, Bitcoin and blockchain technology was car-
ried out in Section 2.3 of the thesis. For our fifth contribution, we proposed a payment
protocol that guarantees true fair-exchange during an e-commerce transaction when
Bitcoin is used as an anonymous payment method. We then analyse the protocol for
its security and anonymity requirements. Following this we carried out a discussion
about Bitcoin transaction link-ability and explained how additional anonymity guar-
antees can be established. Finally, the proposed protocol was extended to support
other cryptocurrencies such as Zerocoin/Zerocash that provide improved security and
anonymity.
Next, we focused our attention onto other payment transaction scenarios that can
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leverage the blockchain technology. We identified the philanthropic sector as an indus-
try that can gain benefits by using blockchains. In particular, donation payments asso-
ciated with foreign or humanitarian aid activities. In our investigation to the current
philanthropic models we were able to identify issues such as: donation transparency,
transactional costs, speed of getting the donations to the beneficiaries, provisioning
the received donation to beneficiaries in disconnected environments, etc. as main chal-
lenges faced by charities. As our sixth and final contribution, we proposed a novel
philanthropic model that address these challenges by leveraging the Bitcoin blockchain
for donating foreign aid for humanitarian causes. We then proposed a SMS based
mobile payment solution to provision donations and to be used by beneficiaries in dis-
connected environments for their day-to-day payments. The solution is finally analysed
for its security requirements.
Our work in this thesis identifies issues and weaknesses in payment systems used in
real world that raise concerns regarding the security of centralised and distributed pay-
ment transactions. To address these issues, we carried out a background investigation
on each payment technology and their underlying payment architectures. Addressing
the identified security concerns, we proposed a number of solutions that improve the se-
curity of both centralised and distributed payments. Enhancing the security of payment
transactions is primarily the main contribution of the thesis. However, we also con-
sider improving privacy related to distributed payments. More specifically, anonymity
which is a property of most cryptocurrencies, is a privacy element that we consider
under distributed payments. In our proposed solutions, we discuss how anonymity is
guaranteed or enhanced while improving the security of these payment transactions.
Furthermore, the work carried out in this thesis has resulted in six academic submis-
sions in international conferences and journals.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows.
The work carried out in Part I of the thesis, presents background work related to
both centralised and distributed payments. The beginning of Chapter 2 presents the
background related to EMV based Centralised Payments. The discussion starts by giv-
ing an introduction to EMV and its practical use in the payments industry. Then a num-
ber of payment technologies such as: Chip & PIN, Contactless Card/Mobile Payments
and Tokenisation are introduced. Following this, an investigation is carried out on each
technology to identify their underlying architectures and the operating environments.
Following this, Chapter 2 presents the background related to Bitcoin/Blockchain based
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Distributed Payments. First, an introduction to Bitcoin, its architecture and security
features is given. Afterwards, a discussion on the blockchain technology and key prop-
erties/aspects inherent with the technology is carried out. Following this, a number of
proposals that leverage the blockchain technology to provide security related solutions
are discussed. Chapter 2 then presents background related to Anonymous and Fair-
exchange Payment Protocols. Finally, the chapter carries out a discussion on formal
analysis of cryptographic protocols.
The work carried out in Part II of the thesis, present the proposed improvements for
EMV based Centralised Payments. In Chapter 3, we present our first contribution of
the thesis under centralised payments. In this chapter, the current EMV OPV process
is discussed and potential issues related to the security of OPV is identified. We then
propose solutions that addresses these issues and improve the security of OPV. The
proposed protocol is mechanically analysed and implemented to obtain performance
measurements. The research carried out in Chapter 3 has led to the publication of
academic paper number two under the title “Enhancing EMV Online PIN Verification”
in the list of publications.
In Chapter 4, we extend the work in our first contribution presented in Chapter 3
by introducing a second method that OPV can be deployed. Afterwards, we identify
potential security issues in this deployment method and propose solutions that improve
the security of OPV. Finally we analyse the proposed solution. Based on the research
carried out in Chapter 4, paper number six under the title “Enhancing EMV Online
PIN Verification For A Second Deployment Method” in the list of publications is under
review at an international journal.
In Chapter 5, we discuss an inherent weakness in the current EMV architecture and
introduce EMV Tokenisation which has been adopted as a solution. We then investigate
the EMV tokenisation architecture and identify a potential drawback related to oﬄine
payments. Addressing this issue, we propose a tokenisation based payment protocol
that can be used in oﬄine environments. The proposed protocol is then subject to me-
chanical formal analysis and implemented to obtain performance measurements. The
research carried out in Chapter 5 has led to the publication of academic paper number
three under the title “Extending EMV Tokenised Payments to Oﬄine-Environments”
in the list of publications.
Chapter 6, investigates the security of tokenised payments. We identify a number of
potential attack scenarios that pose a threat to tokenised based payment transactions.
After this, we propose a contactless mobile payment protocol that is based on tokeni-
sation to address the potential issues and improve the security of tokenised payment
transactions. Finally, the proposed protocol is subject to mechanical formal analysis.
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The published academic paper number four under the title “Enhancing EMV Tokeni-
sation with Dynamic Transaction Tokens” in the list of publications was based on the
research carried out in Chapter 6.
The work carried out in Part III of the thesis, present the proposed improvements
for Bitcoin/Blockchain based Distributed Payments. More specifically in Chapter 7,
we present our fifth contribution of the thesis. The work carried out in this Chapter 7,
first discuss the e-commerce environment and introduce distributed payments. We
then investigate anonymous payment protocols and fair-exchange payment protocols.
Afterwards, we identify a potential issue when it comes to guaranteeing fairness in
anonymous payments such as Bitcoin. We then propose a protocol that guarantees true
fair exchange for Bitcoin payments in e-commerce. Finally, we analyse the protocol and
extend it to support other cryptocurrencies such as Zerocoin/Zerocash. The research
carried out in Chapter 7 has led to the publication of academic paper number one
under the title “Optimistic Fair-Exchange with Anonymity for Bitcoin Users” in the
list of publications.
Chapter 8, extends the work on Bitcoin/blockchain payment and explore other
payment scenarios that can be enhanced by leveraging the blockchain technology. In
particular, we focus our attention on donation payment involved with foreign/ human-
itarian aid activities. We first identify issues and challenges faced by charities and
then discuss the advantages of blockchain solutions. Following this, a novel philan-
thropic model that leverages the Bitcoin blockckchain was proposed. Furthermore, we
propose a SMS based mobile payment solution to provision donations and to be used
by beneficiaries in disconnected environments. The solution is finally analysed for its
security requirements. The research carried out in Chapter 8 has led to the publication
of academic paper number five under the title “Philanthropy On The Blockchain” in
the list of publications. Finally, Chapter 9, provides concluding remarks of the thesis
and outlines future research directions.
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In this chapter, we present the background work related to both EMV based
centralised payments and Bitcoin/blockchain based distributed payments.
We explore the underlying payment architectures, operating environments
and security features on a number of current and emerging payment tech-
nologies. Following this, we carry out background research related to anony-
mous and fair-exchange payment protocols. Finally, we discuss formal anal-
ysis of cryptographic protocols and introduce the chosen tools that will be
used to formally analyse our proposed protocols in subsequent chapters.
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2.1 EMV based Centralised Payments
Centralised payment systems are payment schemes that are controlled, owned, managed
or regulated by any financial service, bank or a government. A good example of this is
bank issued credit and debit card based payments. In the recent years there have been a
lot of academic research carried out in this particular area [146, 88, 89, 59, 60, 70] as well
as real world industrial solutions that has already been rolled out [13, 14, 15, 16, 24, 20].
A significant aspect is that due to the wide use of mobile phones, the traditional
payment card based payments are now been gradually migrated to mobile phones.
Compared to payment cards, mobile phones have added communication methods to
run innovative payment applications but this has also given new attack vectors for
perpetrators.
2.1.1 EMV
EMV (Europay MasterCard Visa) is a globally accepted standard, initially introduced
for Chip & PIN payment transactions [14, 15] and contactless transactions [24].
In smart card-based payment systems (credit and debit) [159], security sensitive
data related to both the payment system and the cardholder is securely stored on the
tamper-resistant chip in the smart card [146, 133]. The Personal Identification Number
(PIN) is used to establish an association between the smart card and its authorised
cardholder during a chip & PIN transaction. In the EMV payment scheme, the PIN
issued by a Card Issuing Bank (CIB) for a particular payment card is considered to be
known only by the authorised cardholder, the issued payment card and the CIB or the
payment authorisation entity.
In some scenarios the CIB will instruct the Scheme Operator (SO) which is a trusted
entity that manages the payment scheme (e.g. MasterCard, Visa or Amex) to authorise
EMV transactions on CIB’s behalf. This process is generally known as the stand-in-
process. In such situations, the PIN details are also shared with the SO. Furthermore,
the authorised cardholder may share their PIN with other users such as family members.
It must be noted that, in such scenarios, we consider that a payment transaction is
initiated with the cardholder’s consent.
During a EMV chip & PIN based payment transaction, the cardholder first inserts
the payment card into the Terminal. The payment terminal discussed throughout the
chapter is the payment acceptance device that is used to accept card-based payment
transactions. Note that this is not an Automated Teller Machine (ATM). We refer to
the terminal as CTPOS in this chapter.
Following this, the card and the terminal communicate with each other to engage
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in an EMV transaction. In EMV both the payment card and the terminal are set
with liability limits such as maximum payment amount, risk measures and predefined
parameters. The card and the terminal establish common parameters for the transac-
tion based on their risk assurance levels. If this established common parameter require
cardholder authentication, then the terminal requests the consumer to enter his/her
PIN.
Depending on the PIN authorisation environment the entered PIN is verified either
by the payment card or by the authorisation entity (i.e. scheme operator or CIB).
Depending on the PIN verification result, the cardholder is either authorised to proceed
with the transaction or not authorised. The PIN can be related to as an alternative
to a cardholder’s signature. The knowledge of the PIN entered by the cardholder
during a transaction provides some assurance that the genuine cardholder is initiating
the payment. The combination of using a smart card and its associated PIN can
significantly reduce payment card fraud [182, 123].
EMV supports both oﬄine and online PIN verification methods. In oﬄine PIN
verification the cardholder PIN is sent to the card either in plaintext or enciphered
format to be verified. In contrast to this, during an Online-PIN Verification (OPV)
the PIN needs to be sent to the authorisation entity (e.g. scheme operator or CIB) for
verification. This process is explained in detail in the next section.
2.1.2 EMV Online PIN Verification
In this section we expand our discussion on the EMV OPV process. We first carried
out a background research to understand how the OPV process works in the current
EMV payment architecture. For this, resources such as: the EMV specifications and
past literature was referred to.
We understood that the EMV specifications [13, 14, 15, 16] do not specify informa-
tion related to the OPV process that may be supported by CTPOS devices. Similarly,
to the best of our knowledge, there are no publicly available documentation that specifi-
cally detail the OPV process between the CTPOS and the authorising entity. However,
there are some documentation such as [49, 131, 65] that explains how OPV as a Card-
holder Verification Method is carried out during an Automated Teller Machine (ATM)
transaction. We outline the OPV process carried out in the current architecture by
considering what we have understood about the OPV process associated with ATM
transactions and referring to resources such as [195].
In the OPV process, there may be a number of intermediary entities in the pay-
ment communication channel between the CTPOS and the authorisation entity. These
intermediaries could be: the acquirer’s subcontractors that manages the CTPOS de-
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vices, third party Payment Terminal Operators (PTO) and other nodes engaged in the
key-translation mechanism (where messages are enciphered and deciphered from node
to node).
The current EMV architecture has placed an indelible trust assumption on the in-
termediaries involved. Most of these intermediaries are bound by contracts with either
the acquirer or SO/CIB, yet it is questionable whether this is sufficient to let intermedi-
aries handle sensitive data related to the cards and cardholders. The EMV specification
[16] states that “When the applicable Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) is online
PIN, the Interface Device (IFD) shall not issue a Verify command. Instead the PIN
pad shall encipher the PIN upon entry for transmission in the authorisation or financial
transaction request”.
Even though this indicates that the PIN is forwarded in encrypted format from
the CTPOS onwards, it does not specifically detail any information related to the
PIN encipherment for the OPV process. Neither does it mention whether the CTPOS
encrypts the PIN with a cryptographic key only shared with the authorisation entity
or with the next point of contact that engages in key-translation on the communication
path.
The CTPOS devices are deployed by the PTO. The PTOs that the merchants use
can be the acquiring banks and their subcontractors or even third parties (payment
providers). A single third party may deploy a large number of CTPOS devices at
different merchants or locations and manage them. Depending on the geographical
location, these third parties may differ and it is not practically feasible for issuers to
get in contact with all the third parties globally, in order to share secret keys with each
other.
Furthermore, an authorisation entity sharing a unique cryptographic key with each
individual CTPOS would be logistically impractical when considering the number of
different acquiring banks, subcontractors, third parties and the sheer number of CTPOS
devices out there in a global scale. After all, one of the objectives of introducing EMV,
was to achieve the interoperability between different entities without prior business
relationships.
We previously discussed the OPV mechanism used in ATM transactions. Taking
the involved intermediaries into consideration and the need of providing confidentiality
to the cardholder’s PIN when it passes through one intermediary to the other, it can be
assumed that a similar key-translation mechanism as in ATM transactions is used here.
However, it is important to outline a notable difference which is that the ATM com-
munication infrastructure (ATM Network) and the ATMs themselves are considered to
be trusted.
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Figure 2.1: Online PIN Verification Message Flow
The Figure 2.1 illustrates the entities and the message flow in the OPV process.
It shows how the involved intermediaries sharing unique cryptographic keys with each
other engage in the key-translation process. Considering the communication link be-
tween intermediary A and the issuer for instance, the PIN block which contains the
PIN is first enciphered by intermediary A using a shared key KAcq−A before it is sent
to the acquirer. Once received, acquirer deciphers the message to obtain the PIN block
and subsequently enciphers it using the shared key KAcq−B before forwarding to B.
This process continues with each intermediary node until the message is received by
the CIB or the authorisation entity.
2.1.3 Financial Fraud
According to a report published by the Financial Fraud Action UK (FFA) [93], the total
cost associated with Card Not Present (CNP) fraud, such as: fraudulent purchases
made using compromised card details, over the internet, telephone or by mail order
amounted to £432 million in 2016. CNP fraud is also referred to as Remote Purchase
fraud. The FFA report also outlines that the total international fraud losses on cards
that had been issued in the UK was £200 million in the same year [93]. A proportion
of the loss is due to Primary Account Number (PAN) compromise where counterfeit
cards with compromised PAN details are used in countries that have not fully rolled
out EMV Chip & PIN [150, 37].
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PAN Compromise
Amongst the plethora of advantages provided by EMV, there is an inherent weakness
associated with how PAN and related data is handled during a payment transaction
in the current EMV architecture. Fraudsters and organised crime groups have ex-
ploited this weakness over the past years which has led to a significant rise in financial
fraud [93, 150, 37, 174, 140, 181]. Regardless to whether it’s a contact or contactless
EMV transaction, in the current payment architecture, the PAN and related data is
transferred in clear to the payment terminal. This is because the PAN and related
data are processed in clear to complete a number of steps in an EMV PoS transaction
[150, 14, 13, 15, 16, 24].
PAN data are compromised by fraudsters during EMV transactions or by breaching
merchants’ databases that store consumer payment card details [165, 30]. Fraudulently
obtaining PAN and PAN related data to carry out financial fraud is also called PAN
compromise.
Following a PAN compromise, the fraudsters may take different routes in order to
make a profit, such as: selling the details on the black-market, making counterfeit cards
or carrying out Cross-channel fraud. In Cross-channel fraud, the compromised PAN
and related data, either during a PoS transaction or by breaching a database are used
in other payment channels such as e-commerce payments.
To understand the scale of financial loss associated with PAN compromise the fol-
lowing case study can be taken as an example. The US retail giant Target was hacked
by cyber criminals in 2013 [179]. The attackers used malware that infected PoS termi-
nals at more than 1800 branches to compromised payment card details [165, 179]. The
attackers compromised more then 40 million consumer credit/debit card details. The
total financial loss for the company associated with the breach has mounted to around
$202 million. In May 2017, Target settled an $18.5 million class action lawsuit related
to the data breach.
2.1.4 EMV Tokenisation
In PAN compromise, the harvested PAN-related data is then used to carry out cross-
channel fraud which includes Card Not Present (CNP) and Counterfeit Card transac-
tions via internet, telephone or mail order. Tokenisation is increasingly being adopted
by the payment industry as a method to prevent PAN compromise by mapping the
PAN with a substitute value.
The process that manages the conversion from a PAN to a token and vice-versa is
called tokenisation and the substitute value is called a token. Until recently, tokenisa-
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tion was used by merchants and payment processing service providers to store consumer
card details in a tokenised format to mitigate the risk of card data being hacked from
databases [179, 30, 165]. This chapter does not refer to independent tokenisation meth-
ods used by various merchants and their payment processors in order to manage and
store consumer payment card details in token format. The tokenisation discussed in
this study refers to replacing the PAN used during EMV transactions with a token
defined in EMV Tokenisation Specification [20]. The EMV Tokenisation Specification
details requirements to support payment tokenisation in EMV transactions [20].
Following the standardisation of EMV tokenisation specification [20], there has
been a dramatic move towards early adoption of this technology in contactless mobile
payment applications. One example is the release of Apple Pay [22, 83, 25].
Tokenisation, discussed in this chapter, is a method that replaces the sensitive PAN
used during an EMV transaction with a substitute value called the token. The token is
a 13-19 digit numeric value that passes validation checks set by the payment scheme.
A token is generated such that it does not reveal or conflict with the real PAN [20].
An adversary who captures the token cannot deduce the actual PAN.
EMV tokenisation is also in the interest of organisations that accept and handle
consumer payments. In the payments industry, organisations, merchants, retailers,
service providers, etc. that handle consumer payment card details are required to be
compliant with industrial standards such as the Payment Card Industry-Data Security
Standard (PCI-DSS). Compliance to such standards require adequate implementation
of security controls, routine audits and management which can be costly and time
consuming for organisations that accept and handle consumer payments. Therefore,
storing and managing tokens instead of PANs in their servers and databases can simplify
compliance audits such as PCI-DSS [155, 78, 39]. In addition to this, organisations that
store customer payment details for faster payment checkout in subsequent transactions,
can store tokenised payment details instead. This makes the payment details restricted
to a specific merchant and unusable elsewhere, making it an unattractive target for
cyber criminals.
2.1.5 Current Operating Environment of EMV Tokenisation
In this section, the current tokenisation online operating environment is presented. A
generic payment architecture and the transaction message flow for a tokenised contact-
less mobile payment are shown in Figure 2.2 and explained according to [20, 83].
At the start of an online tokenised EMV contactless mobile payment transaction,
the mobile device passes the payment token and token-related data to the terminal.
The terminal forwards the authorisation request to the acquirer, who then forwards it to
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Figure 2.2: Generic EMV Tokenised Payment Architecture
the payment network. The entities involved in this process engage in a key-translation
process, which means that two entities share a symmetric key to communicate, as
shown by connecting arrows on both ends in Figure 2.2. When a message is forwarded
to a particular entity, it is deciphered and enciphered using the shared symmetric key
with the next entity. The payment network then communicates with the Token Service
Provider (TSP) to de-tokenise the token in order to retrieve the PAN and validate the
cryptogram [20, 83]. Following this, the payment network forwards the authorisation
request with the mapped PAN details to the bank for authorisation. The bank, after
carrying out necessary validations, sends an Authorisation Response Code (ARC) to
the payment network in an authorisation response [20, 114]. The payment network
now forwards the authorisation response to the terminal. The payment network may
or may not send a TSP-generated response cryptogram in the authorisation response
message to the terminal via the acquirer [20]. The terminal then approves or declines
the transaction. As explained, the current architecture requires online connectivity
during transactions.
In this section we discussed EMV based centralised payment technologies and their
underlying payment architectures. In the next section, we introduce Bitcoin/blockchain
based distributed payment technologies and discuss how these technologies differ from
the centralised architecture.
2.2 Bitcoin/Blockchain based Distributed Payments
In the payment industry, digital ledgers are used to record details related to payment
transactions. In the previous section, we discussed a number of payment technologies
in the EMV based centralised payment architecture. In EMV based centralised pay-
ment technologies, digital ledgers are stored and shared in a centralised architecture.
However, there are other payment technologies that uses different methods to store and
share ledgers. In order to explain this clearly, we describe three architectures that can
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be used to share a digital ledger and identify their main differences. The architectures
are illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Architectures to share a Digital Ledger
A digital ledger that keeps a record of payment transaction details can be shared
in three main architectures. In Figure 2.3, the nodes that store and share the ledger is
highlighted in blue. The green nodes connect to a blue node to query the ledger. The
significant differences of these architectures are listed below.
• Centralised: Client Server architecture with the server as one central node keeping
the ledger.
• Decentralised: Distributed network of several centralised architectures connected
by the central nodes. The central nodes share the same ledger and each central
node serve a limited number of nodes. This way the network does not rely on a
single server but uses a number of servers.
• Distributed: No central server keeping the ledger but each node is connected to
various other nodes and all the nodes share the same copy of the ledger. Also
considered a public shared ledger.
Distributed payment systems are payment schemes that are not controlled or man-
aged by a single financial service, bank, payment network or a government. Instead,
the responsibilities of managing the payment system is distributed to a large network
of entities. Most of these payment systems work on a peer-to-peer basis and the nodes
joining as peers help run the payment system. The concept of recording payment trans-
action related data in a shared distributed ledger is also called blockchain technology.
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Unlike the fiat currency based centralised payment technologies that we discussed
in Section 2.1, distributed payment systems are based on Cryptocurrencies which is a
subset of what is generally known as Digital currency [71, 113].
A good example of this is Bitcoin which is a widely used distributed payment
system to make anonymous payments [71, 147, 113]. Bitcoin is the first distributed
cryptocurrency that was proposed in 2008. At the time of writing, there are hundreds
of cryptocurrencies that have a market value [73, 71]. The common aspect of all
these cryptocurrencies is the distributed ledger also known as the blockchain shared
with participants in the payment system. Cryptocurrency falls under the category of
distributed and/or decentralised Digital Currency which is not managed by a central
payment scheme, financial institution, government, etc. but rather by the peers joining
the distributed system [71, 113].
In the recent years, consumers, businesses, financial institutions, governments, etc.
are starting to understand the benefits of using distributed payment methods to make
online purchases and at PoS transactions [104, 142, 196, 67, 202, 56, 113]. Furthermore,
a recent study estimates the current number of active cryptocurrency wallet holders
to be between 2.9 - 5.8 million and the total cryptocurrency market capitalisation in
April 2018 was $265 billion [104, 73].
In this section, we gave an introduction to distributed payment systems and dis-
cussed key features in regards to how these technologies operate. In the next section,
we extend our discussion on blockchain technology and Bitcoin by investigating the
underlying payment architectures.
2.2.1 Blockchain Technology
In the 1990’s, peer-to-peer networks were gaining rapid interest and the technology
was mainly used for the purpose of file sharing at the time. Peer-to-peer file sharing
services such as Napster and Gnutella were used to share multimedia files such as MP3
[50]. Raising intellectual property and copyright concerns, unregulated peer-to-peer
file sharing services were classed as earlier forms of darknets [50].
Just after the year 2000, innovations based on peer-to-peer networks found new
ground other than file sharing [177, 50]. One such example is the invention of the
Bitcoin peer-to-peer network [147, 52].
The blockchain technology as we know of today, is one of the significant innovative
outcomes that came from Bitcoin [147, 71, 113]. Bitcoin is a distributed cryptocur-
rency system that works on a peer-to-peer network. Unlike in a banking networks
where transactions are approved by dedicated servers, in distributed payment systems,
all transactions are approved by peers joining the peer-to-peer network. Transactions
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are represented in hash outputs and the ownerships of monetary value attached to
a public key (also known as the coin address) is transferred using digital signatures.
Transferring ownership of the value attached to a coin from one user to the other using
digital signatures creates a chain of signatures. The recipient can verify the ownership
of a coin using the signature chain [147]. The recipient, however, cannot check whether
the sender has already transferred the coins to another user and is trying to make a
duplicate payment with the same coins. This is referred to as the double-spending
problem and a payment system should support detection of any attempted double
spending. As there are no dedicated server or an authorisation entity to verify each
payment transaction, distributed payment systems solve the double spending problem
is by introducing a shared distributed ledger that permanently records all transactions
that have completed in the past [147, 113]. This innovative solution is also called the
blockchain. To provide a permanent record and an audit trail, past transactions are
included in blocks. A block is a record of sequences of digitally signed and verified
transactions. This provides a permanent record of a sequence of blocks from the very
first to the latest block which can be used by peers to prevent double spending. The
created blocks are timestamped and chained together in the order they appeared, de-
riving the term blockchain [147, 113]. A blockchain is shared and synchronised with
all the nodes connected to the peer-to-peer network in a global scale. The blockchain
can be referred to as a globally distributed cryptographic ledger.
Types of Blockchains
Blockchains can be categorised in to two main categories based on permissions, who
can recorded information on the blockchain and who can view recorded information,
etc. The two main types of blockchains are described below.
1. Unpermissioned: A unpermissioned blockchain is a distributed ledger shared
and synchronised with all the entities in a peer-to-peer network. The management
of the ledger, how and when things are recorded on to the ledger is not controlled
by a single entity. The ledger is visible to all the entities and any entity on the
peer-to-peer network can append or record a transaction as long as it is genuine.
The integrity of the ledger is agreeing upon by using a majority consensus. The
Bitcoin blockchain is a good example.
2. Permissioned: A permissioned blockchain is a distributed ledger that has one or
a given number of owners. Any records to the ledger can be only added by these
owners and not by any other nodes. The consensus in regard to the integrity of the
ledger is reached only by entities with pre-defined privileges. Due to the limited
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consensus, transactions are much faster compared to unpermissioned blockchains,
the owners have more control over the consensus mechanism and management of
the blockchain.
In the next section, we extend our discussion on Bitcoin, explain its underlying
blockchain based architecture.
2.2.2 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a distributed digital cash system based on a peer to peer network architec-
ture. Satoshi Nakamoto which is a pseudonym (online identity - might not be the real
name) proposed and developed the payment system in October 2008. In January 2009,
the first hash block called the Genesis Block was created and a publically available
global ledger called the Blockchain was broadcast on the Bitcoin peer to peer network.
There after, the Bitcoin payment system is widely used to make anonymous payments
over the Internet. Payment transactions are broadcast to all the nodes in the peer to
peer network and are permanently recorded. Bitcoin transactions are represented in
SHA 256 hash outputs. There are two types of broadcasts; Transactions and Blocks.
The system is built to have a fixed number of Bitcoins in circulation; this amount is
roughly 21 Million Bitcoins. As of April 2018, there are about 16.9 Million Bitcoins in
circulation [55]. In Bitcoin mining is the process a group of nodes authorising trans-
actions and creating new blocks. On average, in the Bitcoin network a new block is
created every ten minutes. Verification of transactions is assigned randomly to network
peers and the verifying peers get a small portion of Bitcoins. However, the creation
of a valid new block pays the creator 12.5 Bitcoins at the current level which is also
known as Coinbase within the Bitcoin community [53, 52]. This amount halves every
four years to balance out the increase of computational power over time. A user can
start using Bitcoins by running Bitcoin wallet/client software. It can be used to man-
age Bitcoin addresses/keys and to make payments. Every user needs to have a Bitcoin
address to receive Bitcoins from other parties and a corresponding Secret Key is needed
to transfer Bitcoins to other parties.
A user can generate a unique Bitcoin address which is also called a Bitcoin public
key by using an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) key as given
below [53, 147].
Step 1: Generate Private ECDSA key. Step 2: Generate Public ECDSA key.
Step 3: Create a SHA-256 hash of step 2. Step 4: RIPEMD-160 hash of step 3.
Step 5: Add bytes 00 to the front of step 4. Step 6: SHA -256 hash of step 5.
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Step 7: SHA -256 hash again of step 6. Step 8: Take the first 4 bytes of step 7.
Step 9: Add these 4 bytes at the end of step 5. Step 10: Base58 encoding of step 8.
Each Bitcoin public key has a corresponding private key which is used by the payer
to generate a digital signature when making a payment.
Bitcoin works in a slightly different way from other digital currencies by having a
globally broadcasted transaction record that links ownership to a Bitcoin instead of a
unique string that represents a coin [69, 163, 151].
A Bitcoin transaction is the process of transferring the monetary value attached
to a particular Bitcoin address by digitally signing a hash of a previous transaction
together with the next owners public Bitcoin address and adding this record to the
shared ledger. The ownership is transferred from one address to the other by using this
chain of signatures. This links past transactions to the present ones.
The transaction verification and creating new blocks by the Bitcoin miners is made
a fair and non-trivial task by introducing a Proof of Work method, a concept first
introduced by Adam Back in 2002 as a counter-measure against unsolicited junk mail
and denial of service attacks [42]. Peers who engage in this process are called Bitcoin
miners and miners are rewarded for their computation. This concept was implemented
by Bitcoin making the peers to generate a hash less than a target value with a certain
number of zero bits at the beginning of the hash. Generating a hash that has a certain
number of zero bits at the beginning is a difficult task that takes computational time.
The work needed increases exponentially as the required number of zero bits in the
beginning increases. As a result, a constructed block cannot be easily changed [53, 147].
Based on the consensus mechanism, nodes in the network accept the longest blockchain.
Because of this, to include a manipulated block the attacker needs to re-perform the
proof-of-work for the modified block and all subsequent blocks that appeared chrono-
logically. This is considered practically infeasible.
The need for having continues relationship with past transaction hashes to the
present ones incurs the need for storage space to store all the hashes. The system over
comes this drawback by making the transactions hashed in a Merkle Tree [139]. This
makes the hash only needing to record the Root Hash [147, 139].
Therefore, Bitcoin transaction security relies on the correctness of the Block Chain
[147, 53]. By looking at one’s Bitcoin address, the true identity of the user cannot
be revealed. However, due to the necessity of having to broadcast all transactions
publicly prevents the anonymity of Bitcoin payment transactions. This has become
a drawback and with the advancements in computational power and data analysis, it
may be possible to link Bitcoin transactions to real user identities [164, 44, 170, 203,
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124]. There have been several attempts to improve the security of Bitcoin recently.
These include techniques to address attacks on Bitcoin [44] and solutions to address
anonymity, such as Zerocoin which is a proposed distributed digital cash system that
acts as an extension to Bitcoin [141]. Furthermore, MasterCoin is a proposal to make
Bitcoin more stable and secure by adding a new protocol layer on top of Bitcoin to run
services [198].
2.2.3 Existing SMS Payment Systems and Bitcoin
In developing countries, SMS (Short Message Service) mobile payment systems have
been extremely successful. One such example is the popular M-PESA in Kenya [173].
The SMS approach has been extended to perform Bitcoin transactions e.g. Bitcoin
Currency (BTC) For SMS [28], where users can add Bitcoin to their online wallets using
SMS, and Coinapult Bitcoin SMS service [2] which a range of Bitcoin transactions can
be done1. However, the problem with these schemes is that all requires the users to
have online access to set up the Bitcoin wallets and to maintain them.
There have been attempts to integrate Bitcoin with SMS based payment systems
such as M-PESA in Kenya but failed because of business pressures [23, 205, 1]. However,
Bitwala offers a Bitcoin remittance transfer service to Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria
that uses mobile money services [27], but again, the user needs online access to their
Bitcoin Wallet.
Other proposals to carry out Bitcoin transactions using mobile phones require the
users to download smartphone apps to interact with online Bitcoin wallets e.g. BTC
Wallet [96], which is not feasible for the environment under discussion, both in terms
of equipment available and online access.
2.3 Anonymous and Fair-exchange Payment Schemes
In the previous section, we introduced Bitcoin. Anonymous payment schemes such
as Bitcoin helps realise anonymity and user privacy during payment transactions are
called Anonymous Payment Protocols. Digital Cash is a variant of anonymous payment
protocols [113]. Protocols that are built to achieve fairness in e-commerce transactions
are called Fair-exchange Protocols. A combined solution that would realise fairness as
well as anonymity is called an Anonymous Fair-exchange Payment Protocol. In the
next two sections, we carry out a discussion to identify these schemes.
1The Coinbase SMS service was discontinued in March 2017 in favour of their smartphone apps
[148].
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2.3.1 Anonymous Payment Schemes
Anonymous Payment Protocols provides anonymity to the payer during a payment and
improves privacy of the payment transaction. There are two main types of anonymous
payment systems: on-line payment systems and off-line payment systems. In an on-
line scheme the payer, payee and the bank requires an online connection at least once
during the protocol to verify the digital cash. The first on-line anonymous payment
system was proposed in 1985 [68]. In 1989 a new payment scheme was introduced that
uses a special type of user account called ‘standard values’ to achieve anonymity [62].
Supporting this, a new scheme that considerably reduces the size of these databases
was proposed in 1994 [63].
The significant aspect in off-line schemes is the fact that the Trusted Third Party
(TTP) does not have to be on-line during the protocol run between the payer and
the payee. Instead, the TTP verifies whether digital cash has been double-spent when
the payee presents the digital cash to the TTP to be deposited in to his/her account.
Chaum et al. proposed one of the first off-line anonymous digital cash schemes in late
1980’s [69]. Ferguson scheme is a digital cash system that falls under the category
of transferable cash [92]. DigiCash was a real world implementation, founded 1990 by
Chaum. However, the company did not succeed. CyberCash founded in 1994, provided
a wallet application and a micropayment system called CyberCoin designed with the
use of Netbill protocol [154]. Mondex is a digital cash system that is based on Smart
Card technology. The project was initiated in 1991 and at present Mondex is part of
the MasterCard worldwide suite of smartcard products. Mondex at first achieved a
good start, but could not expand as expected in to wider deployment [132].
2.3.2 Fair-exchange Schemes
E-commerce transactions most of the time involve buying and selling of electronic con-
tent, goods and services between parties that have no prior trust-relationships with
each other. This requires e-commerce payment, contract signing, digital content ex-
change, certified delivery protocol schemes and implementations to improve fairness
between involved parties. Fairness in e-commerce can be categorised as Weak and
Strong fairness.
Weak fairness is when in an electronic transaction between two parties, the honest
party can prove to a third party after the transaction protocol-run, that he/she followed
the protocol even though the dishonest party did not send or pay to the honest party
or aborted the protocol [162].
On the other hand, Strong fairness or True fairness ensures that, the protocol itself
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tries to avoid disputes and misbehaving of parties and resolve any disputes within the
protocol without reaching an external judge. These protocols make sure that due to
the misbehaviour of a dishonest party, a honest party engaged in a transaction does
not get penalised [40]. Due to this, either both parties are guaranteed to receive their
items or none of them receive anything.
When it comes to e-commerce scenarios such as exchanging electronic content, only
a few Anonymous Fair-exchange Protocols have been proposed [109, 208, 209, 207].
Depending the involvement of a trusted third party, fair-exchange protocols can be
divided in to two main categories.
Two party based protocols (Gradual-exchange)
These protocols do not rely on a TTP to achieve fairness but employ a process of
gradual exchange of several messages between the transacting parties to augment the
probability of fairness over the rounds of exchanged messages. Proposals include a
protocol based on bit-by-bit information exchange [58] and a system called the “1-out-
of-2 oblivious transfer protocol” [162]. In the above protocols, the party with the most
computational power than the other could gain advantage by conducting brute-force
attacks on received message to compute the remainder [47]. In 1990 a probabilistic
protocol was proposed as a solution [47]. However, the protocols discussed above lack
simultaneity of exchange and during the protocol, involved parties could misbehave for
their own advantage [162].
Protocols based on a Trusted Third Party
TTP based protocols can be classified into three main types depending on the TTP’s
involvement.
In-line TTP based protocols, involve the TTP to collect exchanged items, check
their accuracy and finally forward them to the intended parties. Proposals include, the
Believers Protocol which guarantees confirmation of sending and receiving of certified
electronic mail [43] and a protocol which adopts a TTP as a non-repudiation server
[72]. Strong fairness is provided because of the involvement of the TTP. However, to
manage and maintain large amounts of communicated messages, the TTP is required
to be readily available any-time which is considered a bottleneck.
On-line TTP based protocols have proven to be more efficient than in-line TTP
protocols due to the fact that, the TTP involves in the protocol run but not in every
transmitted message. However, the involved TTP still engages in the protocol run to
guarantee fairness by validating, storing and generating transmitted messages. The
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Netbill Protocol was one of the first protocols which achieved strong fairness [79].
Another protocol was proposed aiming at Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems to
achieve non-repudiation [206]. Zhou and Gollmann proposed another on-line protocol
which tried to reduce the workload of the TTP [210]. The protocol was designed to
provide evidence for the sender and the receiver, during the protocol run as well as after
completion. Zhang et al. proposed another protocol which would provide fair-exchange,
user anonymity and privacy payments over the internet [209].
Off-line TTP based protocols lets the transacting parties exchange products with-
out the involvement of a TTP unless transacting party misbehaves, prematurely aborts
or a communication failure happens. These protocols are also called “Optimistic Pro-
tocols”. The first optimistic protocol was proposed in 1989 [62]. An improved protocol
which allows exchange of two digital content between two parties was another proposal
[41]. The TTP in this protocol gathers enough evidence of a dishonest party to present
in front of a judge. Furthermore, an Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange Protocol
without Random Oracles has been proposed recently [106].
In this section, we carried out a background research on anonymous and fair-
exchange payment protocols. In the next section, we introduce formal analysis tools
that can be used to verify the security of cryptographic protocols.
2.4 Formal Analysis Tools
This section introduces formal analysis tools. Evaluating the security of a proposed
protocol is important to identify potential weaknesses and to improve the protocol by
addressing the identified weaknesses. The security requirements of a cryptographic
protocol can be evaluated using a formal analysis tools. These tools check for network
related attacks in the communication channel between the sender and the receiver.
Even though formal analysis is not the main focus of this thesis, we use it to show that
the protocols proposed in this thesis are secure and complete.
There are a number of formal analysis tools, such as: AVISPA, ProVerif, CasperFDR,
Tamarin and Scyther. Comparisons between a number of these tools are carried out
in [85, 82]. The comparisons in [85, 82], identified that, performance wise, ProVerif
was the fastest tools and Scyther came in close second but had the advantage of not
using approximations. Furthermore, Scyther also supported handling unbounded veri-
fications. The comparisons also found that, CasperFDR had an exponential behaviour
and was faster then AVISPA’s implementation called SAT-based Model Checker tool
(Sat-MC) for a smaller number of protocol runs. Furthermore, AVISPA was found to
be slower then other analysis tools and had the drawback of not being able to display
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an attack tree [85, 82]. We use CasperFDR and Scyther for formally analysing our
protocols in this thesis. Our choice of these two tools were mainly based on the usabil-
ity aspect. Both tools provide a Graphical User Interface (GUI), ease of modelling the
protocol and clear outputs. From the two selected tools, Scyther provides verification
of synchronisation as an additional security claim of a given protocol. Furthermore, we
found Scyther to be user friendly and provided easy installations for Microsoft, Linux
and Mac operating systems.
The combination of CasperFDR and Scyther used in this thesis for mechanical for-
mal analysis are sufficient to verify the security claims of the proposed protocols. More
specifically, the tools are capable of analysing security claims such as: Confidentiality,
Integrity, Aliveness (Alive), Weak agreement (Weakagree), Non-injective agreement
(Niagree) Non-injective synchronisation (Nisynch), Secrecy of data (Secret), etc. un-
der the Dolev-Yao adversarial model in associated protocols [87, 81, 80].
Another type of alternative formal analysis technique is called Probabilistic Model
Checking, mainly used for analysing quantitative properties such as: reliability, respon-
siveness or resource usage [127]. Tools developed to carry out quantitative analysis us-
ing probabilistic model checking include: PRISM [126, 128] and The Markov Reward
Model Checker (MRMC) [120, 119]. These tools are used for analysing quantitative
properties of systems that exhibit probabilistic behaviour such as: communication loss
in a wireless channel, identifying the probability of a component of a system (e.g airbag,
brakes, network sensor) failing, etc.
Our main objective of the thesis is to enhance the security of payment transactions.
Quantitative analysis is not the main focus of the thesis. Therefore, the selection of
formal analysis tools were based on the capability of verifying the security claims of
the proposed protocols. The CasperFDR and Scyther mechanical formal analysis tools
used in the thesis are suitable and capable of verifying the security requirements.
2.4.1 CasperFDR
The security requirements of a cryptographic protocol can be analysed using the process
algebra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) introduced in [105] to produce a
description of a protocol system and its model checker Failures-Divergence Refinement
(FDR) [171]. As the process of producing a description of a system in CSP is time
consuming, a combined solution which is called CasperFDR was proposed in [129].
CasperFDR uses the Dolev-Yao threat model in [87] for the security verification of
protocols. In Dolev-Yao threat model, the adversary is assumed to have full control
over the communication channel where, the adversary has capability to impersonate
other users, intercept and modify communicated messages.
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The security protocol can be modelled as an abstract using a text editor and pro-
vided as input to Casper. The tool then produces a CSP description of the protocol in
a .csp file. Then the .csp file can be verified by FDR which outputs potential attacks
and weaknesses if detected. CasperFDR uses Running and Commit events to verify
the authenticity of communication between two entities. The Running is executed by
the receiver after receiving a message by the sender and the Commit is executed by the
sender after receiving a reply by the receiver. When verifying security requirements,
CasperFDR uses the Claim event. For example, the secrecy of communicated data can
be verified using Claim Secret. This makes a protocol-run between the sender and the
receiver to complete.
When verifying the security of a protocol using CasperFDR, an input script that
has two main parts of the modelled protocol needs to be submitted. The first part
of this script provides the protocol definition. In more detail, this defines the com-
municating entities and their initial knowledge of components related to the protocol
messages. #Free variables is used to define users, variables and functions used in the
protocol. #Protocol description is used to model the protocol messages, their content
and the sequence they are transmitted. After this, the #Processes declares the roles of
different entities used in the CSP process (INITIATOR, RESPONDER, SERVER) and
provides their initial knowledge (using the term ‘knows’) of values at the beginning of
the protocol. The next input in the script is #Specifications which defines the security
requirement such as: agreement for authentication and secret for confidentiality of the
analysed protocol.
The second part provides the system definition. In more specifically, this defines
the actual entities in the system, attackers knowledge and capabilities. The #Actual
variables also referred to as #Type definitions defines the names of the entities to be
used in the FDR verification. They are similar to the ones listed in #Free variables.
Additionally the Intruder is also defined as a participant in the protocol. Next, the
functions such as public/private keys used by the entities of the protocol are defined
using #Functions. The #System is used to declare the entities of the protocol with
their actual names and knowledge. Finally, the name of the intruder and the intruder’s
knowledge of other entities in the protocol and values communicated are declared in
#Intruder.
2.4.2 Scyther
Scyther is a formal analysis tool that can be used to verify the security requirements
of a cryptographic protocol [80, 81]. Scyther is capable of analysing a protocol for an
unbounded number of instances compared to other formal analysis tools in [85, 82]. The
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Scyther tool can be installed in a number of operating systems including: Microsoft
Windows, Linux and Mac OSX, where as CasperFDR only supports Linux. The Scyther
tool has a user friendly GUI with menu tabs to run verifications from an input file,
read help information and change settings related to set the verification parameters.
Scyther mainly uses the Dolev-Yao threat model in [87] for the security verification of
protocols. However, Scyther can support other threat models.
The description of a protocol can be modelled and provided as input to Scyther
using the Security Protocol Description Language (SPDL) defined in [81]. In the input
.spdl file, the functions, variables and constants of the protocol are declared at the
beginning. The usertype command generate new data types. The spdl provides three
main protocol modelling features: roles, events and claims. The entities in a protocol
are described using a set of roles, which characterise events. The send and receive
operations are classed as send and recv events respectively; each corresponding send
and recv event has the same sequence number.
In the script roles is used to declare entities communicating in the protocol and
a role can execute multiple protocol-runs. The variables used to store received values
are defined in Var and newly generated parameters are declared by Fresh. The Macro
can be used to replace a set of values that are repeatedly used in a protocol by an
abbreviation. The Ticket can be used to replace an unknown value.
The security requirements and objectives of a protocol that require verification are
specified using claim events. More specifically, the secrecy of data is verified using se-
cret. Security requirements related to authentication are verified by: Alive for aliveness
of a protocol run, Weakagree for weak agreement, Niagree for non-injective agreement
and Nisynch for non-injective synchronisation [81, 80]. Aliveness means that, a re-
ceiver successfully completes a protocol with a sender, then the sender has previously
been running the protocol. Non-injective synchronisation means that the send and
receive events happens to the expected sequence. Non-injective agreement means that
the communicating entities agree with the communicated content at the end of the
protocol run.
After verification, an output summary is provided. If a potential attack is identified
by Scyther, it outputs a graph detailing the attack in addition to the summary.
2.5 Summary
In this Chapter we first presented the background research related to EMV based
centralised payment systems. More significantly, we introduced aspects in the EMV
payment architecture such as: EMV OPV process, Tokenisation and operating envi-
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ronments.
Following this, the background related to Bitcoin/blockchain based distributed pay-
ments was presented. Under this category, we gave an detailed introduction to Bitcoin
and blockchain technology. In both the centralised and distributed payments discussed
in this chapter, we investigated the main features/aspects inherent in each payment
architecture and explored their operating environments.
After this, we discussed anonymous and fair-exchange payment protocols. We car-
ried out a discussion to explain why these protocol are important in e-commerce based
payment transactions. Finally, we introduced mechanical formal analysis tools and how
these methods can be used to evaluate the security of our proposed protocols.
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In this chapter, we present our first contribution of the thesis under the
EMV based centralised payment category. We first discuss the EMV Online
PIN Verification (OPV) process and explain how OPV can be deployed in
two methods (Segmented and Unified Authorisation) in the current EMV
payment architecture. We then reflect upon the indelible trust assumptions
placed on the intermediaries in the EMV payment architecture. In this
chapter, we focus our attention on the Segmented Authorisation method
and identify potential attack scenarios that can compromise the security of
the OPV process when these trust assumptions are scrutinised. Addressing
these potential issues, we then propose a number of solutions that improve
the security of OPV process in Segmented Authorisation method.
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3.1 Introduction
In Section 2.1.1, a brief introduction to EMV and its architecture was given. The PIN
verification process in an online authorisation environment is called the Online-PIN
Verification (OPV). An introduction to OPV is given in Section 2.1.2. Investigating
the OPV process is the main focus of this chapter. In our investigation, we elaborate on
the indelible trust assumptions placed on the intermediaries (subcontractors) between a
payment terminal and the scheme operator/card issuing bank. This trust assumption,
makes rest of the participants in the payment architecture assume that the intermedi-
aries are trusted and secure. When this trust (assumption) is scrutinised, we discuss a
potential attack scenario that can be used by a financial fraudster to compromise PIN
related information.
We further discuss how this information can be used by the fraudster to carry out
an online PIN approved transaction without the involvement of the genuine cardholder
but with the correct PIN. We then propose three solutions based on the existing OPV
process that defend against these attacks. The proposed improvements are then imple-
mented to measure any incurred performance penalties. In our practical implementa-
tion as detailed in section 3.4.2, however, we implement and measure the performance
penalties of both symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods proposed in each of
our solutions. The results of performance measurements are included in Tables 3.7. Fi-
nally we subject the proposed protocol to mechanical formal analysis using CasperFDR
to evaluate the security guarantees.
In Section 3.1.2 we explain why securing the PIN is vital for all the stakeholders at
different levels of the payment architecture. To secure PIN and associated transaction
details, modern payment terminals are designed to be secure and tamper resistant
[159, 13, 133].
In section 2.1.1, we explained how EMV supports oﬄine and online PIN verification
methods. In the oﬄine PIN verification, the PIN is verified by the payment card and
in OPV the PIN is verified by the authorisation entity. The PIN verification carried
out by the authorisation entity is considered as having a higher assurance level then
the PIN verified by the payment card. This is because the CIB as the entity that issues
the payment card also sets the PIN and manages any PIN changes for each particular
customer. The main focus of this chapter is the PIN verification carried out by the
authorisation entity which is referred to as OPV.
The financial institutions especially the banks suffer significant financial loss due
to payment card fraud [93, 150, 37, 174, 140, 181]. The main focus of this Chapter
is to improve the security of OPV process which would help to prevent potential at-
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tack scenarios that we identify in our work. Preventing such attack scenarios would
significantly help improve the security of payment transactions and reduce the risk of
potential financial cost associated with such attacks if they are realised.
In the next section, we extend our discussion on EMV OPV and explain two different
methods how OPV process can be deployed in the current EMV payment architecture.
3.1.1 Two OPV Deployment Methods
In this section, we discuss the two different OPV methods that may be used in the
current EMV payment architecture. In our discussion, the two OPV methods are
differentiated based on whether OPV is carried out together with the online transaction
authorisation or as a separate authorisation. Then we explain how the OPV process
can be carried out at different stages of the overall EMV transaction, depending on the
selected deployment method.
Segmented Authorisation Method
In this section, the OPV process discussed in Chapter 3 is revisited. As explained
previously, in the Segmented Authorisation method, the OPV is carried out separately
to the online transaction authorisation. In order to explain this more clearly, we list
the transaction steps in this deployment method as follows:
1. The CTPOS first constructs the encrypted PIN block which contains the user’s
entered PIN.
2. The enciphered PIN block is then sent to the authorising entity to be verified.
The authorising entity could be the Scheme Operator (SO) or the Card Issuing
Bank (CIB).
3. If the PIN is verified correctly, the authorising entity sends a response message
back to the CTPOS confirming that the OPV was successful.
4. It is after this confirmation of the outcome of the OPV, that the CTPOS proceeds
to the online transaction authorisation.
5. The online transaction authorisation request contains the card generated Autho-
risation Request Cryptogram (ARQC).
6. The card generates a cryptogram and forwards it to the CTPOS.
7. The CTPOS sends the cryptogram in an online transaction authorisation request
to the authorising entity.
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8. The authorisation entity verifies the cryptogram and sends a response message
to the terminal indicating whether the transaction was approved or declined.
As we can see, in the Segmented Authorisation method, the OPV process initi-
ated and completed before the transaction authorisation. This separation of the two
processes raised a few security concerns that we discuss in subsequent sections. The
proposed solutions that addresses the potential attack scenarios related to the Seg-
mented Authorisation Method was previously presented in Section 3.3.
Unified Authorisation Method
In this section, we introduce the second deployment method which is different to the one
we discussed above. The differentiating factor is mainly related to the communication
sequence of the OPV and the transaction authorisation. In contrast to the Segmented
Authorisation method, in the Unified Authorisation method that we introduce here,
the OPV is carried out together with the online transaction authorisation. To explain
this more clearly, we list the transaction steps in this deployment method as follows:
1. Similar to the previous method, the CTPOS first constructs the encrypted PIN
block which contains the user’s entered PIN.
2. Instead of sending the enciphered PIN block to the authorising entity separately,
in this instance the CTPOS requests the ARQC from the card.
3. Once the ARQC is received, the CTPOS constructs a unified message which
includes the OPV and the online transaction authorisation requests.
4. The online transaction authorisation request contains the card generated ARQC.
5. The ARQC together with the enciphered PIN block is then sent to the SO/CIB.
6. After receiving the request messages, the SO/CIB conducts OPV and online
transaction authorisation. The outcomes of both verifications are then sent back
to the CTPOS in a response message.
As we can see, in the Unified Authorisation method, the OPV process and the
transaction authorisation is carried out together in the same message sequence. In this
section, we explained both the Segmented and Unified Authorisation methods. In the
next section, we explain a potential issue that raise concerns regarding the security of
OPV process.
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3.1.2 Problem Statement
In the current EMV architecture in which OPV process is carried out, there are a
number of intermediary entities in the communication path between the CTPOS and
the SO/CIB. The EVM Card Specification Book 4 recommends and outlines why this
communication should be adequately protected [16].
By examining the OPV process used in the ATM transaction architecture [195] and
referring the literature in [49, 131, 65], it is clear that first the CTPOS requests the
PIN from the cardholder. Once the PIN is received the CTPOS encrypts it before
forwarding the encrypted PIN details to the authorisation entity for verification.
During a transaction, the CTPOS encrypts the PIN using a symmetric key shared
between the terminal and the first point of contact (which is not necessarily the
SO/CIB) in the communication channel towards the SO/CIB. It must be noted that
the symmetric key used to encrypt the PIN between the CTPOS and the first point of
contact can also be a session key. We explain this process which is also termed as the
key-translation in Section 2.1.2. The same key-translation mechanism is used by the
first point of contact to forward the PIN to the next entity in the communication path
towards the SO/CIB.
We explained the EMV OPV process in section 2.1.2. There is another process in
EMV called the “transaction authorisation” which is used to decide whether a partic-
ular transaction can be authorised or declined. As part of this process, during a trans-
action the payment card generates a message to request authorisation to a particular
transaction by the authorization entity which is called the transaction authorisation
message. In the EMV specification, this authorisation request is called the ARQC.
However, the current payment process has no binding between the ARQC and the
OPV process [14, 13, 15, 16].
The ARQC is encrypted by a symmetric key shared between the payment card and
the authorisation entity. The encrypted fields include a number EMV tags that are
standardised parameters in the EMV specification. In EVM Card Specification Book
4, it details that one of these tags is the Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) which
indicates the method used to verify a cardholder during the transaction [16]. Normally
the cardholder verification is carried out before the transaction authorisation.
The CVM is a tag that is three bytes in length. The bytes indicates: the CVM
performed, CVM conditions and CVM results [16, see: p49]. When it comes to infor-
mation related to the OPV process in the CVM tag, the only information related to
the OPV is a single binary value that is set to 1 if CVM was performed at the start of
a payment transaction [15, see: p162]. As we can see in both the CVM or the ARQC,
there are no tags/parameters that binds the OPV process with the associated ARQC.
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Another key observation that we understand is that during an OPV, the PIN is
handled (creating a PIN block to be sent to the authorising entity for approval) only
on the PIN entry device which in this case the CTPOS and the payment card is not
informed about the PIN value entered on the CTPOS.
The risk associated with the weaknesses and shortcomings that we briefly outlined
above is realised if an adversary compromises one of the intermediaries that engage
in the key-translation process between the CTPOS and the authorisation entity. Such
compromise would lead to the adversary obtaining details such as PIN and associated
payment transaction related information to carry out further financial fraud.
The adversary at the compromised entity will be able to observe OPV messages
that include PINs and associated Primary Account Numbers (PAN). By obtaining such
information, the attacker is now in a position to carry out an OPV-based transaction
at a merchant’s premises with a stolen card for which the adversary has previously
obtained the relevant PIN. This way an attacker can perform an EMV transaction that
requires online approval at a CTPOS.
As indicated in reports [45, 117, 118], the notion of an attacker being able to
compromise an intermediary in the payment architecture is not hypothetical or too far-
fetched. It is important not to underestimate such scenarios for the overall improvement
of the payment system.
3.1.3 Contributions
In this chapter we propose solutions that enhance the security of EMV OPV process by
addressing the aforementioned security concerns that we briefly identified. Our main
contributions for this chapter are two fold. The first contribution is the proposed en-
hanced OPV process that proposes three separate solutions to protect the PIN details.
The second contribution is how we bind the OPV with the respective ARQC in an
online transaction authorisation scenario.
1. To protect the PIN we have proposed an enhanced OPV process using:
(a) Card-based solution with symmetric cryptography.
(b) Card-based solution with asymmetric cryptography.
(c) Payment terminal-based solution with asymmetric cryptography.
2. Binding each OPV with the associated ARQC.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 the payment
networks operating environment is outlined and the attacker’s capabilities and potential
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attack vectors for compromising the OPV process is discussed. In section 3.3, the
three potential countermeasures that address the security concerns are provided. The
proposed solutions are then analysed in section 3.4. Finally, concluding remarks are
provided in section 3.5.
3.2 Potential Concerns
In this section, we discuss the operating environment and make assumptions related to
the OPV process. Following this, we introduce our attack model, explain the attacker’s
capabilities and examine two potential risk scenarios.
3.2.1 Operating Environment and Assumptions
The operating environment of the OPV process is illustrated in Figure 3.1. As we
previously discussed, the PTO can represent a number of entities such as the acquiring
banks, subcontractors or third parties. In Figure 3.1, these intermediaries are outlined
with a dotted rectangle. In OPV, the communication path between the payment termi-
nal and the authorisation entity (i.e. SO/CIB) may consist of numerous intermediaries
such as: the acquirers’ subcontractors who operate CTPOS devices, third party PTO
and other entities that engage in key translation (where messages are enciphered and
deciphered from node to node).
A PTO might issue or lease their payment terminals to a number of customers
(merchants). In our operating environment, however, we assume all the scenarios: the
PTO is a third party that manages the terminals, subcontractor or it is an acquiring
bank. The choice of who is the PTO does not affect our operating environment and the
risk scenarios discussed later. It must be noted that it is more likely that there can be
some additional nodes between the PTO and the scheme operators. These additional
nodes can be a number of entities in the communication path to the SO. In the event
of the PTO is a third party, one of these additional nodes must be the acquiring bank.
Figure 3.1: OPV Operating Enviroment
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As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the SO is directly connected with the CIB and has a
secure communication channel. The arrows connect two entities with each other and
the arrowhead indicated the direction of the message flow. Furthermore, each arrow
connecting two entities uses a unique session key to secure the communication between
those two entities.
The key-translation process is performed by each intermediary and SO until the
OPV message is received by the CIB. In some scenarios, the SO performs the OPV
verification on behalf of the CIB. However, in this chapter we are not considering such
scenarios. However, the risk scenarios that we discuss in this chapter is not affected
by this. The terminal, each intermediary node and scheme operator will perform key
translation until the OPV message is delivered to the CIB.
The following entities are considered to be trusted and secure in this study: the
smart cards, payment terminals, SO and the CIB. The rationale for this consideration
was discussed in Section 3.4.1. However, any intermediary that might be connected
to the public internet is considered to have the potential to be compromised. This
assumption can be considered reasonable by referring to past incident reports [45, 117,
118, 54, 110, 125]. In one incident attackers were able to successfully infiltrate sensitive
information from the banking sector [118].
Here, we gave an overview of the operating environment. In the next section, we
outline the capabilities of the attacker after taking into consideration the operating
environment, the assumptions made about the intermediaries and other entities in the
payment architecture.
3.2.2 Attacker’s Capability
The capabilities of the adversary are listed below:
1. Has the capability to compromise any of the intermediary nodes.
2. Has the capability to access the OPV communication in plaintext on the compro-
mised intermediary node. As in the operating environment discussed in section
3.2.1, individual intermediary nodes perform a key translation process, which in
essence decrypts the ingress message and then encrypts, with a new key, the
egress message.
3. Can not break the standard1 (strong) encryption algorithms.
4. Can not compromise the smart cards, payment terminals, scheme operator or
CIB.
1Standardised in the relevant up to date statement
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5. Might collude with other adversaries that steal smart cards from genuine card-
holders.
In the next subsequent sections, the report describe two potential risk scenarios.
The attacker capabilities identified above is taken into account in the discussion.
3.2.3 Two Potential Risk Scenarios
In this section, a discussion is carried out about two potential risk scenarios that
pose a threat to the security of payment transactions. In the identification of these
attacks the operating environment of the payment network, the assumptions made
and the capabilities of the adversary are taken into consideration. Successful attacks
that we describe below might result in compromise of the OPV process and the online
transaction authorisation.
It must be noted that for the authorisation entity or CIB, it might be extremely
challenging to detect the fraudulent transaction during the payment stage or even
after the transaction has taken place. This is because there is a trust assumption in
the payment network that numerous intermediary nodes are trusted and the adversary
compromises one of these intermediaries. Therefore, it is difficult to pinpoint where the
payment data was compromised and how. Furthermore, once the fraudulent transaction
appears in the bank statements the genuine cardholder will deny making any payment
and claim a refund from the CIB. There is a considerable financial loss associated with
this type of fraud for the CIB.
Correct PIN in OPV Message
The first risk scenario is outlined in this section. In the operating environment of
the payment architecture, we outlined that the adversary has complete access to the
compromised intermediary node and can observe all the transactional messages that
pass through the compromised node. The steps involved in the compromise of the
payment transaction in the first risk scenario is listed below.
1. First, the adversary observes the communication passing through the compro-
mised intermediary node and builds a database of PIN numbers. This database
contains the Primary Account Number (PAN) and associated PIN.
2. A malicious accomplice M of the adversary steals a smart card. The adversary
matches the cards PAN with the database. If a match is found then the adversary
and the accomplice know the associated PIN. Before the card gets blocked by the
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CIB, the accomplice presents the card to a (genuine) payment terminal, enters
the correct PIN and can perform online or oﬄine payment transactions.
The risk associated with the compromise is exacerbated if the relevant compromised
details are cloned into a magnetic strip card and then used with the compromised
correct PIN. The cloned magmatic strip card are then used in countries that have not
yet fully migrated to the Chip & PIN payment scheme. This has led to a significant
increase in card payment fraud that has been carried out abroad on payment cards that
have been issued in countries already using the Chip & PIN scheme [93]. Most of the
countries that have not migrated to the Chip & PIN scheme are still using magnetic
stripe payment. Mostly all magnetic strip payment transactions are approved online
and this includes the OPV as well. As we have explained in this risk scenario, the
adversary is able to compromise the correct PIN and related data. With the correct
PIN already being compromised, an adversary is able to successfully prove knowledge
of the cardholder’s PIN to the authorisation entity during a fraudulent transaction
carried out by a cloned magnetic stripe card.
OPV Response Message
In the second risk scenario, a payment transaction may potentially be compromised in
the following manner:
1. A malicious accompliceM of the adversary steals a smart card and then presents
this card to a payment terminal that uses an intermediary node that is under total
control of the adversary.
2. M selects the payment terminal in a manner that will opt in for the OPV process.
3. The payment terminal requests the cardholder (M) to enter his PIN. M enters
any random sequence at the payment terminal. The terminal then encrypts this
entered PIN and sends it to the authorisation entity over the network.
4. The adversary captures this message. Whether it allows the message to go for-
ward to the authorisation entity or not makes no difference. Authorisation entities
(e.g. scheme operators and CIBs) do not link the OPV process with the online
transaction authorisation (i.e. ARQC [16]). The adversary then replays a suc-
cessful OPV verification response message generated by the CIB (observed in
previous genuine transactions) back to the terminal. The adversary has observed
this successful message in previous runs of the OPV process and can just replay
it to the payment terminal.
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5. The payment terminal will receive a successful PIN verification message and pro-
ceeds to request the smart card to generate an online transaction authorisation
message (i.e. ARQC) in the 1st GENERATE AC command [14]. The card gen-
erated ARQC is then sent to the authorisation entity. The authorisation entity
verifies the ARQC and does a credit check on the users account. If satisfied, the
authorisation entity generates an Authorisation Response Code (ARC). The ARC
is then XORed with the ARQC and then enciphered using the session key shared
with the card to construct an Authorisation Response Cryptogram (ARPC) to
approve the transaction. The ARPC is then sent back to the CTPOS. The ARPC
could also be in the form of a Message Authentication Code (MAC).
6. The CTPOS forwards the ARPC to the card and requests an outcome in the
2nd GENERATE AC command [14]. The card after verifying the valid ARPC,
generates a Transaction Certificate (TC) and sends it to the CTPOS.
7. CTPOS now accepts the card transaction and either sends the TC straight for
payment processing or stores it for payment processing at a later time. The attack
is possible due to lack of strong binding between the OPV and the ARQC.
In this section, we outlined two main risk scenarios and walked through each poten-
tial payment transaction compromise. The discussed risk scenarios defines the threat
model, in which our proposed solutions are based. The solutions that address the
security concerns discussed above are presented in the next section.
3.3 Proposed Solutions
In this section, we present three proposed solutions that address the aforementioned
risk scenarios that were discussed in Section 3.2. Overall the solutions are proposed to
guarantee the end-to-end security of OPV process between the payment card and the
issuing bank.
When constructing the solutions, we have taken into consideration the overhead
it adds on the intermediaries in a practical term. Therefore, the proposed solutions
introduce minimal or no changes to the operational/system architecture of the inter-
mediaries involved in the current EMV payment scheme between the payment terminal
and the SO/CIB. Another reason for this consideration is that the CIB has no control
over the intermediaries and enforcing a system/process update on the intermediaries is
a challenging task.
To meet our objective, the changes require to apply the proposed improvements
are only made to the payment cards, the CIB and the CTPOS devices. The CIB has
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Payment Card Payment Terminal Intermediary Authoriser
SKT
OPVrq
OPVrq
OPVrq
OPVrp
OPVrp
OPVrp
Terminal Generated Session Key (SKT ), Online PIN Verification Request (OPVrq), Online PIN Verification
Response (OPVrp)
Figure 3.2: Generic OPV Protocol Sequence Diagram
complete ownership of the payment cards that are being issued to customers and their
back-end authorisation systems. This means any changes to the payment cards and the
back-end systems are within the capability of the CIB. Furthermore, it is considered
possible to apply the security improvements to the CTPOS devices (this may be carried
out by a software/hardware update) by requesting an update via the payment scheme.
We first introduce a generic OPV model that lays the foundation on which our
three proposed solutions are based. The generic model also makes it easier to explain
and describe the three proposed solutions more clearly. The protocol message flow of
the generic OPV model is illustrated in the protocol sequence diagram in Figure 3.2.
In the generic protocol, first the CTPOS sends the payment card a session key SKT
generated by the CTPOS and the PIN entered by the cardholder. The PIN is either
sent in plaintext or in enciphered format.
In the event of the PIN being sent to the card in the enciphered format, the CTPOS
can choose one of the following two methods depending on the scenario. They are:
1) the CTPOS could use the card’s public key recovered from the card’s public key
certificate, 2) if the payment card contains a dedicated key pair for PIN encipherment,
the CTPOS may use a card owned PIN encipherment public key.
However, it must be noted that if the PIN is sent enciphered in a PIN block, the
purpose of this message is for the card to retrieve the PIN, but not to respond to a
VERIFY command carried out in oﬄine PIN verification.
After successfully receiving the message from the CTPOS, the payment card con-
structs a PIN block which contains the PIN and details of the corresponding account
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number according to ISO-9564-1 & ISO-9564-2 [17, 9]. Table 3.1 lists the data included
in the OPV PIN Block.
The Unpredictable Numbers (UN) mentioned in this study have the same properties
as defined in the EMV specification [14]. A symmetric key shared with the authorisation
entity is used for the encipherment that is carried out inside the payment card. The
authorisation entity during a payment transaction could either be the SO or the CIB.
The encipherment is given a term called the OPV Encipherment PIN Block and has
the notation e{PB}.
In order to provide confidentiality to the PIN related data both OPV PIN Block
(PB) and the OPV PIN Result Block (PRB) are in the encrypted format. In the
encipherment of the PB and the PRB using a symmetric encryption algorithm, three
separate symmetric encipherment methods are used. The three encipherment methods
are listed and details given below;
1. Basic Encryption: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [115] as the sym-
metric encryption algorithm with Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) as the mode of
operation.
2. Encrypt-then-MAC: AES as the symmetric encryption algorithm with CFB
as the mode of operation and a key based Message Authentication Code (MAC)
computed using SHA256 [149] to provide integrity.
3. Authenticated Encryption: AES as the symmetric encryption algorithm and
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [135, 90] as the mode of operation is used as a
combined single operation to provide authenticated encryption.
In this section, three separate messages that detail each of the symmetric encryption
process are not given. Instead, it must be noted that the symmetric encipherment
of the OPV PIN Block with the notation “e{PB}” represents any one of the three
cryptographic processes listed above depending on which method is selected. The
same symmetric encipherment algorithm used to create the e{PB} is selected by the
CIB to encipher the PRB to create the enciphered OPV PIN Result Block “e{PRB}”.
For the symmetric encipherment of the OPV PIN Block in the generic protocol, we
use the basic encryption mode with three blocks of 16 bytes each with a total length
(L) of 48 bytes. The first block includes, 1 byte data header and 15 bytes of the random
number (UN) generated by the smart card. The second block includes, the remaining
1 byte of the random number, 8 byte PIN Block and 7 bytes of the CTPOS generated
session key. The third block includes, remaining 9 bytes of the CTPOS generated
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session key and 7 bytes of random padding. In our practical implementation of this,
we used 128bit - AES [115] with CFB as the mode of operation.
Table 3.1: OPV PIN Block (PB) in Segmented Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Card Unpredictable Number (CUN) : 16 Bytes.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 7 Bytes.
Following this an Online PIN Verification Request (OPVrq) message addressed to
the authorisation entity is constructed by the payment card. The message includes
a concatenation of the Primary Account Number (PAN) which is the long number
embossed on the payment card, and the encipherment of the OPV PIN Block e{PB}.
A session key shared between the payment card and the CIB is used to encipher the
e{PB}.
OPV rq = PAN ||e{PB}
The constructed OPVrq is then sent to the CTPOS. Once the message is received by
the CTPOS, it encrypts the PIN-related data by following the existing EMV process.
For this the CTPOS uses the key it shares with the next entity on the communication
path. This entity could be the acquiring bank or an intermediary in the EMV payment
architecture. In a similar manner the OPVrq is then forwarded from entity to entity
until the authoriser is reached.
Once the request is received by the authorisation entity, it deciphers the e{PB} by
retrieving the shared session key it holds in its records. The authorisation entity then
verifies the recovered PIN with the PIN it holds for the cardholder in its record. If
the PIN validates successfully the outcome is included in an OPV PIN Result Block
(PRB). The data included in the PRB is listed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: OPV PIN Result Block (PRB) in Segmented Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
Authoriser Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 10 Bytes.
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The Authoriser then constructs the OPVrp. This message is in enciphered format.
We use the basic encryption mode with three blocks of 16 bytes each for the encipher-
ment (128bit AES). Therefore, the last block was included with 10 bytes of random
padding. It is the encipherment of the PRB using the session key SKT of the CTPOS.
The notation below is used to show the symmetric encryption of PRB using the key
SKT .
OPV rp = e{PRB}
The constructed OPVrp is then sent to the same communication path, which may
go through the same acquirer and intermediaries in the current EMV architecture. The
OPVrp is pushed until it is reached by the CTPOS. The message is then deciphered
by the CTPOS to obtain the PIN verification result.
The CTPOS transfers this message to the payment card once the CTPOS is sat-
isfied with the OPVrp. Based on our threat model, the payment card, CTPOS and
scheme operator/CIB are assumed to be trusted entities. EMV transaction authorisa-
tion continues following the OPV process described above.
3.3.1 Card based Solutions
In this section, we discuss the proposed solutions that are mainly based on the payment
card. In the card-based solution, the encipherment of the PB happens inside the
payment card before it is forwarded to the CIB (Authoriser in our generic model) to be
verified. The card-based solutions are further sub-categorised, depending on whether
a symmetric or an asymmetric cryptographic key is used to encipher the PB.
Card uses an online-PIN encipherment symmetric key of the CIB
The solution described here introduces an online-PIN encipherment symmetric key
KOPV that the payment card shares with the CIB. From the KOPV , a session key
KSOPV is derived using a key derivation function similar to the one specified in EMV
specification [14, see: p127 - p131] and also discussed in [133]. It is assumed that the
session key derivation between the card and the CIB is synchronised.
During a payment carried out using this solution, first the card is inserted to the
CTPOS. Then the cardholder entered PIN is sent to the payment card. The PIN is
sent either in clear or in encrypted format. The CTPOS also sends the session key
SKT . The OPV process in this solution follows exactly the same steps as described in
the generic OPV model above. Considering the ownership of the payment card by the
CIB, the necessary changes are under the control of the CIB.
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Card uses an online-PIN encipherment public key of the CIB
Previously we described a solution that is based on a symmetric key. The solution
described here introduces an online-PIN encipherment public key POPVCIB of the CIB.
It must be noted that this is not the CIB’s public key that is recovered from the CIB’s
public key certificate residing in the card during EMV transactions. The POPVCIB in
this solution refers to a specific online-PIN encipherment public key introduced in our
construction.
This particular cryptographic key is stored in the payment card by the CIB during
card personalisation. It is in the format of a public key certificate that has been signed
by the CIB.
During a payment transaction in this solution, there are similar steps as in the
generic model. First, the CTPOS sends a session key SKT and the PIN entered by
the cardholder either in plain text or in enciphered format to the card. The card then
constructs the PB-1. Table 3.3 lists the data included in the PB-1. In this occasion,
PB-1 is enciphered using the public key POPVCIB to generate the enciphered OVP PIN
Block that has the notation z{PB-1}. For the implementation of the public key-based
solutions, we selected 1048bit RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) [176] with random
padding generated by the selected PRNG. The included random padding was based on
the Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS #1 v1.5) for RSA [116]. The required
random padding of non-zero randomly generated bytes was calculated as follows: 256
bytes (the public key length) deducted by 44 bytes (the message length of 41 bytes and
3 bytes for separating the padding).
Table 3.3: OPV PIN Block -1 (PB-1) in Segmented Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number (CUN) : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 212 Bytes.
Following this, the OPVrq is constructed by the payment card. This message also
includes the PAN and the public key encipherment of PB-1.
OPV rq = PAN ||z{PB − 1}
The constructed OPVrq is then sent to the CTPOS. The CTPOS device now follows
the existing EMV process and encrypts the PIN-related data with the key it shares with
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the next entity on the communication path. This way the OPVrq is forwarded until
the CIB is reached.
Once the message is received by the CIB, it is deciphered to obtain the PIN related
data and verifies whether the PIN is correct. The outcome of the PIN verification is
included in an OPV PIN Result Block (PRB-1). The content of the (PRB-1) is listed
in Table 3.4
Table 3.4: OPV PIN Result Block -1 (PRB-1) in Segmented Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
CIB Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 10 Bytes.
Following this, the OPVrp is constructed by the CIB. This is the encipherment of
the PRB-1 using the session key SKT of CTPOS.
OPV rp = e{PRB − 1}
The constructed OPVrp is sent back via the same communication path until the
CTPOS is reached. Once the message reaches the CTPOS, the CTPOS deciphers the
e{PRB-1} to obtain the CVR. The CVR is then verified and if the verification is
successful, the CVR is passed to the payment card. EMV transaction authorisation
continues following the OPV process we described above.
3.3.2 Terminal based Solutions
In this section we present the terminal based solution that improves the security of the
OPV process. In this solution, before the PIN block is sent to the CIB, it is enciphered
at the CTPOS. This method is different to the previous two solutions that we discussed
as the PIN entered by the cardholder is not sent to the card but instead enciphered in
the CTPOS.
Terminal uses an online-PIN encipherment public key of the CIB
In order to carry out the OPV PIN Block encipherment in the CTPOS, this solution
introduces an online-PIN encipherment public key POPVCIB of the CIB. A public key
certificate is used to store the POPVCIB as in the previous Section 3.3.1. The certificate
is given to the CTPOS during a payment transaction.
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During a transaction, the card provides; the CIB’s public key certificate (also known
as the card key) signed by a Certification Authority (CA) and the CIB’s online-PIN
encipherment public key certificate signed by the CIB. To verify the authenticity of
the CIB’s public key to have been signed by the CA, the CTPOS uses the CA’s public
verification key. The CTPOS used the CIB’s public verification key to verify that the
POPVCIB recovered by the certificate was signed by the CIB.
The CTPOS then uses the POPVCIB to create the public key encipherment of PB-2
that has the notation z{PB-2}. Table 3.5 includes the data fields included in the OPV
PIN Block PB-2.
Table 3.5: OPV PIN Block -2 (PB-2) in Segmented Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
CTPOS Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 212 Bytes.
Following this the OPVrq is constructed by the CTPOS. The message includes the
PAN and the public key encipherment of the OPV PIN Block as detailed below.
OPV rq = PAN ||z{PB − 2}
Following the communication path towards the CIB, the OPVrq is then sent from
one entity to the other. Once the OPVrq is received by the CIB, the z{PB-2} is
deciphered and the PIN entered by the cardholder is verified whether to be correct
or not. The outcome of this verification is included in a CVR. Afterwards, the CIB
constructs the OPV PIN Result Block (PRB-2) as shown in Table 3.6 .
Table 3.6: OPV PIN Result Block -2 (PRB-2) in Segmented Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
CIB Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 10 Bytes.
The CIB uses the session key SKT of CTPOS to encipher the PIN Result Block and
includes this in the OPVrp as shown below.
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OPV rp = e{PRB − 2}
The CIB uses the same communication path to send the OPVrp back to the CTPOS.
Once the message reaches the CTPOS, the PIN result block is deciphered and the CVR
is retrieved for verification. Once satisfied, the CTPOS will generate other commands
if the transaction proceeds to transaction authorisation.
3.3.3 Binding of OPV and Transaction Authorisation
In the current EMV process there seems to be no direct linkage between the OPV
process and the online transaction authorisation for a given EMV transaction. As
the two verifications are carried out separately in two different instances, this raises
a security concern. This leaves a space for replay attacks in which a harvested OPV
Response Message could be replayed or injected by the compromised intermediary
during an EMV transaction.
Both of our card-based and terminal-based proposals discussed in sections 3.3.1,
3.3.2 help to eliminate the aforementioned attacks by making a minor change to the
current EMV transaction authorisation message. In response to the GENERATE AC
command issued by the CTPOS in an EMV online transaction authorisation process,
the payment card generates an Authorisation Request Cryptogram (ARQC) [14, 15].
Here the payment card can include the Authoriser Unpredictable Number inside the
ARQC, which is a symmetric encipherment using the shared key between the card and
the Authoriser. The Authoriser Unpredictable Number is sent back to the CTPOS in
the OPV PIN Result Block (PRB) as discussed in our generic OPV model in Section 3.3
and shown in Table 3.2.
Once the ARQC is received, the authoriser deciphers it. The Authoriser can use
the Authoriser Unpredictable Number that it keeps a record of to link the previously
verified OPV to the received transaction authorisation request. This gives assurance to
the Authoriser that this is a genuine and timely transaction. The Authoriser may also
include a combined verification result inside the Authorisation Response Cryptogram
(ARPC) when the ARPC is sent back to the card.
3.3.4 Our Experience Related to EMV Specifications
The proposed solutions improves the security of the OPV process within the threat
model identified in Section 3.2.3. Improving the OPV would mean that the strong
trust assumptions that are placed on the intermediary nodes can now be relaxed. The
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solutions are categorised into card-based and terminal-based solutions depending on
which entity the PIN block encipherment occurs in during OPV.
We have carried out a thorough research and studied the EMV specifications to
learn and understand PIN block construction. The EMV specifications do not provide
any details in regard to the PIB block construction and encipherment of the OPV
[13, 14, 15, 16]. However, one of the EMV specifications details the process of PIN
block construction and encipherment that happens at the CTPOS during an oﬄine PIN
verification process which is different to the OPV [14]. In an oﬄine PIN verification,
the CTPOS sends the enciphered PIN to the card to be verified [14].
Furthermore, in our study, standards such as ISO-9564-1 & ISO-9564-1 and similar
guidelines given in [195, 17, 9] were referred. These documents make recommendations
on how PINs and associated account information need to be protected during trans-
mission from one system to another. Since there is no publicly available standard on
how PIN block construction and encipherment should be carried out in OPV, we have
made reasonable assumptions in our PIN block construction and encipherment.
3.4 Analysis
In this section, the proposed solutions presented in the previous section are evaluated
for their security and performance. Firstly, the security of the proposed solutions is
evaluated while taking into consideration the attacker’s capability. Afterwards, perfor-
mance measurements are taken to show the potential penalties for the existing process
if they are adopted.
3.4.1 Security Analysis
Before we begin are analysis the capabilities of the adversary outlined in section 3.2.2 is
revisited. According to this, a malicious user (adversary) has the capability of compro-
mising an intermediary entity. However, the adversary cannot compromise the smart
cards, payment terminals, scheme operator, or CIB. This limitation is imposed be-
cause if an adversary can successfully compromise any of these entities then almost no
protection mechanism would be strong enough to protect against attacks on the OPV
process. The rationale behind this is described below:
1. During an oﬄine PIN-based transaction, the payment card uses the copy of the
cardholder PIN it securely stores in its tamper resistant chip to compare with the
value entered by the cardholder. If an adversary can break the tamper resistant
smart card to access the PIN, then he could potentially access any other infor-
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mation on it, thus rendering any countermeasure, including ours, redundant. In
such scenario, the attacker is able to clone a completely new card with the details
and perform a transaction with the correct PIN.
2. If an attacker has the capability of successfully compromising a payment terminal,
then the attacker can access authorised PIN at all instances a payment card is
being used at that particular compromised terminal. However, in this scenario,
the adversary will only capture the PINs of the cards used on a single payment
terminal.
3. An authorisation entity (e.g. scheme operator and CIB), similar to the payment
cards, has to store copies of authorised PINs for verification purposes. If an
adversary compromises the authorisation entity then it is challenging to protect
the PINs and the OPV process (even with our proposal).
In our proposed solutions, secure communication to the authorising entity is pro-
vided by using the OPVrq. In particularly, the payment card issued by the respective
CIB either encrypts the message itself or gives the encryption (public) key to the pay-
ment terminal to be used for encryption.
After receiving the OPVrq by the CIB, it is deciphered and the PIN is verified. The
response (OPVrp) which indicates whether the PIN verification was successful or not
is sent back to the payment terminal. The payment terminal generates the session key
that encrypts the OPVrp, which is included in the OPVrq by either the smart card
or the terminal. The OPVrp also guarantees message freshness. Depending on the
selected proposed solution, this is achieved by either the payment card or the terminal
generating an unpredictable number and including this in the OPVrp.
An adversary observing these messages can store them for the purpose of replaying
them at some later stage. For the solution based on the symmetric key and encryption
performed by the smart card, a replay of the OPVrq will be easily detected as the
session key used for encrypting (and successful decryption) this message would have
expired. Furthermore, the adversary cannot see the PIN in plaintext as he does not
have the capability of breaking a strong cryptographic algorithm.
However, for solutions based on an asymmetric cryptosystem (e.g. using public key
of the CIB) the smart card or the payment terminal generates a session (symmetric)
key. This key is later used by the CIB to encrypt the OPVrp. If the adversary replays
the OPVrq message, which is enciphered using the public key of the CIB, the session
key part of the replayed message would be different. As a result, when a OPVrp is
generated by the CIB, the payment terminal may not be able to decrypt this OPVrp
message properly. This would avoid a successful replay attempt of the OPVrq message.
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In section 3.3.3, we explained how our proposed solution binds the OPV process
with the online transaction authorisation process. This is achieved by including the
authorising entity generated Authoriser Unpredictable Number sent back in the PIN
Result Block in the online transaction authorisation. The authorising entity can use the
unpredictable number to link a particular OPV to its associated online transaction au-
thorisation. This provides a countermeasure against an adversary taking advantage of
the lack of binding between the OPV process and the online transaction authorisation.
Consider a potential scenario in which an adversary creates a “Yes” card [146]. A
“Yes” card is a fake payment card that replies to the terminal with a PIN verification
successful message regardless to whether the entered PIN is correct or not. In this
scenario, the OPV process has to execute the first two proposed solutions (based on
the smart card).
When a malicious user enters a PIN on the payment terminal, it is sent to the “Yes”
card. Following this, the “Yes” card generates an OPVrq message. The intention is
that when the authorisation entity tries to verify the OPVrq and fails, it will send a
PIN verification decline result back in the OPVrp. However, this response goes bank
to the “Yes” card which simply discards this message. Instead the “Yes” card sends
the payment terminal a message that indicates to the payment terminal that the PIN
verification was successful.
The success of this attack is dependent on the OPVrq completely being isolated from
the payment terminal. We remove this isolation in our proposed solution by using a
symmetric key generated by the payment terminal. After generating the symmetric key,
it is communicated to the authorisation entity in the OPVrq message. The symmetric
key is used by the authorisation entity to encipher the OPVrp. Therefore, once the
OPVrp is received at the payment terminal, it can also decrypt the message and verify
whether the PIN was verified or not. Hence, this potential scenario cannot circumvent
the protection provided by our proposals.
In our analysis, we consider another concern that could raise some security con-
cerns. That is the use of a standard Initialisation Vector (IV) [138] for the symmetric
cryptosystem. The reason why we discuss this is because of the potential patterns in
the ciphertext might reveal some information regarding the PIN. To avoid this (even
when the IV is a predefined value), in the OPVrq message, we append a random num-
ber generated by the smart card to the data header and then append the PIN value.
This way, the first 16 byte (plaintext) block to be used by the symmetric algorithm (i.e.
AES [115]) will have 15 random bytes and the first byte of the second block will also
be random (the 16 byte random number is spread over the first two plaintext blocks).
This randomness in the plaintext of the first block avoids any patterns being detected
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in the second block, which contains the PIN. Furthermore, the session keys are unique
per transaction for the symmetric key-based solutions. Which means that the same key
is not used in multiple transactions. The encryption makes it difficult for an adversary
to gain any additional information from the OPVrq or OPVrp message about the PIN
or the associated decision.
3.4.2 Practical Implementation
In this section, we describe our implementation of the proposed solutions. The main
aim of implementing the proposed solutions was to identify and measure potential per-
formance penalties the existing OPV process has to bear if our proposed improvements
were to be applied.
To implement our solutions, we used two 32bit Java Cards [12] connected with a
Microsoft Windows 7 machine running on 2.3GHz, 2GB RAM as our test bed. The
machine was used to represent the CTPOS and CIB (for OPVrp). For the symmetric
key based solution, we selected Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [115] as the
encryption algorithm with a 128bit key.
Table 3.7: Performance Penalties associated with Each Solution
Proposed Solutions
Basic Encryption Encrypt-then-MAC Authenticated Encryption
Java Card 1 Java Card 2 Java Card 1 Java Card 2 Java Card 1 Java Card 2
Symmetric Key Card 64ms 86ms 138ms 156ms 122ms 136ms
Asymmetric Key Card 138ms 159ms 196ms 218ms - -
Asymmetric Key Payment Terminal2 34ms 48ms -
CIB OPVrp (footnote 7) 16ms 28ms 22ms
We used the Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) as the mode of operation for both
basic encryption and Encrypt-then-MAC methods. Whereas, we opted for the Ga-
lois/Counter Mode (GCM) as the authenticated encryption method [135, 90]. For the
generation of the random number [35] we selected the HMAC-based Pseudorandom
Number Generator (PRNG)3 .
For the implementation of the public key-based solutions, we selected 1048bit RSA
(Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) [176] with random padding generated by the selected
PRNG. The same PRNG was used to generate the session keys used in this solution.
Table 3.7 lists the performance penalties incurred by our proposed solutions. All
measurements are given in milliseconds (ms). A point to note is that there is no
authenticated encryption mode (similar to GCM) for asymmetric cryptosystems (i.e.
RSA). Therefore, in Table 3.7 performance measurement for this is not included.
Our implementation does not emulate the complete EVM specifications. It only
3PRNGs based on different cryptographic algorithms can give different performances; a detailed
discussion of this can be found in [35]
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implements the proposed improvements to the OPVrq and OPVrp processes. The
performance measurement should be taken as an additional execution cost that the
EVM process has to bear to implement the proposed solutions in this chapter.
3.4.3 Mechanical Formal Analysis
In this section, the proposed improvements are subject to a mechanical formal analysis.
The analysis is based on the CasperFDR tool. The CasperFDR mechanical analysis
framework can be used to test the soundness of a security protocol under a set of defined
security properties. In this approach, the Casper compiler [129] takes a high-level
description of the protocol, together with its security requirements. It then translates
the description into the process algebra of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP)
[105]. The CSP description of the protocol can be machine-verified using the Failures-
Divergence Refinement (FDR) model checker [172]. The intruder’s capability modelled
in the Casper script (appendices A.1.1 and A.1.2) for the proposed protocol is:
1. Intruder can masquerade any entity in the network
2. Intruders can read the messages transmitted in the network
3. Intruder cannot influence the internal process of an entity in the network
The security specification for which the CasperFDR evaluates the network is as
shown below. The listed specifications are defined in the #Specification section of
appendices A.1.1 and A.1.2:
1. The protocol run is fresh and both applications were alive,
2. The key used for encryption/decryption in the symmetric system and the private
key used for decryption in the asymmetric system, is not revealed to the adversary,
3. Long terms keys of communicating entities are not compromised, and
After successfully evaluation the proposed protocol, the CasperFDR tool did not
find any feasible attacks and weaknesses related to the protocol.
3.5 Summary
In this section, we conclude our discussion and summarise the key contributions of this
chapter.
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At the beginning of this chapter, the EMV OPV process, current payment ar-
chitecture and the online transaction authorisation process were discussed. We then
identified and described how certain aspects of the payment architecture and its asso-
ciated deployment methods open up a potential route for an adversary to compromise
payment transactions for fraudulent financial gains. Afterwards, assumptions related
to the payment network’s operating environment, the capabilities of an adversary and
potential attack scenarios were outlined.
Subsequently, we proposed three potential ways to enhance the OPV process and
a proposal of how to bind it to the online transaction authorisation. The proposed
solutions were then analysed with a discussion on their security in the context of the
adversary’s capabilities. We also provided the execution measurements for our proposed
modifications; this showed the potential performance penalty incurred by our proposals.
Furthermore, proposed modifications were then subjected to the mechnical formal
anlysis using the CasperFDR tool. The concerns raised by this chapter are considered to
be valid as the OPV and online transaction authorisation is considered the highest level
of trust in the card-based payment mechanism. It can differ based on laws/regulations
or the relationship between the cardholder and CIB, but if the correct PIN is used
in an OPV and online transaction authorisation then the liability of the payment is
either with the cardholder or the CIB. If attacks can successfully occur at this level
they could potentially cause substantial reputation damage to the overall card-based
payment scheme, along with causing financial loss to the cardholder/CIB.
Furthermore, such attacks could make it difficult to detect whether an OPV-based
transaction was actually made by the cardholder or the adversary, as the compromise
of the intermediary nodes might not be detected in time. Therefore, we consider this to
be a concern and suggest that a mandating rollout of an OPV process in a geographical
region should take into consideration these concerns and our potential solutions.
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In this Chapter, we extend our work on enhancing the EMV OPV process
deployed in the Unified Authorisation method in the current EMV architec-
ture. We then identify potential attack scenarios that an attacker can use to
gain access to the Personal Identification Number (PIN) data by compromis-
ing the OPV process. Addressing these concerns, we propose improvements
that enhance the security of the OPV process in the Unified Authorisation
method.
71
4. Improving OPV Security in Unified Authorisation Method
4.1 Introduction
The EMV OPV process can be deployed in two different methods. When OPV is
carried out in a separate message from the online transaction authorisation, we named
that deployment method as Segmented Authorisation. In contrast to this, when OPV
is carried out in the same message together with the online transaction authorisation
we named that deployment method as Unified Authorisation. In Section 3.1.1, we
differentiated the two OPV deployment methods that could be used in the current
EMV architecture to carry out the OPV process.
The EMV OPV process we discussed in chapter 3 was the Segmented Authorisation
method. In this chapter, we extend our work carried out to enhance the EMV OPV
process in the Unified Authorisation method. The transaction steps in the segmented
authorisation method were discussed in Section 3.1.1 and in the unified authorisation
method were discussed in Section 3.1.1.
In Section 2.1.1, we first gave a detailed introduction to EMV payment scheme and
its architecture. We then introduced the EMV OPV process and showed how OPV
is carried out in a generic setting in Section 2.1.2. More emphasis is given on the
Unified Authorisation method as it is the main focus of this chapter. The operating
environment of the current EMV payment architecture and assumptions were discussed
in Section 3.2.1. A representation of the operating environment was illustrated in
Figure 3.1.
In the next section, we extend our discussion on the Unified Authorisation method
and investigate whether there are any security weaknesses or potential risk scenarios.
4.2 Potential Concerns
This section is more focused in identifying security weaknesses and potential attack
scenarios in the Unified Authorisation method. We begin the discussion by outlining
trust assumptions associated with the operating environment discussed in Section 3.2.1.
Afterwards, we detail the attacker’s capability in the current operating environment.
Subsequently, we examine two potential risk scenarios associated with the Unified Au-
thorisation OPV deployment method.
The current architecture shown in Figure 3.1, has placed an indelible trust assump-
tion on the intermediary entities that engage in key translation during OPV and trans-
action authorisation processes. Most of these intermediaries are bound by contracts
with either the acquirer or SO/CIB. Part of the contract may include information re-
lated to liability obligations and security requirements. Yet it is questionable whether
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this is sufficient to let intermediaries handle sensitive data related to the cards and
cardholders.
The CTPOS devices are deployed by Payment Terminal Operators (PTOs) as dis-
cussed in our operating environment in Section 3.2.1. It is not practically feasible
for an issuer to get in contact with all the PTOs globally, in order to share a secret
cryptographic key to make communication secure between the CTPOS and the issuer.
We also understood that given the number of different merchants’ acquirers, subcon-
tractors, third parties and the number of CTPOS devices, this would be logistically
impractical. After all, one of the objectives of introducing EMV, was to achieve the
interoperability between different entities without prior business relationships.
In this work, the smart cards, payment terminals, scheme operators and CIB are
considered to be secure and trusted. The rationale for this consideration was discussed
in Section 3.4.1. However the intermediaries are considered to have the potential to
be compromised. This assumption is based on recent reports and incidents where
banking sector services were successfully infiltrated by adversaries [45, 117, 118, 54, 110,
125]. Therefore, the assumption can be considered reasonable. Taking this operating
environment and our assumptions regarding the intermediary nodes and other entities,
we expand the discussion to the capabilities of our adversary in the next section.
4.2.1 Two Potential Risk Scenarios
As the operating environment and assumptions are similar to the one discussed in
Chapter 3, the attacker’s capabilities that we identify here are the same as discussed in
Section 3.2.2. Based on the payment-networks operating environment, our assumptions
and the adversary’s capabilities, two potential risk scenarios that pose a threat to the
OPV in the Unified Authorisation method are discussed here.
In Section 3.2.3, we identified two risk scenarios and discussed how the risks can
compromise the security of OPV in the Segmented Authorisation method. From these
two risk scenarios, only the first risk scenario (Correct PIN in OPV Message) discussed
in Section 3.2.3 is valid in the Unified Authorisation method. The second risk scenario
(OPV Response Message) discussed in Section 3.2.3 is not longer valid in the Unified
Authorisation method. The main reason for this is that the OPV and the online
transaction authorisation are being carried out together in the Unified Authorisation
method. For further explanation regarding why the second risk scenario is not valid in
the Unified Authorisation method, please refer to Section 4.4.1. However, a new risk
scenario has emerged that can potentially compromise the OPV process in the Unified
Authorisation method. The risk scenario is explained below.
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PIN Block Replay in OPV Request
Discussed below is another potential attack scenario that pose a threat to the security
of OPV. The risk scenario that we outline in this section shows how OPV can be com-
promised in the Unified Authorisation method. The compromise can be considered
as an attack carried out to cause financial and reputational damage to one or more
targeted financial institutions. The attack could also be used by criminals to black-
mail financial organisation for ransom. In this risk scenario, the payment transaction
compromise is carried out as follows:
1. In this attack, the adversary keeps a record of all the PAN and associated PIN
blocks passing through the compromised intermediary. The adversary in addition
to this, keeps a record of all the merchants by mapping the merchant IDs that are
associated to the transactions that pass through the compromised intermediary.
2. The adversary may threaten the financial institution for ransom or post a message
on online forums advertising that lost/stolen cards from the advertised geograph-
ical locations are more likely to be approved during transactions even by entering
a random sequence for the PIN at a number of listed merchants.
3. Whenever an online authorisation message in the Unified Authorisation Method
is received by the adversary at the compromised intermediary, it carries out a
database string search to retrieve the corresponding PIN block of the PAN. If the
PIN block is already in the adversary’s database, then the adversary removes the
existing PIN block part of the online authorisation message and replaces it with
the correct PIN block retrieved from the database.
4. This way the adversary replays the previously known correct PIN blocks by re-
placing the PIN block part of the online authorisation message but leaves the
ARQC part of the message unchanged. The message is then forwarded towards
the CIB.
5. The CIB after receiving the online authorisation message, which includes both
the OPV and the online transaction authorisation, first verifies the PIN and if
correct proceeds to online transaction authorisation. The CIB verifies the ARQC
and does a credit check on the user’s account. If satisfied, the CIB generates
an ARC. This is then Xored with the ARQC and enciphered using the shared
session key with the card to generate the ARPC.
6. The CIB then sends the OPV result and the ARPC to the terminal in a single
response message. The terminal checks the successful PIN verification result from
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the CIB. Upon successful OPV result, the terminal forwards the ARPC to the
card and request an outcome in the 2nd GENERATE AC command.
7. The card after verifying the validity of the ARPC, generates a Transaction Cer-
tificate (TC) and sends it to the terminal. The terminal then approves the trans-
action.
In this section, we identified two attack scenario that pose a significant threat to
the OPV process when it is deployed in the Unified Authorisation method. In the two
risk scenarios, due to the attacks being performed at the compromised intermediary,
it is difficult for the authorisation entity to detect a fraudulent transaction. We also
identified another potential attack scenario but discussed why it cannot be carried out in
the Unified Authorisation deployment method. Aiming to address the aforementioned
security concerns, we present our proposed solutions in the next Section.
4.3 Proposed Solutions
In this Section, we propose three solutions that address the aforementioned security
concerns and potentially guarantees end-to-end security of OPV between the payment
card and the CIB. In our approach we have also taken in to consideration the operating
environment of the payment architecture and attacker capability.
The proposed solutions are compatible with both OPV deployment methods. How-
ever, we have already presented the solutions for the Segmented Authorisation method
in Section 3.3. Therefore, in this section we only emphasise in presenting the solutions
that are relevant for the Unified Authorisation method.
When constructing the solutions for this deployment method, as before we have
taken into consideration the overhead it adds on the intermediaries in practical terms.
Therefore, the proposed solutions introduce minimal or no changes to the opera-
tional/system architecture of the intermediaries involved in the current EMV payment
scheme between the payment terminal and the SO/CIB. To guarantee this, the required
changes to apply the proposed improvements are only made to the payment cards, the
CIB and the CTPOS devices.
The proposed solutions remove the need for placing strong trust assumptions on the
intermediary entities. The solutions are categorised into card-based and terminal-based
solutions depending on which entity the PIN block encipherment occurs in during the
OPV process. For a generic construction of the OPV process and protocol diagram we
would direct the reader to Section 3.3 of the previous Chapter 3.
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In our construction, the EMV specifications, standards such as ISO-9564-1 & ISO-
9564-2 and similar guidelines were referred [13, 14, 15, 16, 195, 17, 9]. Since there
is no publicly available standard on how PIN block construction and encipherment
should be carried out in OPV, we have made reasonable assumptions in our PIN block
construction and encipherment.
4.3.1 Card Based Solutions
In this section, we present our solutions that are mainly based on the payment card.
In the payment card based solution, the PIN Block (PB) is enciphered inside the
payment card before it is forwarded to the CIB (Authoriser in our generic model) to be
verified. The card-based solutions are further sub-categorised, depending on whether
a symmetric or an asymmetric cryptographic key is used to encipher the PB.
Card uses an online-PIN encipherment symmetric key of the CIB
Here we present our first solution which introduces an online-PIN encipherment sym-
metric key KOPV that is shared between the payment card and the CIB. Based on the
KOPV , a session key KSOPV is derived using a key derivation function similar to the one
specified in EMV specification [14, see: p127 - p131] and also discussed in [133]. It is
assumed that the session key derivation between the card and the CIB is synchronised.
During a transaction, the payment card is inserted to the CTPOS and the PIN is
entered. The PIN gets sent to the payment card either in plain text or in encrypted
format. The CTPOS also sends the session key SKT . In the Segmented Authorisation
method, the proposed solution follows exactly the same process as described in the
generic OPV model in Section 3.3. Presented below is the proposed solution for the
Unified Authorisation method.
In the Unified Authorisation method, the PIN is enciphered by the card using the
online-PIN encipherment symmetric key in exactly the same process that is carried
out in the segmented authentication method. The only difference is due to the need
of transferring both the OPV and the online transaction authorisation messages in
the same message towards the CIB. The construction of the proposed solution in the
Unified Authorisation method is as follows:
The CTPOS first obtains the enciphered PIN block from the card, where as the card
constructs it exactly the same way as before in the segmented authorisation method.
The data included in the OPV PIN Block are shown in Table 4.1. The Unpredictable
Numbers (UN) mentioned in this study have the same properties as defined in the
EMV specification [14].
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Table 4.1: OPV PIN Block (PB) in Unified Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number (CUN) : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 10 Bytes.
However, the card generates a hash of the enciphered PIN block which has the
notation h(e{PB}) and keeps the hash on its records. The stored hash is later used in
the ARQC construction. The CTPOS instead of sending the OPV Request to the CIB,
requests an ARQC from the card by issuing the 1st GENERATE AC command. As
opposed to the ARQC generated by the card in the segmented authorisation method,
in the Unified Authorisation method the ARQC indicates that OPV is not carried
out and the PIN is not verified. Furthermore, the card also includes the h(e{PB}).
The hash of the enciphered PIN block provides an assurance that the associated PIN
block has a cryptographic binding with the received ARQC. Due to h(e{PB}) being
included in the ARQC and the cryptogram being enciphered with a shared symmetric
key shared between the card and the CIB, assurance to the integrity of the included
hash is given. This is further discussed in Section 4.4.1. For the generation of the hash,
we use SHA256 hash function [94].
The ARQC is then sent to the CTPOS. To meet the mandate of having both
parts in the same message, the CTPOS then constructs an Online PIN Verification
and Transaction Authorisation Request (OPVTArq) message, which includes the PAN,
enciphered PIN block and the ARQC. The message is then forwarded towards the CIB.
OPV TArq = PAN ||e{PB}||ARQC
The CIB, upon receiving the OPVTArq, uses the PAN to retrieve the shared session
key and deciphers the e{PB}. The CIB, in this instance, validates the PIN to be correct
before proceeding to transaction authorisation.
0Measurement was taken from a desktop computer.
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Table 4.2: OPV PIN Result Block (PRB) in Unified Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
Authoriser Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 10 Bytes.
Only if the PIN is correct, then the CIB constructs the OPV PIN Results Block
(PRB), shown in Table 4.2 and encrypts it using the CTPOS’s session key SKT to
create the enciphered PIN results block e{PRB}, but does not send it to the CTPOS
yet. Instead, it verifies whether the ARQC is genuine and has been generated by the
card. The fields in the ARQC also indicate to the CIB that OPV has not been carried
out prior to this stage. Furthermore, the CIB generates the hash of the enciphered PIN
block again and compares it with the recovered h(e{PB}) from the ARQC. If the two
hashes match, then the CIB has assurance that the received e{PB} is associated with
the ARQC in the transaction. The CIB also conducts an account level credit check
on the card holder, and if satisfied, constructs an ARPC. During the construction
of the ARPC, the CIB also includes an unpredictable number UNCIB in the ARQC.
After this process, the CIB constructs an Online PIN Verification and Transaction
Authorisation Response (OPVTArp) message, which includes the PAN, enciphered
PIN result block and the ARPC. The message is then sent towards the CTPOS.
OPV TArp = PAN ||e{PRB}||ARPC
The CTPOS deciphers the e{PRB} to obtain the PIN verification results. If sat-
isfied with the result of the PIN verification, the CTPOS forwards the message to the
card and request an outcome in the 2nd GENERATE AC command. The card, verifies
the validity of the ARPC and generates a Transaction Certificate (TC). During the
construction of the TC, the card includes CUN,UNCTPOS & UNCIB in the TC, cryp-
tographically binding the associated unpredictable numbers. This links the e{PB},
e{PRB}, ARQC & ARPC to the TC. The TC is then sent to the CTPOS, who then
approves the transaction. The CTPOS either forwards the TC for payment processing
straight away or keeps it in its record to be forwarded at a later time. In either way,
when the TC is received, the CIB can verify that the TC has a binding to OPV and
transaction authorisation processes.
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Card uses an online-PIN encipherment public key of the CIB
The solution we discussed above uses a symmetric key for the PIN Block encipher-
ment. The solution described here introduces an online-PIN encipherment public key
POPVCIB of the CIB. It must be noted that this is not the CIB’s public key that is
recovered from the CIB’s public key certificate residing in the card during EMV trans-
actions. The POPVCIB is a specific online-PIN encipherment public key introduced in
our construction which is in the format of a public key certificate that has been signed
by the CIB. The solution for the Segmented Authorisation method can be found in
Section 3.3.1 of the previous Chapter 3. Presented below is the proposed solution for
the Unified Authorisation method.
In the unified authentication method, similar to the segmented authorisation method,
the card enciphers the constructed PIN block PB-1 using POPVCIB to generate the en-
ciphered PIN block that has the notation z{PB-1}. The data included in the PB-1 are
shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: OPV PIN Block -1 (PB-1) in Unified Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number (CUN) : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 212 Bytes.
The z{PB-1} is sent to the CTPOS, who then instead of sending an OPV request to
the CIB, issues the 1st GENERATE AC command to the card requesting the ARQC.
The card then constructs an ARQC, the card also includes the hash of the public
key enciphered PIN block, which has the notation h(z{PB-1}). The ARQC is then
sent to the CTPOS. The CTPOS in possession with both the z{PB-1} and the ARQC:
constructs an Online PIN Verification and Transaction Authorisation Request (OPV-
TArq) message, which includes the PAN, enciphered PIN block and the ARQC. The
message is then forwarded towards the CIB.
OPV TArq = PAN ||z{PB − 1}||ARQC
The CIB, upon receiving the OPVTArq, deciphers the z{PB} and verifies whether
the PIN is correct. The outcome of this verification is constructed in an OPV PIN
Result Block (PRB-1) shown in Table 4.4
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Table 4.4: OPV PIN Result Block -1 (PRB-1) in Unified Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
CIB Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 10 Bytes.
This is then enciphered using SKT to create the enciphered PIN Result Block
e{PRB − 1}. If the PIN verification was successful, the CIB proceeds to transac-
tion authorisation by verifying the ARQC and doing an account credit check. During
the ARQC verification, the CIB generates the hash of the public key enciphered PIN
block and compares it with the hash h(z{PB-1}) recovered from the ARQC. If the
two hashes match, the CIB can verify that the received PIN block and ARQC are
associated with one another. The CIB then constructs the ARPC. Following this, the
CIB constructs an Online PIN Verification and Transaction Authorisation Response
(OPVTArp) message, which includes the PAN, enciphered PIN result block and the
ARPC. The message is then sent towards the CTPOS.
OPV TArp = PAN ||e{PRB − 1}||ARPC
The CTPOS deciphers the e{PRB − 1} to obtain the PIN verification result. If
satisfied, the CTPOS forwards the message to the card and requests an outcome in
the 2nd GENERATE AC command. The card verifies the validity of the ARPC and
generates a TC. During the construction of the TC, the card includes CUN,UNCTPOS
& UNCIB in the TC, cryptographically binding the associated unpredictable numbers.
This links the e{PB}, e{PRB}, ARQC & ARPC to the TC. The TC is sent to
the CTPOS, who then approves the transaction. When the CTPOS forwards the TC
for payment processing, the CIB can verify that the TC has a binding to OPV and
transaction authorisation processes.
4.3.2 Terminal based Solution
In this solution, we present our third solution that is based on the terminal which is
also referred to as the CTPOS in this Chapter. Here the PIN Block is enciphered at
the CTPOS before it is sent to the CIB for verification. A noticeable difference in this
method is that the PIN entered by the cardholder is not sent to the payment card but
instead enciphered by the CTPOS.
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Terminal uses an online-PIN encipherment public key of the CIB
In this solution an online-PIN encipherment public key POPVCIB of the CIB is in-
troduced. This cryptographic key is mainly used to carry out the OPV PIN Block
encipherment at the CTPOS. The public key is stored in the payment card in a pub-
lic key certificate, similar to the proposal in Section 4.3.1, and during a transaction
the certificate is given to the CTPOS. The solution for the Segmented Authorisation
method can be found in Section 3.3.2 of the previous Chapter 3. Presented below is
the proposed solution for the Unified Authorisation method.
Our third solution under the Unified Authorisation method, does not send the card
holder entered PIN to the card, instead it is enciphered by the CTPOS. First the
CTPOS, includes the PIN in to a OPV PIN Block (PB-2). The OPV PIN Block PB-2
includes data mentioned in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: OPV PIN Block -2 (PB-2) in Unified Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
CTPOS Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 212 Bytes.
It must be noted that, the unpredictable number included in is generated by the
CTPOS but not the card as in the previous two solutions. The CTPOS then uses
POPVCIB to create the public key encipherment of PB-2 that has the notation z{PB-
2}. As opposed to the third solution in the Segmented Authorisation method, the CIB
does not send the z{PB-2} to the CIB for OPV but instead request the card for an
ARQC by issuing the 1st GENERATE AC command.
The card as in the previous two solutions in the Unified Authorisation method,
includes a field inside the ARQC stating that the OPV process is not carried out and
the PIN is not verified. Furthermore, the card also includes the hash of the public key
enciphered PIN block h(z({PB-2}) in the ARQC. The ARQC is then sent to the CT-
POS. The CTPOS now in possession with the z{PB-2} and the ARQC constructs an
Online PIN Verification and Transaction Authorisation Request (OPVTArq) message,
which includes the PAN, enciphered PIN block and the ARQC. The message is then
forwarded towards the CIB.
OPV TArq = PAN ||z{PB − 2}||ARQC
Once the message is received, the CIB deciphers the z{PB-2} and verifies the
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PIN. The outcome is included in an OPV PIN Result Block (PRB-2). The CIB then
constructs a OPV PIN Result Block (PRB-2) shown in Table 4.6
Table 4.6: OPV PIN Result Block -2 (PRB-2) in Unified Authorisation
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
CIB Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding : 10 Bytes.
This is then enciphered using SKT to create the enciphered PIN Result Block
e{PRB − 2}.
If the PIN verification is successful, the CIB verifies the ARQC and does an account
level credit check. During the ARQC verification, the CIB generates the hash of the
public key enciphered PIN block and compares it with the h(z({PB-2}) recovered
from the ARQC. The two hashes must match for the CIB to complete transaction
authorisation. Once transaction authorisation is completed the CIB generates the
ARPC, which is then included in the OPVTArp message together with the PAN and
the e{PRB − 2} before sending the message to the CTPOS.
OPV TArp = PAN ||e{PRB − 2}||ARPC
The CTPOS deciphers the e{PRB − 2} to obtain the PIN verification result. If
satisfied, it forwards the message to the card and requests an outcome by issuing the
2nd GENERATE AC command. The card after verifying the validity of the ARPC,
generates the TC. Similar to the previous two solutions in the unified authentication
method, the card includes CUN,UNCTPOS & UNCIB in the TC. This links the e{PB},
e{PRB}, ARQC & ARPC to the TC. The TC is sent to the CTPOS, who then
approves the transaction. When the CTPOS forwards the TC for payment processing,
the CIB can verify that the TC has a binding to OPV and transaction authorisation
processes.
4.3.3 Binding of OPV and Transaction Authorisation
As we have detailed before, in the Segmented Authorisation method there seems to be
no direct linkage between the online PIN verification and the online transaction autho-
risation for a given EMV transaction. The two verifications are carried out separately,
leaving space for replay attacks in which a harvested OPV Response Message could be
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replayed or injected by the compromised intermediary during an EMV transaction.
In the Unified Authorisation method, due to the mandate of both the enciphered
PIN block and the ARQC being received by the CIB at the same time makes the attack
discussed in Section 3.2.3 invalid for the Unified Authorisation method. However, this
leaves an opportunity for adversaries to carry out other alternative attacks, such as the
attack scenario we identified in Section 4.2.1.
In contrast to the solution we outlined to bind both the enciphered PIN block
and the ARQC in the Segmented Authorisation method, in the Unified Authorisation
method, we do not introduce a separate solution. This is due to both the enciphered
PIN block and the ARQC being received by the CIB simultaneously. However, in our
construction for all the three solutions in the Unified Authorisation method, we achieve
the same required binding.
This is achieved by, the card generation a hash of the enciphered PIB block and
including this in the next generated ARQC. At the point of examination of the ARQC,
the CIB generates a hash of the received enciphered PIN block and compares it with
the hash recovered from the ARQC. If the two hashes match, it gives assurance to the
CIB that the corresponding PIN block is associated with the received ARQC. This is
explained in more detail, when we have explained each of our solution.
In this Section, we presented our three solutions that enhance the security of OPV
process especially when it is deployed in the Unified Authorisation method. We also
discussed how we achieve the required binding between OPV and the transaction au-
thorisation in all three of our proposed solutions.
In the next subsequent sections, we analyse our proposed solutions, discuss our
implementation experience and provide mechanical formal analysis results.
4.4 Analysis
In this Section, the proposed solutions are evaluated for their security and performance.
The security of the proposed solutions is analytically evaluated in relation to the at-
tacker’s capability. The performance measurements are taken to show the potential
penalties for the existing process if they are adopted. We also subject the protocol for
mechanical formal analysis and provide results.
4.4.1 Security Analysis
We first provide a analytical analysis of the proposed solutions mainly based on Unified
Authorisation method. The analysis carried out here is short compared to the analysis
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in chapter 3 to avoid any overlaps. A detailed analysis on common points can be found
in Section 3.4.1.
In our analysis, we take the adversary capability and operating environment as-
sumptions in to consideration. According to this, the adversary can compromise an
intermediary entity but cannot compromise the smart cards, payment terminals, scheme
operator, or CIB. The rationale behind identifying the entities that cannot be compro-
mised by the adversary is because, if an adversary can successfully compromise any of
these entities then almost no protection mechanism would be strong enough to protect
against attacks on the OPV process. A detailed explanation for this rational can be
found in Section 3.4.1.
In our proposed solutions, the OPVrq is encrypted to provide end-to-end security.
Before sending the PIN related data to the CIB, it is encrypted either by the smart card
or the CTPOS. Furthermore, the OPVrp is also encrypted by the CIB using a session
key included in the OPVrq by either the smart card or the terminal. The response
message also includes a random number generated by the smart card or payment ter-
minal (depending upon which proposed solution is selected), providing assurance of the
freshness of the OPVrp message.
In the card based solution where a symmetric key is used for the encipherment, any
attempts of replying the OPVrq by an adversary will be detected as the session key
used to encipher this message would have expired.
Furthermore, in the solution that uses a asymmetric key (public key of the CIB),
the payment card or the CTPOS generates a symmetric session key which is used by the
CIB to encipher the OPVrp message. If an old OPVrp is replayed the terminal/payment
card would not be able to decrypt the message due to the session key being wrong. As
a result any replay attempts of the OPVrp can be detected.
In Section 4.3.3 we also explained why certain attack scenarios are circumvented
because both the enciphered PIN block and the ARQC are being received by the
CIB simultaneously. The OPV Response Message, attack scenario that we discussed in
Section 3.2.3 is only valid for the Segmented Authorisation method but the compromise
cannot be carried out in the Unified Authorisation method. Here we explain why it is
not possible to carry out the attack in the Unified Authorisation deployment method.
We would like to direct the reader to Section 3.2.3 for further details related to the
steps involved in the compromise.
The main reason why this particular attack scenario cannot be carried out in the
Unified Authorisation method is because the CIB receiving the PIN block and the
ARQC in the same message during a EMV transaction. In the Segmented Authorisation
method, when the terminal requests the card to generate the ARQC, it also sends details
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of successful OPV result. Following the terminal’s request, when the card generates
the ARQC, the fact that OPV has been successfully carried out beforehand is indicated
in the ARQC. Furthermore, the card also includes a hash of the enciphered PIN block
in association to the particular transaction which acts as a binding between the PIN
block and the ARQC.
As opposed to the ARQC generated in the Segmented Authorisation method, in the
Unified Authorisation method, the card indicates in the generated ARQC that OPV is
not carried out. In addition to this, the card also includes a hash of the enciphered PIN
block in the generated ARQC. With these details, the CIB gets to know that OPV is
not carried out by examining the ARQC, hence the CIB always carries out OPV before
proceeding to transaction authorisation. Due to this reason, the adversary at the
compromised intermediary cannot change the OPV response message. The adversary
also cannot remove the PIN block part of the request message and only send the ARQC
to the CIB as during examination of the ARQC the CIB will indeed get to know that
OPV has not been carried out.
As explained above, we provide binding between the OPV and online transaction
authorisation in all three proposed solutions by including the authorising entity gener-
ated Authoriser Unpredictable Number sent back in the PIN Result Block in the online
transaction authorisation. This lets the CIB link a particular OPV to its associated
online transaction authorisation.
The solutions also prevent “Yes” card [146] attacks by using a symmetric key gen-
erated by the payment terminal. More details related to this can be found in Sec-
tion 3.4.1. Furthermore, we consider another concern that could raise some security
concerns. That is the use of a standard Initialisation Vector (IV) [138] for the symmet-
ric cryptosystem. We detail how our solution overcomes this by using recommended
block size and random numbers in Section 3.4.1.
In the next section, we discuss our implementation experience and approach taken.
4.4.2 Practical Implementation
In this section, we describe our implementation of the proposed solutions with the
aim of providing potential performance penalties the existing OPV process has to bear
if our improvements are adopted. For comparison purposes, we provide performance
measurements of both Segmented Authorisation method and the Unified Authorisation
method in Table 4.7.
1Measurement was taken from a desktop computer.
2Measurement was taken from a desktop computer.
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Table 4.7: Performance Penalties associated with Each Solution
Proposed Solutions
Basic Encryption Encrypt-then-MAC Authenticated Encryption
Java Card 1 Java Card 2 Java Card 1 Java Card 2 Java Card 1 Java Card 2
Performance penalties imposed by proposed solutions on the segmented authorisation method
Symmetric Key Card 64ms 86ms 138ms 156ms 122ms 136ms
Asymmetric Key Card 138ms 159ms 196ms 218ms - -
Asymmetric Key Payment Terminal1 34ms 48ms -
CIB OPVrp 16ms 28ms 22ms
Performance penalties imposed by proposed solutions on the unified authorisation method
Symmetric Key Card 71ms 92ms 143ms 160ms 128ms 141ms
Asymmetric Key Card 143ms 164ms 202ms 225ms - -
Asymmetric Key Payment Terminal2 36ms 52ms -
We use the same test-bed described in Section 3.4.2, for our implementation. Ta-
ble 3.7 lists the performance measurements given in milliseconds (ms).
Our implementation does not emulate the complete EVM specifications but only
implements the proposed improvements. The performance measurement should be
taken as an additional execution cost that the EVM process has to bear to implement
the proposed solutions in this chapter.
In the next Section, we subject our proposed solution to mechanical formal analysis.
4.4.3 Mechanical Formal Analysis
In this section, we subject the proposed modifications to a mechanical formal analysis
based on the CasperFDR tool.
The CasperFDR mechanical analysis framework can be used to test the soundness
of a security protocol under a set of defined security properties. We do not evalu-
ate the solutions related to the Unified Authorisation method, as they only differ in
hash generation and verification. Whereas, the remaining aspects are more or less
the same as for the evaluated protocol in the Segmented Authorisation method. The
attacker model and a detailed explanation during the construction of the Segmented
Authorisation method of the formal analysis can be found in Section 3.4.3. The listed
specifications are defined in the #Specification section of appendices A.1.1 and A.1.2
After successfully evaluating the proposed protocol, the CasperFDR tool did not find
any feasible attacks and weaknesses related to the protocol.
4.5 Summary
In this section, we conclude our discussion and summarise the key contributions of this
chapter.
This Chapter is an extension to our contributions in Chapter 3 which investigated
the Segmented Authorisation OPV deployment method and proposed solutions. The
second OPV deployment method which we investigate in this chapter is referred to
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as the Unified Authorisation method. We then described how certain aspects of this
deployment method open up a potential route for an adversary to compromise pay-
ment transactions for fraudulent financial gains. Following this, assumptions related
to the payment network’s operating environment, the capabilities of an adversary and
potential attack scenarios were outlined.
Subsequently, we proposed three potential ways to enhance the security of OPV
when deployed in the Unified Authorisation method. We also discussed how we bind
the OPV process with the online transaction authorisation. Proposed solutions were
then analysed for their security and results of potential performance penalty incurred
by our proposals were listed. Furthermore, the protocol was then subjected to the
mechanical formal analysis using the CasperFDR tool.
The attacks we discuss in this Chapter can be considered to be difficult to detect
whether an OPV-based transaction was actually made by the cardholder or the ad-
versary, as the compromise of the intermediary nodes might not be detected in time.
Therefore, we consider this to be a concern and suggest that a mandating roll-out of
an OPV process in a geographical region should take into consideration these concerns
and our potential solutions.
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In this chapter, we focus our attention on Transaction Authorisation which
is another important aspect of the EMV payment architecture. We first
introduce the EMV Primary Account Number (PAN) based payment archi-
tecture and outline an inherent weakness associated with the payments. We
then introduce EMV Tokenisation which has been adopted to solve this prob-
lem and further identify a bottleneck in this new architecture. Afterwards,
we propose a solution that extends the usability of tokenised payments in of-
fline environments. Finally, we mechanically analyse our proposed protocol
and implement the solution to obtain performance measurements.
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5.1 Introduction
Unlike a contactless smart card, a mobile1 has additional capabilities including in-
creased computing ability, a greater variety of accessible Application Programming
Interfaces (API), and readily available communication channels via a Mobile Network
Operator (MNO) or Wi-Fi. Furthermore, modern mobile devices typically feature NFC
and hardware or software Secure Element (SE) technologies that provide secure execu-
tion environments in which to execute sensitive applications [3, 19, 21]. Hardware SEs
provide a secure storage environment for credentials and offer tamper resistance against
physical attacks [11]. Mobile payment applications provide additional features includ-
ing having a number of virtual contactless payment cards issued by different financial
institutions in one place; passcode unlocking mechanisms to access virtual payment
cards; and the ability to block such cards if a mobile is lost or stolen.
The above properties and features of mobile devices are beneficial for running
mobile-based payment solutions. Due to the additional capabilities of the mobile-
platform, a payment application that runs on a mobile platform can be integrated with
more advanced features compared to a payment applet that runs on a smart card.
The common parameters in which a mobile device that runs a contactless payment
application and a payment terminal communicates are standardised under the EMV
contactless specification [24]. This provides interoperability between participating pay-
ment terminal and contactless mobile payment applications.
An introduction to EMV Tokenisation was given in Section 2.1.4. EMV Tokenisa-
tion is increasingly being adopted by the payments industry to prevent PAN compro-
mise as explained in Section 2.1.3 of the thesis.
5.1.1 Problem Statement
The EMV Tokenisation Specification details the requirements for supporting payment
tokenisation in EMV transactions [20]. Even though tokenisation provides security
against PAN compromise, there are many challenges yet to be addressed in the tokeni-
sation landscape [83]. The lack of support for making or accepting tokenised payments
in an oﬄine transaction environment is a shortcoming in this payment architecture.
Finding a solution to this shortcoming is the main focus of this chapter. The
current tokenisation architecture requires online connectivity on the terminal in order
to reach the payment authorisation entity during a tokenised transaction. However, it
is not always possible to have online connectivity in certain transaction scenarios. In
1In this chapter, the payer’s contactless mobile payment device that emulates a contactless smart
card is referred to as the mobile.
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this chapter, we identify three scenarios where a fully oﬄine transaction capability is
considered beneficial for both the merchant and the consumer.
1. Connectivity is not possible due to the geographical location of a transaction,
such as purchases made on aeroplanes and underground subway systems.
2. Steady/continuous connectivity is not guaranteed. If a business is operating in a
non-stationary environment, it is most unlikely that the merchant’s portable pay-
ment acceptance terminal has continuous connectivity to the payment network;
for example, a merchant who sells snacks on a fast-moving train using a portable
payment terminal. If the merchant is able to accept payments from customers
wanting to make tokenised payments, accepting and storing tokenised payments
has significantly lower financial loss associated with payment card breaches as we
explained in Section 2.1.4. Further more, this may also help improve the mer-
chant’s turnover. More significantly, the consumers would be protected by the
security of being able to make tokenised payments.
3. It is significantly cheaper to carry out oﬄine transactions due to the commu-
nication and processing costs involved with establishing each online transaction
individually. An example is carrying out a number of transactions oﬄine and then
forwarding all the transactions simultaneously for batch payment processing at a
later time.
From the above discussion and example scenarios, the inability to make/accept
tokenised payments in an oﬄine environment may act as a deterrent for both consumers
and merchants. This could hinder the potential adoption of contactless mobile payment
solutions based on tokenisation with in the payments industry.
5.1.2 Contributions
In this chapter, we propose a contactless mobile payment protocol based on EMV to-
kenisation that allows oﬄine token payments when no online connectivity is present
on either the terminal or the mobile. The proposed solution also provides end-to-end
encryption between the secure element of the mobile and the terminal. This provides
security for transaction data other than the token. The protocol is analysed against
protocol objectives and subjected to mechanical formal analysis using Scyther. In
our analysis, we show that while tokenised payments prevent PAN compromise dur-
ing transactions, they are still susceptible to token relay attacks. A discussion related
to token relay attacks is carried out in Section 5.4.1. We then discuss how the pro-
posed protocol can be extended to detect and prevent potential token relay attacks
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using ambient sensing. Finally we implement the protocol and provide performance
measurements. The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
1. The protocol introduces the Oﬄine Transaction Token (OTT), providing the
ability to make fully oﬄine tokenised payments
2. End-to-end encryption between the secure element of the mobile and terminal
provides additional security for transaction data other than the Token
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, the prospec-
tive oﬄine operating environment and the adversary’s capability are discussed. The
proposed protocol is presented in Section 5.3. A security analysis of the protocol is
carried out in Section 5.4 and the protocol is subjected to mechanical formal analysis
in Section 5.4.2. The practical implementation of the protocol and performance mea-
surements are given in Section 5.4.3. Finally, in Section 5.5, the discussion is concluded
and further research directions are identified.
5.2 Oﬄine Operating Environment and Adversary’s Ca-
pability
The current EMV tokenisation online operating environment was presented in Sec-
tion 2.1.5 of the thesis. A generic payment architecture and the transaction message
flow for a tokenised contactless mobile payment was illustrated in Figure 2.2 in Sec-
tion 2.1.5. In this section, we briefly discuss the prospective oﬄine operating envi-
ronment in order to provide oﬄine payments based on EMV tokenisation. Then the
capabilities of the adversary in this environment and potential risk concerns are dis-
cussed.
In the oﬄine transaction environment considered in this chapter, online connectivity
to reach the authorising entity is not available on either the secure element or the
terminal. The secure element and the terminal are the only two parties involved during
the transaction. Therefore, in such a scenario the terminal needs to decide whether
to accept or decline a tokenised transaction. As the payment transaction is carried
out oﬄine, it is paramount to secure the payment and the communication between the
secure element and the terminal. The payment settlement phase is carried out when
the terminal has online connectivity at a later time.
Taking the prospective oﬄine-based operating environment as discussed above into
consideration, the capabilities of the potential adversary who may compromise the
tokenisation-based payment system are listed below:
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• Cannot break the standardised (strong) encryption algorithms.
• Has the capability to eavesdrop unencrypted messages passed between the secure
element and the terminal.
• Cannot compromise the terminal’s public key certificate introduced in Section 5.3.1.
In Section 5.4.2, we discuss why the terminal’s public key certificate is not in the
adversary knowledge in the adversary model.
• Cannot compromise the secure element, terminal, scheme operator, token service
provider or the issuing bank.
Based on the adversary’s capability and the current operating environment, an ad-
versary who compromises token transaction data during an oﬄine transaction scenario
may carry out fraudulent transactions. The risk scenarios involved may include the
adversary changing the transaction amount to a new value, capturing the OTT, or
replaying the same OTT to carry out multiple oﬄine transactions with different termi-
nals. Therefore, as well as providing oﬄine token transaction capability, it is vital to
secure the sensitive token transaction data communicated between the secure element
and the terminal.
In order to store the OTT securely on the mobile phone for oﬄine use and to prevent
the OTT being compromised, tamper resistant storage and secure execution are needed.
In our threat model for the complete oﬄine payment environment, the OTT needs to
be protected from the adversary. A mobile phone with a card emulation environment
such as Host Card Emulation (HCE) does not offer tamper resistance [38, 180, 158].
Therefore, we consider a mobile phone with an embedded secure element which offers
both security guarantees in our proposal. In the next section, we take these concerns
into consideration and propose our protocol.
5.3 Proposed Solution
In this section, an oﬄine contactless mobile payment protocol based on EMV tokeni-
sation is proposed. The payment protocol is used to make oﬄine payments when
there is no online connectivity on either the terminal or the mobile during a tokenised
transaction. The objectives of the proposed protocol are listed below.
1. The protocol should be able to make secure oﬄine payment transactions.
2. End-to-end encryption should be provided between the SE and terminal. This
offers additional security to protect transaction data other than the Token.
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5.3.1 Protocol Assumptions
The assumptions made in the proposed solution are listed below:
• The Token Service Provider (TSP) is a trusted entity that securely generates,
issues and de-tokenise transaction tokens on behalf of the bank.
• The TSP in the proposed protocol takes part in the same payment scheme and the
TSP generated signatures can be verified by the terminal following the certificate
hierarchy shown in Figure 5.2.
• The terminal has been issued with a public key certificate signed by the scheme
operator.
• The Oﬄine Transaction Token (OTT) and security-sensitive data including the
cryptographic keys are securely stored in the secure element. It is not possible
for an adversary to steal/compromise the OTT or data residing in the secure
element.
• The nonces generated by the terminal are random and unpredictable. An adver-
sary cannot deduce the second nonce by examining the first nonce.
The notation used in the proposed solution is included in Table 5.1. The tokenised
contactless mobile payment architecture of the proposed protocol is illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.1. The protocol proposed in this chapter comprises a setup phase, a payment
phase and a settlement phase. In the Setup Phase, the payment app and the OTT
are securely provisioned to the secure element of the mobile. The payment phase can
be used to make an oﬄine tokenised payment when there is no online connectivity on
either the terminal or the mobile.
5.3.2 Setup Phase
During the setup phase, the personalisation of the payment application and provision-
ing of OTT related data is accomplished. The provision of payment application and
security-sensitive data to the secure element is carried out using a secure Over-The-Air
(OTA) channel [18]. Following application personalisation, the payment application’s
sensitive data elements reside in the secure element and its user interface is located in
the mobile platform. The components that reside in the secure element consist of all
cryptographic keys needed by the mobile, i.e. Smobile and Pmobile. The secure element
also stores: Certbank(TSP ), Certbank(SE), Token Application Transaction Counter
(TATC), OTT and the token service provider’s digital signature on the hash of Static
Token Data (STD) which has the notation sSTSP [h(STD)]. The OTT is generated by
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TSP
Bank
Acquirer NodesPayment Terminal
 OperatorTerminal
Mobile
Scheme Operator
Intermediaries
Figure 5.1: Tokenised Contactless Mobile Payment Architecture of the Proposed Pro-
tocol
Table 5.1: Notation used in the Proposed Protocol
T/SE/SO/x : Terminal/Secure Element/Scheme Operator/Identity of X.
TSP/OTT : Token Service Provider/Oﬄine Transaction Token.
TATC : Token Application Transaction Counter, count of token transac-
tions since personalisation. It is shared between mobile, bank &
TSP and used during key derivations.
MaxV alue : Maximum value of the total oﬄine token transactions allowed per
OTT. Predefined value set by the bank.
Tlimit : Transaction Limit is a record kept in the secure element. It is the
total value of previous oﬄine token transactions.
KTo′ : Token Cryptogram Generation Symmetric Session Key derived by
a key derivation function used by TSP.
K : SE generated Symmetric Session Key.
EK{Z} : Symmetric Encryption of data string Z using key K.
SX : Private Signature Key of entity X.
sSX [Z] : Digital signature outcome (without message recovery) from apply-
ing the private signature transformation on data string Z using SX
of X.
PX , P
−1
X : Public Encryption/Decryption Key Pair of entity X.
ePX{Z} : Encryption of data string Z using a public algorithm with PX .
CertY (X) : Public Key Certificate of X issued and certified by Y .
aX : Ambient sensor details issued by entity X.
h(Z) : Hash of data string Z.
nX / n2X : First / second nonce issued by entity X.
A||B : Concatenation of A and B in that order.
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the TSP and has a strong cryptographic binding with the bank, TSP , Token and ntsp.
The OTT consists of a TokenData part and an encrypted part (Token Cryptogram).
The construction of the OTT is shown below.
OTT = TokenData||TokenCryptogram
TokenData = Token||TokenExpiry||TokenR-ID2
TokenCryptogram = EKTo′{TokenData||MaxV alue ||CurrencyCode||ntsp}
The OTT is securely provisioned to the secure element using an OTA channel.
Once the OTA is provisioned the secure element keeps a record of the MaxV alue
and the Tlimit. The MaxV alue is the total oﬄine token transactions value allowed
for a particular OTT. This is a predefined value set by the issuing bank, taking the
liability involved in oﬄine transactions into consideration. The Tlimit is the total value
of previous oﬄine token transactions carried out using a particular OTT. In a given
transaction scenario, the secure element adds the prospective transaction value to the
Tlimit to check whether the combined value exceeds the MaxV alue. The secure element
only presents the OTT to a terminal if the prospective transaction does not exceed the
MaxV alue.
However, whenever there is online capability and the MaxV alue of a particular
OTT has been reached, a new OTT is provisioned automatically to the secure element
using an OTA channel. The provisioning of the new token simultaneously resets the
Tlimit.
Following personalisation of the payment application, the user is required to enter
a passcode for secure access to the payment application. The passcode is stored in the
secure element for future authentication of the user with the payment application.
Figure 5.2: Certificate Hierarchy used in the Proposed Architecture
The certificate hierarchy used to verify the public encryption keys and signature
verification keys of the entities is shown in Figure 5.2. The scheme operator is at
2Token Requester ID: 11-digit unique numeric value, positions 1-3 indicating TSP and positions
4-11 indicating the requester and token domain [20].
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the top level of the certificate hierarchy used in the proposal. Terminals and secure
elements participating in the payment scheme can verify certificates issued by the
scheme operator or entities that have been certified to be trusted in the certificate
hierarchy. The TSP also takes part in the payment scheme. As illustrated in Figure 5.2,
the secure element’s public key is certified by the bank and the terminal’s public key is
certified directly by the scheme operator. We have constructed the certificate hierarchy
in this manner because the number of secure elements that need certifying is greater
than the number of terminals. In the current payment architecture, a terminal is
deployed by the merchant’s acquiring bank or by a subcontractor of the acquiring bank.
In our proposal, the scheme operator certifies the terminal’s public key. However, on
a practical note, in the current payment architecture, terminal manufacturers need to
have their terminals certified by a scheme operator. Therefore, it is within the capability
of the scheme operator to certify each terminal’s public key directly, probably at the
same time.
5.3.3 Payment Phase
The protocol messages of the proposal are illustrated in Table 5.2 and explained as
follows. To make a contactless mobile payment, the user access the payment application
by entering the passcode and holds the mobile device at close proximity to the terminal
(the NFC range of the terminal).
Table 5.2: Oﬄine Transaction Token Protocol.
1. T → SE : t||nt||CertSO(T )
2. SE → T : ePT {se||t||nse||nt||PDOL||K}
3. T → SE : EK{t||se||nse||n2t||amount||CurrencyCode}
4. SE → T : EK{se||t||n2se||n2t||OTT}||sSTSP [h(STD)] ||
sSSE [h(DAD)] ||Certbank(SE)
STD = se||OTT
DAD = n2t||n2se||OTT
a. T : SE read complete
b. T : oﬄine token & dynamic data authentication
c. T : approved/declined - post-transaction clearing request
Message 1: In the first transaction message, the terminal provides its identity,
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terminal-generated first nonce and the terminal’s public key certificate to the secure
element.
Message 2: The secure element then verifies CertSO(T ) and recovers PT . Only
a genuine terminal can provide a public key certificate that verifies correctly. The
second message includes; the identities, nSE , received nonce, the Processing Options
Data Object List (PDOL) [24] and the session key. The message is enciphered using
PT before sending to the terminal. The PDOL instructs the terminal what information
to transmit back to the secure element.
Message 3: The terminal first deciphers the received message and prepares to
send the data requested in the PDOL. The prepared message includes the identities,
the secure element’s nonce received previously, a fresh nonce, and the amount and
the currency code of the transaction. The message is then enciphered using K before
sending it to the secure element.
Message 4: The secure element deciphers the previous message and then carries
out the following verification steps before constructing message 4:
• The secure element checks whether it has received the expected nSE in order to
detect any replay attempts.
• The secure element examines the prospective transaction amount to check it is
within the maximum value of a single oﬄine token transaction set by the issuer.
If the transaction amount exceeds the maximum value the secure element declines
the transaction, otherwise it proceeds to the next verification.
• The secure element then verifies whether the amount of the transaction is with the
required limits. This is done by examining the Transaction Limit Tlimit kept in
the secure element’s record. The Tlimit includes the total value of previous oﬄine
token transactions. The secure element adds the prospective transaction amount
to the value in the Tlimit and checks to see whether the final amount exceeds
the MaxValue, which is the total oﬄine token transaction value allowed for a
particular OTT. If the MaxValue has been reached, the secure element declines
the transaction; otherwise the secure element proceeds to construct message 4.
The secure element updates the Tlimit record when message 4 is successfully
issued.
The secure element uses the Oﬄine Transaction Token (OTT ) for the payment
transaction and includes the following data in the constructed message: the identities;
n2se; n2t; and the OTT . The message is enciphered using K. The n2t forms part of the
Dynamic Application Data (DAD) used by the terminal to detect any replay attempts.
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Message 4 also includes the sSTSP [h(STD)], sSSE [h(DAD)] and the public key
certificate. The TSP ′s signature on static token data can be used by the terminal
to carry out oﬄine token data authentication to verify the authenticity of the OTT
related data oﬄine. The SE′s signature on the DAD can be used by the terminal to
carry out oﬄine dynamic data authentication to verify that it is communicating with
a genuine secure element. Finally the public key certificate can be used to verify the
signature through the certificate hierarchy.
Once message 4 is successfully sent, the secure element may leave the NFC field
of communication. The terminal then carries out the following four verification steps
before the OTT transaction is approved or declined:
• The terminal verifies sSTSP [h(STD)] by generating h(SE||OTT ) and comparing
it with the hash recovered from sSTSP [h(STD)]. If the two hashes match, this
verifies that the TSP has signed the STD presented to the terminal by the secure
element. This provides assurance to the terminal regarding the authenticity of
the OTT . If oﬄine token data authentication fails, the terminal declines the
transaction.
• The terminal then verifies the sSSE [h(DAD)] produced by the secure element.
The terminal generates the hash of the DAD received in message 4 and then
compares this with the hash recovered in the sSSE [h(DAD)]. If the two hashes
match, oﬄine dynamic data authentication is verified successfully, otherwise the
transaction is declined due to the potential of a replay attack. A replay of OTT
can be detected by the terminal due to a replayed message 4 not having the
terminal-generated n2t in the sSSE [h(DAD)].
If the verification steps are completed successfully, then the terminal approves the
oﬄine token transaction. If they fail, then the transaction is declined. In both cases, the
outcome is displayed to the user on the terminal and a printed transaction receipt may
be produced. The terminal issues a token payment clearing request when the terminal
is online capable at a later time, following a successful transaction of an oﬄine token
payment. In the event of an unsuccessful oﬄine token payment, the terminal declines
the transaction, displays a decline message on the terminal and a token payment clearing
request is not sent. The token payment clearing request starts the settlement phase.
The settlement process of the oﬄine token payment may follow the same transaction
processing channel as specified in the EMV tokenisation specification [20] and discussed
in section 2.1.5. The terminal may forward the token payment clearing requests which
include: OTTs and transaction details from a number of transactions, in bulk to the
acquirer. The acquiring bank then forwards the request to the scheme operator who
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then communicates with the TSP. The TSP is able to detokenise and validate the
OTTs. The retrieved PAN and transaction details are forwarded to the issuing bank
for payment clearing. The acquiring bank is settled via the scheme operator.
5.4 Analysis
In this section, the proposed solution is evaluated to see whether it achieves the protocol
objectives. The analysis discusses how the protocol can be extended to prevent token
relay attacks.
The analysis takes into consideration the operating environments outlined in Sec-
tion 2.1.5, protocol assumptions outlined in Section 5.3.1 and those described during
the setup stage in Section 5.3.2.
1. Secure oﬄine payment transactions: Achieving oﬄine transaction capabil-
ity during a tokenised payment was the main focus of the chapter. The proposed
contactless mobile payment protocol based on EMV tokenisation provides capa-
bility of making tokenised payments in a fully oﬄine environment. The proposed
protocol, in order to achieve the objective of making oﬄine token payments, uses
the OTT which includes STD as payment data.
The terminal carries out four verification steps to verify whether the oﬄine trans-
action is genuine. The terminal carries out oﬄine token data authentication, by
verifying sSTSP [h(STD)]. This gives an assurance regarding the authenticity of
the OTT . The terminal does oﬄine dynamic data authentication by verifying
the sSSE [h(DAD)]. By doing this, a replay of OTT is detected by the terminal
as the message would not include n2t if it is not genuine. If these verifications
fail, the terminal declines the transaction.
2. End-to-end encryption to protect transaction data: The protocol provides
end-to-end encryption between the terminal and the secure element. This pro-
vides confidentiality by preventing adversaries from eavesdropping on sensitive
token transaction-related data during transactions. The end-to-end encryption
provides security for transaction-related data other than the token. We further
establish this in Section 5.4.2 where we analyse the protocol in Scyther. Scyther
did not find any feasible attacks including attacks on the secrecy of transaction
data.
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5.4.1 Token Relay Attack
Relay attacks during EMV contactless payment transactions have been examined in
[102, 103, 122, 95, 169, 70]. Even though tokenisation prevents PAN compromise during
an EMV transaction, the current EMV tokenisation architecture specified in [20] does
not address concerns about relaying EMV tokenised payments. Consider the example of
a token relay attack where a genuine consumer makes a token-based contactless mobile
payment at a compromised terminal. The transaction is then relayed to a rogue secure
element elsewhere, which makes a payment at a genuine terminal simultaneously.
Investigating relay attacks is not the main focus of this chapter, however, as an
additional security feature to prevent or detect potential attempts of relay attacks
based on tokenised payments, we carry out the following discussion. We show how
our proposed protocol can be extended to detect and prevent token relay attacks by
adopting ambient sensing, as discussed and illustrated in Figure 5.3. An introduction
to ambient sensing and the explanation of how this can be used is given in Section 5.4.1.
Ambient Sensing
Figure 5.3 illustrates how ambient sensing can be used in the proposed EMV tokenisation-
based oﬄine contactless mobile payment protocol to detect and prevent token relay
attacks. Previous work related to relay attacks detection using ambient sensing can be
found in [136, 175, 100, 178]. Analysis on different sensors and recommendations on
selecting different sensors available on mobile devices can be found in [99]. Considering
two different ambient environments, AE1 and AE2, a token relay from a genuine mobile
in AE1 to a genuine terminal in AE2 via a rogue terminal and mobile can be detected
by the genuine terminal or a Trusted Third Party acting as a comparing entity.
Rogue
Terminal
Genuine
Mobile
Genuine
Terminal
Rogue
Mobile
a terminal =AE2
a mobile = AE1a mobile = AE1
Ambient 
Environment 1
(AE1) 
Ambient 
Environment 2
(AE2) 
a mobile = AE1
Figure 5.3: Ambient Sensing as a Token Relay Attack Prevention Countermeasure
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As illustrated in Figure 5.3, this detection is possible due to ambient sensor data
aterminal generated by the genuine terminal in AE2 being significantly different to the
relayed amobile produced by the genuine mobile in AE1. The difference in ambient
sensor data is detected when the comparison is made. The attributes collected as
ambient sensor data may include atmospheric pressure, ambient noise, ambient light,
Global Positioning System (GPS) data, and others [178].
A mobile device and a supported terminal capture their own ambient environment-
related data on each device using on-board sensors. In the protocol, the mobile sends
its ambient sensor data amobile in message 4 as shown below.
Table 5.3: Extended Protocol Messages.
4. SE → T : EK{SE||n2se||n2t||OTT ||amobile}||
sSTSP [h(STD)] ||sSSE [h(DAD)]
DAD = n2t||n2se||OTT ||amobile
b. T : oﬄine token relay detection
In the protocol stage, any attempted token relay attacks are detected oﬄine by the
terminal. This is due to the transaction being oﬄine and a trusted third party, such
as the TSP , being unavailable to act as a comparing party. To this end, the terminal
generates its own ambient sensor data aterminal and compares it with the amobile received
in message 4. This verification can be completed in step b of the protocol. As amobile
forms part of the DAD, it provides data origin authentication of amobile and other
dynamic application data to the terminal by verifying sSSE [h(DAD)]. If the two
components match or meet the expected threshold, then the terminal proceeds to the
next verification stage; otherwise the terminal declines the oﬄine token transaction
because of the potential of a token relay attack.
5.4.2 Mechanical Formal Analysis
In this section, the proposed protocol is subjected to mechanical formal analysis using
Scyther [80].
The adversarial model used in this analysis is the Dolev-Yao model in [87]. The
following security claims are verified in the analysis: Secrecy of data (Secret), Aliveness
(Alive), Weak agreement (Weakagree), Non-injective agreement (Niagree) and Non-
injective synchronisation (Nisynch) [81, 80]. In addition to the claim types defined
above, the verify automatic claims feature on Scyther was used to verify other claims
[80]. In the adversary model, we have excluded the terminal’s public key certificate
from the adversary’s knowledge. This is because only a genuine terminal is able to
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provide its public key certificate to the secure element and the adversary is unable to
compromise a genuine public key certificate that follows a certificate hierarchy.
Following successful execution of the script, the security of data in the claim events
were verified and Scyther did not find any feasible attacks. In our analysis, we do
not consider the secrecy of the terminal’s first generated nonce (nt) sent in Message
1 as a security concern. This is because, according to the protocol assumptions in
Section 5.3.1, nonces are random and unpredictable. Therefore, an adversary cannot
deduce the second generated nonce (nt2) by examining (nt). As a result, knowledge of
(nt) is of no value to the adversary because for the construction of the DAD, only the
second nonce (nt2) is used. The Scyther script is available in Appendix A.2 and can
be downloaded from [8].
5.4.3 Practical Implementation
In this section, we provide details of the protocol implementation, our experience, and
performance measurements for the protocol.
The protocol was implemented to obtain performance measurements and to provide
a comparison with other protocols. In our implementation, a Java application was
developed to run as the terminal on a Microsoft Windows 7 PC with a 3.2GHz processor
and an 8GB RAM. Then a separate Java card applet was developed to run the payment
application on the mobile. The applet was provisioned to the 16-bit hardware secure
element of a Nokia 6131 mobile phone. For our implementation, obtaining a mobile
phone with an embedded secure element that gave read/write permissions to the secure
element was a challenging task. The only mobile phone with an embedded secure
element with read/write access to provision our payment applet that was available at
the time was the Nokia 6131 mobile phone. In our applet development phase, we found
that Java card frameworks v2.2.2 or above were not supported by the secure element.
In order to provide compatibility with the secure element, the Java card applet was
compiled using Java card framework v2.2.1.
All four messages of our proposed protocol detailed in Table 5.2 were implemented.
The communication between the terminal and the secure element was carried out by
command and response Application Protocol Data Units (APDU) [160, 191]. In our
implementation for asymmetric encryption, we used plain RSA [176] with 1024-bit key
and recommended padding. We used MD5 [167] as the hashing algorithm and the RSA
Digital Signature Algorithm for signatures [46].
During our implementation, we found that even though the Java card framework
v2.2.1 specification [10] supports Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the secure
element we used did not support AES. Because of this limitation on the secure element,
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we used double-length key Triple DES [121] in Electronic Codebook mode for symmetric
encryption. The algorithm was also supported by the Java card framework v2.2.1 [10].
It is important to note that, double-length key Triple DES is an approved cryptographic
algorithm and electronic codebook is an approved mode of operation in the EMV
specification [14, see: p135-145].
The protocol is scalable to use other advanced algorithms, modes of operations and
hashing algorithms. If the implementation had been carried out on a modern mobile
phone with an embedded secure element, we would have used AES for symmetric
encryption and SHA256 as the hashing algorithm.
Table 5.4: Performance Measurements Comparison in Milliseconds
Measures
Proposed Protocol SSL [193] TLS [194] P-STCP [34] STCP [36]
OTT
Specification 16bit 32bit 32bit 16bit 16bit
Time to complete 3971ms 4200ms 4300ms 4344ms 3875ms
A performance measurements comparison between the proposed OTT protocol and
some other protocols implemented on smart cards is shown in Table 5.4. At the time of
writing, we could not find any oﬄine token protocols or their timing measurements in
published literature to enable us to carry out a more accurate comparison. In order for
us to understand the performance of the protocol, we choose performance measurements
from four different protocols available in the literature. The chosen protocols were also
implemented on smart cards for measurements in their corresponding papers.
Three different timing measurements were obtained from our implemented protocol.
We recorded timing measurements for Message 2, Message 4 and the total time for the
protocol to complete. For Messages 2 and 4, timing was measured from the time
the command APDU [160] was sent from the terminal to the time it received the
response APDU [160] from the secure element. The overall protocol completion time
was measured from the time the applet selection command APDU was sent from the
terminal to the time it completed all the verifications after receiving Message 4. The
measurements for Message 2 and Message 4 were 751 milliseconds and 3086 milliseconds
respectively. The overall protocol completed in 3971 milliseconds. The overall time
it took to complete the protocol fell in the same performance range as the compared
protocols in Table 5.4. Another point to note is that, the 16bit hardware secure element
on the Nokia 6131 mobile phone used in our implementation was released in 2006. A
more recent 32bit secure element on a modern smart phone would most probably give
improved performance measurements.
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, an OTT protocol based on EMV tokenisation was proposed. The
proposed solution achieves the two main objectives of the protocol: to be able to
make secure oﬄine token transactions and to provide end-to-end security between the
terminal and the secure element. The proposal was analysed and we further identified
how the protocol could be extended to prevent potential token relay attacks. Finally,
we subjected the protocol to mechanical formal analysis using Scyther and provided
performance measurements from a practical implementation. At the time of writing,
apart from [77, 152], there is no publicly available academic research based on EMV
tokenisation. To the author’s knowledge, the work carried out here is the first to
propose an oﬄine transaction token protocol with mechanical formal analysis, practical
implementation and performance measurements.
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In this chapter, we further investigate the current tokenisation architecture
and identify a number of weaknesses that pose a few security threats to to-
kenised payments. We identify five potential attack scenarios in the current
architecture, especially when a particular implementation of EMV tokeni-
sation uses a static-token which is passed onto payment terminals during
every transaction. We then propose a contactless payment protocol that
addresses these security concerns and enhances the security of tokenised
payment transactions.
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6.1 Introduction
EMV provides a number of benefits for both merchants and consumers such as: provid-
ing the capability of making a payment transaction at a supporting terminal anywhere
in the world. However, in Section 2.1.3, we discussed why, compromising the Primary
Account Number (PAN) sent during EMV transactions to be used in card-holder not
present or magnetic-stripe transactions is a problem. EMV Tokenisation was adopted
as a countermeasure to PAN compromise[20]. Tokenisation replaces the PAN by a
substitutive value called the Token which is a 13-19 digit numeric value that does not
reveal the PAN and passes validation checks set by the payment scheme[20]. Since its
introduction, EMV tokenisation has seen early adoption in contactless mobile payment
applications[22, 83, 25].
Near Field Communication (NFC) modules in smart phones and portable devices
enable users to carry out close proximity communication which also include contactless
payments. Here the mobile emulates a contactless smart card. In this chapter, the
payment device that emulates a contactless smart card is referred to as a mobile. Mo-
biles let users store a number of payment applications in one place and have hardware
or software secure element technologies. Secure elements provide a secure execution
environment to carry out sensitive executions. Compared to a contactless smart card,
one of the additional capabilities of a mobile is the readily available communication
channels via the network operator or Wi-Fi.
In Section 2.1.4, an introduction to EMV tokenisation was given and the tokenised
payment architecture was discussed. The Scheme Operator (SO) was referred to as
the Payment Network in Chapter 2.1.4. The numerous intermediaries involved in the
payment communication channel between the terminal and the SO include: third party
terminal providers that the acquiring bank may have used as sub-contractors to process
merchant payments, nodes that carry out key-translation at different locations in the
payment channel. The payment architecture and the transaction message flow of a
generic EMV contactless mobile transaction based on tokenisation is illustrated in
Figure 6.1. The intermediaries are outlined in a dotted rectangle.
We explained the transaction message flow during a generic EMV tokenised pay-
ment transaction in Section 2.1.5. The only additional message flow that we elaborate
upon here is the communication between the intermediaries. After receiving the token
and token related data, the terminal sends the additional token related data in the
transaction authorisation message to the Scheme Operator (SO)/ Card Issuing Bank
(CIB) via a number of intermediaries for approval. These intermediaries also engage
in same key-translation process.
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Figure 6.1: Generic EMV Tokenised Payment Architecture
In the payment architecture, the SO has a direct communication channel to the TSP
and the bank. The payment terminal operator supplies terminals or rents out terminals
to a number of merchants. It also engages in collecting transactions originating from
the merchant’s terminals and forwards them towards the SO/CIB. A payment terminal
operator can either be a third party, or an acquirer’s subcontractor. However, whether
it’s a third party payment service provider or an acquirer’s subcontractor does not
change our attack scenarios discussed later. A key translation mechanism is used for
communication of transaction data between the terminal and the SO in both directions.
The same communication path between the terminal and the SO that was taken to send
the transaction authorisation request is also taken in reverse to send the transaction
authorisation response back to the terminal.
The bank, SO, mobile and TSP are considered as secure and trusted entities. In
contrast to this, we consider that the terminal has the potential to be compromised.
This is evident from reports and research shown in [183, 74, 89, 60]. The compromised
terminal could also represent a rogue NFC enabled mobile phone acting as a terminal
[91]. We also consider that the intermediaries have the potential to be compromised.
This assumption is not too far fetched due to reports and research shown in [45, 117,
118, 114] which makes our assumptions reasonable. Taking this operating environment
into consideration, we expand the discussion to outline potential attack scenarios in
the next section.
6.1.1 Problem Statement
In this section, we discuss two problem areas that raise concerns about the security
of tokenised contactless mobile payments. The first problem area that we identify
is related to the process where the terminal and the mobile is authenticated during
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a transaction. During a payment transaction, the terminal always authenticates the
card/mobile but the card/mobile does not authenticate the terminal. There is a general
assumption that the terminal is a trusted and a secure device. An adversary at a rogue
terminal can carry out a number of attacks during a tokenised payment transaction
because of this lack of mutual authentication.
The second problem area we identify in our work is the fact that similar indelible
trust assumptions are placed on the intermediary entities between the terminal and
the SO / CIB in the EMV payment architecture. When this trust assumption is
disregarded, an adversary compromising one of the intermediary entities is able to
compromise payment transaction details and carry out fraudulent transaction. The
acronyms used in this chapter are listed in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Acronyms used in the Chapter
ARC : Authorisation Response Code
CDA : Combined Data Authentication
CIB : Card Issuing Bank
DDA : Dynamic Data Authentication
DTD : Dynamic Token Data
DTT : Dynamic Transaction Token
EMV : Europay MasterCard Visa
NFC : Near Field Communication
PAN : Primary Account Number
SDA : Static Data Authentication
SO : Scheme Operator
SPDL : Security Protocol Description Language
TAR : Token Authorisation Request
TSP : Token Service Provider
TVR : Terminal Verification Result
6.1.2 Contributions
The chapter provides three main contributions. These are: 1) Providing mutual-
authentication between the terminal and the mobile in the proposed solution, so that
both entities are able to authenticate to each other. 2) To address the security concerns
that arise form using static-token, the proposed solution uses a Dynamic Transaction
Token (DTT) that is unique to a particular transaction. 3) To eliminate the indelible
trust assumptions placed on the intermediaries, the proposed protocol provides end-to-
end encryption between the terminal and the Token Service Provider (TSP) as well as
the terminal and the mobile.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 the two potential
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problem areas and the corresponding attack scenarios are discussed. The proposed
protocol is introduced in Section 6.3 and evaluated in Section 6.4 against protocol
objectives. Finally the protocol is subject to mechanical formal analysis in Section 6.4.1.
6.2 Potential Attacks
In this section, we outline potential attack scenarios associated with two main problem
areas in tokenised contactless mobile payments.
6.2.1 Adversary Compromises a Terminal
In this problem area, there are three different potential attacks. The attack scenarios
are outlined and discussed in Attacks 1, 2 & 3 given below. The terminal is considered
to be a trusted device. Even though, a contactless card/mobile is authenticated to the
terminal, the cardholder cannot authenticate or verify the terminal to be genuine device,
meaning there is no mutual-authentication between the terminal and the card/mobile.
When the trust assumption is taken out, a rogue terminal controlled by an adversary
could be included in EMV contactless payment process. For these attacks, we assume
an adversary with the following capabilities. An adversary:
• can gain full control of the terminal including what is displayed on screen for the
payer.
• can change transaction related details such as the amount.
• cannot break standardised encryption algorithms.
• might collude with another adversary that compromises and controls an interme-
diary between the terminal and the SO/CIB.
Attack 1: Over Charging
In this attack scenario, the adversary fraudulently enters a large payment amount
(within the contactless limit) for a transaction but displays the correct purchasing
product price on the terminal screen for the consumer. Due to the terminal not being
authenticated by the mobile, at the time of making the payment, It is not possible for
the mobile to detect whether the terminal is genuine or rogue. Also, the transaction
amount is not displayed on the mobile. Therefore the user does not have any alternative
option other than to believe the amount displayed on the merchants terminal is true.
So the consumer, unaware of the fraudulently over charged amount, continues to make
a payment. At the time of writing, there are a number of mobile banking applications
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that send Short Message Service (SMS) notifications or in-app push notifications for
mobile/card base contactless payments [22, 31, 32]. However, these notifications are
generated post payment and not before making a payment.
Attack 2: Capturing Static Token & Related Data
The second attack scenario we outline is a static token and token related data cap-
turing attack. In this attack scenario, an accomplice controlling the rogue terminal
transacts with a genuine mobile making a tokenised contactless mobile payment. The
genuine mobile sends the static token and token cryptogram to the rogue terminal. The
accomplice captures the static token, its associated cryptogram and other transaction
related data. The rogue terminal may display an authentication failed message on the
terminal and refuse purchase for the consumer. The captured details are used by the
adversary in Attack 4.
Attack 3: Capturing The Unpredictable Number
The attack we describe here is a Unpredictable Number capturing attack. The EMV
Specification defines the Unpredictable Number as a “Value to provide variability and
uniqueness to the generation of a cryptogram [15]”. In this chapter we refer to this
as the terminal nonce. Even though the attack is not a direct compromise of the
terminal, the captured Unpredictable Numbers are generated by the terminal, hence
we list this attack under this category. The EMV tokenisation specification does not
specify whether oﬄine data authentication needs to be carried out by the terminal [20].
Because tokenised payments operate in an online setting, at first, it is not apparent as
to why oﬄine data authentication is actually needed. However, we highlight why failing
to carrying out oﬄine data authentication aggravates the identified security concern.
The attack steps are described below.
1. An adversary attempts a payment at a genuine terminal to obtain the unpre-
dictable number generated by the genuine terminal.
2. At the absence of oﬄine data authentication, the terminal is unable to verify
whether the payment application related data presented by the mobile is genuine.
3. Therefore, the terminal nonce is sent to the mobile as a challenge to be signed by
the mobile in order to carry out dynamic data authentication.
4. The nonce forms part of the dynamic application data which is later signed by
the mobile to generate the digital signature expected by the terminal.
5. Soon as the nonce is received by the rogue mobile, the adversary captures the
nonce and halts any further communication with the terminal.
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In some instances, even if Static Data Authentication (SDA) is carried out by the
terminal, it may still be possible to compromise the terminal nonce if SDA is not
carried out before the nonce is sent. For example, as explained in [70], Visa’s payWave
qVSDC protocol sends the terminal generated nonce before SDA. This would enable
an adversary to obtain the terminal unpredictable number. Potential attacks and other
security concerns related to compromising terminal unpredictable numbers are shown
in [59, 60].
6.2.2 Adversary Compromises an Intermediary
In this section, we discuss the second problem area that raise security concerns in
tokenised contactless mobile payments. In the current EMV architecture, indelible trust
assumptions are placed on the intermediaries between the terminal and the SO/CIB.
When this trust assumption is disregarded, an adversary compromising one of the
intermediaries has a potential attack scenario to infiltrate transaction details and make
fraudulent transactions. The adversary at the compromised intermediary observes
all transaction data passing through it, which also include transaction authorisation
requests, tokens and token related data. For these attacks, we assume the following
adversary’s capabilities. An adversary:
• can compromise any of the intermediaries.
• can gain access to transaction data at the compromised intermediary.
• cannot break standardised and strong encryption algorithms.
• cannot compromise smart cards, the SO or the CIB.
• might collude with the adversary that compromises a terminal.
Attack 4: Adversary Replays An Authorisation Response For Cloned Token
Data
The attack scenario is realised when the transacting terminal fails to carry out adequate
oﬄine data authentication method such as Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) or
Combined Data Authentication (CDA) [14], but sends the transaction data for online
transaction authorisation. We highlight why failing to carrying out adequate oﬄine
data authentication methods such as DDA or CDA aggravates the identified security
concern. The adversary at the compromised intermediary is able to observe all trans-
action data passing through it which also includes: transaction authorisation requests
intended for the SO/CIB. The attack steps are described below.
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1. The adversary works together with the accomplice, who captured the static token
and the corresponding token data in the previously discussed Attack 2.
2. The accomplice chooses a terminal that has an established communication path to
the SO/CIB via the compromised intermediary and makes a contactless payment
with the captured static token data.
3. The terminal carries out SDA on the presented static token data. As the data
were captured from a genuine mobile, the SDA verification at the terminal com-
pletes successfully. However, without DDA or CDA where a dynamic signature
is generated by the mobile and verified by the terminal, the terminal is not able
to detect the cloned data.
4. The terminal sends the transaction data online for transaction authorisation.
5. The adversary, instead of passing the transaction authorisation request to the
authorising entity, stops the request from reaching the authorising entity. The
particular transaction can be identified by the adversary using the static token
included in the message.
6. Instead, the adversary replays an Authorisation Response Code (ARC) pretend-
ing to have come from the authorising entity and indicates that the transaction
was successfully authorised. Once the authorisation response is received, the
terminal approves the transaction.
7. Unlike in a contact-based EMV transaction, the transaction authorisation re-
sponse cryptogram is not sent to the contactless card/mobile [14]. One of the
reasons for this is that in contactless EMV, there is no assurance that the card is
kept in the reader’s field by a cardholder. Because of this reason, the transaction
authorisation response is not enciphered by the bank with a key shared between
the card/mobile and the bank.
Attack 5: Replaying An Authorisation Response For DDA/CDA
In Attack 4, we explained that the EMV tokenisation specification does not specify
whether oﬄine data authentication needs to be carried out [20] as tokenisation operates
on an online environment and showed how this was realised when the terminal did not
carry out DDA/ CDA as oﬄine data authentication. However, from our understanding,
it is still possible to provide oﬄine data authentication for tokenised payments for
additional security before a transaction is sent online for authorisation. In this attack
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scenario, we assume that the terminal is carrying out DDA/CDA and identify another
weakness that could lead to a potential compromise. The attack steps are described
below.
1. The adversary works together with an accomplice, who is in possession of a
number of lost & stolen contactless mobiles. The attack is carried out during
the time-slot between the cards/mobiles are lost/stolen and the relevant issuing
banks are notified by the owners.
2. The accomplice chooses a terminal that has an established communication path to
the SO/CIB via the compromised intermediary and makes a contactless payment.
3. The terminal carries out the dynamic oﬄine data verification. As the dynamic
signature is generated by a genuine mobile, the terminal verification finishes suc-
cessfully. The terminal then sends the transaction data online for authorisation.
4. The adversary, instead of passing the transaction authorisation request to the
authorising entity, captures it.
5. The adversary replays a previously communicated ARC generated by the autho-
rising entity. Once the authorisation response is received, the terminal approves
the transaction.
6.3 Proposed Solution
In this section, we propose a solution that addresses the security concerns discussed in
Section 6.2. The main objectives of the protocol are listed below.
1. Should prevent Attacks 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5.
2. There should be a process to carry out mutual authentication between the ter-
minal and the mobile.
3. End-to-end encryption should be provided between the secure element and the
terminal, as well as between the terminal and the TSP.
6.3.1 Protocol Assumptions
We have made the following assumptions in our proposed solution:
• A secure channel is used for the communication between the mobile and the TSP
(SO in this instance).
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• The TSP is a trusted entity that provides transaction token issuing, de-tokenisation,
token updates and management on behalf of the CIB in a secure manner.
• The SO acts as the TSP in the payment architecture discussed in the proposed
solution.
The notation used in the proposed solution is given in Table 6.2. The tokenised
contactless mobile payment architecture of the proposed protocol is illustrated in Fig-
ure 6.2. The proposed protocol has a setup stage and a payment stage. In the Setup
Stage, involves securely provisioning the payment app and related data to the mo-
bile. The Payment Stage is initiated when making a contactless mobile payment. The
transaction scenario in this chapter is when both the terminal and the mobile are online
capable to reach the TSP. Providing oﬄine tokenised payments is not the focus of this
chapter and related work on this was carried out in the previous chapter 5.
Table 6.2: Notation used in the Proposed Protocols
T/SE/x : Terminal/Secure Element/Identity of X.
TATC : Token Application Transaction Counter, count of token
transactions since personalisation. It is shared between
mobile, bank & TSP and used during key derivations.
K : SE generated Symmetric Session Key.
Ks1 : Symmetric Encryption Session Key shared between TSP
and SE.
Ks2 : TSP generated Symmetric Encryption Session Key used by
the terminal to communicate with the TSP .
KTo′ : Token Cryptogram Generation Symmetric Session Key de-
rived by a key derivation function used by TSP.
EK{Z} : Symmetric Encryption of data string Z using key K.
SX : Private Signature Key of entity X.
sSX [Z] : Digital signature outcome (without message recovery) from
applying the private signature transformation on data string
Z using SX of X.
PX , P
−1
X : Public Encryption/Decryption Key Pair of entity X.
ePX{Z} : Encryption of data string Z using a public algorithm with
PX .
CertY (X) : Public Key Certificate of X issued and certified by Y .
h(Z) : Hash of data string Z.
nX / n2X : First / second nonce issued by entity X.
A||B : Concatenation of A and B in that order.
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Bank
Acquirer NodesPayment Terminal
 OperatorTerminal
Mobile
Intermediaries
1 2 3 6
TSP
8
7
8
7
8
7
Figure 6.2: Tokenised Contactless Mobile Payment Architecture of the Proposed Pro-
tocol
6.3.2 Setup Stage
During the setup phase of the protocol, the personalisation of the payment applica-
tion and provisioning of security sensitive data elements of the payment application
and credentials are carried out using a secure channel. Following the application per-
sonalisation, the security sensitive data elements of the payment application reside in
the SE and the user interface part of the payment application reside in the mobile
platform. The data elements stored in the SE includes, all cryptographic keys needed
by the mobile eg: KSE , Ks1, SSE & PSE/P
−1
SE . The SE also stores: Certbank(TSP ),
Certbank(SE), Token Application Transaction Counter (TATC). Following successful
personalisation of the payment app, on the first use, the user is required to enter a
strong pass-code on first access which is then used for future authentication to login to
the payment app. The subsequent transaction protocols are constructed based upon
the above mentioned data elements.
Terminals and secure elements participating in the payment scheme can verify cer-
tificates issued by the SO or entities that have been certified to be trusted in the
certificate hierarchy. The TSP also takes part in the payment scheme.
6.3.3 Payment Phase
To make a payment during the payment phase of the protocol, the user opens the
payment application by entering the pass-code and taps the device on the terminal. The
protocol messages of the proposed solution are illustrated in Table 6.3 and explained
as follows.
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Table 6.3: Dynamic Transaction Token Protocol Messages.
1. T → SE : t||nt||CertSO(T )
2. SE → T : V ||sSSE [h(V )] ||CertBank(SE)
V = ePT {se||t||nse||nt||PDOL||K||tsp}
3. T → SE : W ||sST [h(W )]
W = EK{t||se||nse||n2t||amount||ePTSP {t||amount||n3t}}
4. SE → TSP : EKs1{se||tsp||n2se||TokenR-ID||amount||
TATC||CertSO(T )||ePTSP {t||amount||n3t}}
5. TSP → SE : EKs1{tsp||se||n2se||ntsp||ePT {DTD}||sSTSP [h(DTD)]}
DTD = tsp||se||t||n2tsp||n3t||DTT ||Ks2
6. SE → T : EK{se||t||n3se||n2t||ePT {DTD}||sSTSP [h(DTD)]}
7. T → TSP : Token||EKs2{t||tsp||Token||n2tsp||n4t||DTT ||
POSem||TV R}
8. TSP → T : Token||EKs2{tsp||t||n3tsp||n4t||Token||
TokenAssuranceLevel|| PANlast4digits||ARC}
Message 1: At the start of the protocol, the T provides its identity, nt and CertSO(T )
to the SE.
Message 2: The SE obtains PT after verifying CertSO(T ). The SE constructs a
message that includes: both identities, nse, nt, the Processing Options Data Object
List (PDOL) that instructs the T what information to send back to the T[24], a session
key generated by the SE to be used in further communication between the T and the
identity of the TSP. The SE enciphers the message using PT . A digital signature of the
message is generated by the SE and both the enciphered part and the digital signature
is sent to the T. The SE’s public key certificate is also sent in the same message.
Message 3: Using the certificate hierarchy, the T verifies the signature of the secure
element in order to authenticate the device that is making the payment. Once the SE
is authenticated, the T deciphers the message. Afterwards, the T encrypts and signs
a message which includes: the identities, nse, n2t, the amount of the transaction and
an encipherment carried out using PTSP on the T’s identity, amount and n3t. The full
message and the signature is then sent to the SE.
Message 4: Using the certificate hierarchy, the SE verifies the signature, authenticates
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the T and deciphers message 3 to obtain transaction related information. Now the SE
prepares to request a token from the TSP by constructing a message. The message
includes: the identities, n2se, Token Requester ID, amount, the Token Application
Transaction Counter (TATC), CertSO(T ) and ePTSP {t||amount||n3t}. The message
is then encrypted using the symmetric key Ks1 shared between the TSP and the SE
before sending.
Message 5: The TSP, first verifies the CertSO(T ) and obtains the T’s public key.
The TSP deciphers ePTSP {t||amount||n3t} and checks whether the amount recovered
from this matches the amount requested by the SE. If satisfied, the TSP queries the
CIB and verifies the user eligibility to be issued a new token. Once this process is
carried out, a DTT and a session key Ks2 is generated by the TSP. The TSP then
creates Dynamic Token Data (DTD) which includes: the identities, n2tsp, DTT and
Ks2. The TSP signs the hash of DTD. The DTD is then enciphered using PT . The
TSP then creates a message that includes: the identities, n2se, ntsp, ePT {DTD} and
sSTSP [h(DTD)]. The message is then enciphered using Ks1 before sending. DTT is
constructed as follows;
DTT = TokenData||TokenCryptogram
TokenData = TokenID||TokenExpiry||TokenR-ID
TokenCryptogram = EKTo′{TokenData||amount||n3t}
Message 6: The SE, prepares a message to send the ePT {DTD} and
sSTSP [h(DTD)] to the T. The message includes: the identities, n3se, n2t,
ePT {DTD} and sSTSP [h(DTD)]. The message is then enciphered using K before
sending. If the SE is not in the NFC field, the user taps the SE on the T again to
transmit the message. Once the message is successfully sent to the T, the SE may leave
the NFC field.
Message 7: After deciphering the message received from the SE, first the nonce is
examined by the T to detect any replay attempts. The T then deciphers the ePT {DTD}
to obtain DTD and verifies sSTSP [h(DTD)] to have been generated by the TSP . Once
satisfied, the T carries out dynamic token data authentication to verify the authenticity
of the presented data. For this the T generates the hash of the DTD received in the
previous message and compares this with the hash recovered in the sSTSP [h(DTD)].
If the two hashes match, dynamic token data authentication is verified successfully,
otherwise the transaction is declined due to the potential of a replay attack.
Depending on the outcome of the dynamic token data authentication, the T con-
structs a Token Authorisation Request (TAR) and forwards it to the TSP for payment
authorisation. To construct the payment authorisation message, the T first constructs a
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message which includes: identities, Token, n2tsp, n4t, DTT , Point-Of-Sale Entry Mode
(POSem)1 and the Terminal Verification Result (TVR) indicating the outcome of the
oﬄine dynamic token data verification. This message is then enciphered using Ks2.
The T also appends the Token to the encipherment before forwarding the message to
the TSP . The existing key translation mechanism is used by the T to forward the
TAR to the TSP via the Intermediaries, for financial transaction authorisation.
The only data sent in the clear is the Token, which on its own cannot be used by
the Intermediary to obtain any useful information corresponding to the PAN . In the
operating environment of the proposed solution, the SO acts as the TSP, therefore the
message is received at the TSP. However in a scenario where the scheme operator is not
taking the role of the TSP , the scheme operator by observing the Token can identify
which TSP it needs to forward the token to.
Message 8: After receiving the TAR, the TSP carries out the following checks to
validate the token:
• queries its database records in-relation to the issued tokens and checks details
such as: expiry, requester ID, amount and the token cryptogram.
• if the token related data is validated properly, the TSP conducts payment token
de-tokenisation to map the token details into PAN details.
Following these verifications the TSP retrieves the PAN details and contacts the
CIB to obtain an ARC. The TSP provides information such as: the PAN, PAN ex-
piry date, amount, POSem, token, token expiry, token requester ID and the Token
Authorisation Request Result (TARresult) in order to obtain the ARC. The TARresult
contains three main components. These are: the outcome of TSP’s token verifica-
tion has passed or failed, TokenAssuranceLevel which indicates the level of assurance
that the TSP has assigned to the token depending on the confidence of the TSP and
TokenAssuranceData which indicates the data used by the TSP to assign a token
assurance level. The CIB before issuing the ARC carries out the following account
level validations:
• retrieve account details corresponding to the PAN.
• check whether there are sufficient funds available and no account restrictions.
• verify POSem and the token has not been presented for authorisation before.
1The POSem acts as a Token Domain Restriction Control [20] to prevent other cross channel fraud
by restricting the tokens to a specific payment channel (contactless mobile payments in this scenario).
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• check the outcome of the TARresult validation carried out by the TSP.
Following all the validation steps, the ARC is issued to the TSP by the CIB.
Afterwards, the TSP constructs a message that includes: the identities, n3tsp, n4t the
Token, Token Assurance Level, the last 4 digits of the PAN and the ARC generated
by the CIB. The message is then enciphered using Ks2. The TSP also appends the
Token to the encipherment before the message is sent to the T via the Intermediaries.
The Intermediary cannot deduce any information corresponding to the PAN or the
authorisation response other then the Token.
Once the message is received, the T deciphers the message using the session key
and examines the results in order to approve/decline the transaction. The outcome
is displayed on the T. The merchant may produce a receipt that includes transaction
details such as the amount, last 4 digits of the PAN, date, time and ARC to be given
to the user upon request.
6.4 Analysis
In this section, the protocol proposed in this chapter is analysed for its security and
protocol objectives. In our analysis we have taken the following into consideration:
the operating environments outlined in Section 2.1.5, adversary capabilities outlined in
Sections 6.2.1 & 6.2.2 and protocol assumptions outlined in Section 6.3.1.
At the beginning of the protocol, both the secure element and the terminal are
authenticated to each other. The established mutual-authentication between the two
entities provides a strong security assurance before security sensitive transaction data
are communicated. Due to the unforgeability of the digital signature used, only a
genuine secure element and the terminal is able to generate their own signatures. The
signatures can be verified using the certificate hierarchy.
The proposed protocol provides end-to-end encryption between the terminal and
the secure element. This provides confidentiality to token transaction related data
by preventing adversaries from eavesdropping. The protocol also provides end-to-end
encryption for the communication between the terminal and the TSP which provides
confidentiality to the communicated information and eliminates the need for placing
indelible trust assumptions on the intermediaries. Below we analyse how the identified
attacks that compromise token transaction data in Section 6.2 are prevented in the
proposed protocol. Table 6.4 categorises different countermeasures used for each attack.
Attack 1 (Over Charging): In the proposed protocol, message 3 sent by the ter-
minal to the secure element has transaction related data including the amount which
is displayed on the users mobile. The request to obtain the dynamic transaction token
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is requested by the mobile device from the TSP, only after the user authorises the
amount displayed on the user’s mobile screen. Any attempts taken by the merchant to
overcharge the user will be detected and the transaction cancelled. Furthermore, the
corresponding token is requested by the mobile using the data received in message 3,
hence a rogue merchant is not in a position to change the amount to a different value.
Further more, any amendments to the transaction amount can be detected due to the
DTD having the transaction amount in it.
Attack 2 (Capturing Static Token & Related Data): In the proposed protocol,
a mutual-authentication process is carried out between the terminal and the mobile
device before the token and token related data is given to the terminal. The nse is sent
by the mobile device as a challenge in message 2 for the terminal to sign with other
related data. After receiving message 3, the mobile verifies the digital signature and
authenticates the terminal to be a genuine device. The mobile aborts the protocol if
the terminal is not successfully authenticated at this stage.
Furthermore, due to the dynamic nature of the transaction token issued by the TSP,
it is unique to a particular transaction and can only be used once. A replay of DTT
can be detected by a genuine terminal due to a replayed message 6 not having the
terminal-generated n3t in the sSTSP [h(DTD)]. Any attempts to carry out Attack 2 is
prevented by these countermeasures. If a particular transaction token is compromised
by an adversary and tried to replay it in another fraudulent transaction, the TSP
would not authorise the transaction for the second time. As the mobile requests a
DTT for every transaction, the TSP is aware of a transaction even before a payment
authorisation request is made by a terminal. This introduces an additional layer of
security to prevent unauthorised transactions, as well as facilitating accurate approvals
& risk assurance levels for the tokenised payment transaction.
Attack 3 (Capturing The Unpredictable Number): The terminal can verify the
authenticity of the digital signature generated by the mobile device due to the unforge-
ability of the digital signature algorithm used. In addition to this, any attempts of
replaying the digital signature is prevented by the nt included in the digital signature.
This provides an assurance regarding the freshness of the message and the signature. If
the verification fails, then the terminal declines the overall transaction which prevents
the terminal from generating the third nonce n3t which is used in the DTT . Further-
more, the protocol prevents any malicious entity from compromising the n3t by using
end-to-end encryption between the terminal and the SO.
Attack 4 (Adversary Replays An Authorisation Response For Cloned Token
Data): The proposed protocol uses the following countermeasures to defend against
this attack. Firstly, at the start of the protocol, mutual authentication is established
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between the terminal and the secure element. By taking this approach, only if the
secure element is authenticated in message 2, the terminal proceeds to the transaction
by sending transaction related data in message 3. Secondly, the proposed solution
uses a DTT rather than a static token. This means that because the DTT includes
both the terminal’s and the TSP’s nonces which makes the token specifically unique
to a particular transaction. A replay of DTT can be detected by the terminal due to
a replayed message 6 not having the terminal-generated n3t in the sSTSP [h(DTD)].
Furthermore, the protocol provides end-to-end encryption for the communication be-
tween the terminal and the TSP . This prevents the adversary at the compromised
intermediary from replaying an authorisation response back to the terminal and any
such attempts are detected by the terminal.
Attack 5 (Replaying An Authorisation Response For DDA/CDA): Unlike
Attack 4 where only SDA is carried out, this attack scenario is even possible when
DDA/CDA is carried out by the terminal. The attack is prevented in the proposed
solution by providing end-to-end encryption for the communication between the two
entities. This provides confidentiality which prevents the adversary at the compromised
intermediary from learning any useful financial payment information related to the
communicated data. Furthermore, nonces generated from both the terminal and the
TSP are included in messages communicated between each other as well as in the
DTT. This makes any replay attempts detectable for the terminal in the event of any
authorisation response replay. Furthermore, the payment application needs the user to
enter a passcode before use. It must be also noted that, if the mobile device is lost,
stolen or damaged, the user is able to inform the CIB in order to restrict access to the
mobile app and to deny access to the token requests.
Table 6.4: Attacks and Countermeasures used in the Proposed Protocol
Attack
Mutual End-To-End DTT Other
Authentication Encryption
1:Over Charging X X Amount displayed on mobile
2:Capturing Static Token & Related Data X X
3:Capturing The Unpredictable Number X X X
4:Adversary Replays An Authorisation X X X
Response For Cloned Token Data
5:Replaying An Authorisation X X X Passcode for payment app
Response For DDA/CDA
6.4.1 Mechanical Formal Analysis
In the previous section we analysed our proposed solution against the security and
objectives of the protocol. Having carried out this informal analysis, in this section, we
subject the protocol to mechanical formal analysis using Scyther [80]. The proposed
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protocol was modelled and provided as input to Scyther using the Security Protocol
Description Language (spdl) defined in[81]. The spdl provides three main protocol
modelling features: roles, events and claims. The roles define the entities in a protocol,
which characterise events. The send and receive operations are classed as send and
recv events respectively; each corresponding send and recv event has the same sequence
number. The security goals and objectives of a protocol that require verification are
specified using claim events. We used the Dolev-Yao model as the adversarial model
used in this analysis[87]. The following security claims are verified in the analysis:
Aliveness (Alive), Weak agreement (Weakagree), Non-injective agreement (Niagree)
Non-injective synchronisation (Nisynch) and Secrecy of data (Secret) for: DTT , ARC,
K, Ks2 [81, 80].
The script was run on an Intel CORE-i7 2GHz machine with 8GB of RAM. When
the security claim events were run together during protocol analysis, Scyther tool was
crashing. We identified that the reason for this was the RAM getting full after a few
hours of protocol analysis. To overcome this issue, the security claims were analysed
one after the other. A point to note that is, running these security claims all together
or separately, does not effect the outcome of the security analysis. Following successful
execution of the script, the security of data in the claim events were verified and Scyther
did not find any feasible attacks within the bounded state space. The Scyther script is
available in Appendix A.3 and can be downloaded from[5].
6.5 Summary
In this chapter of the thesis, we extended our discussion of the current EMV tokenised
payment architecture. We then identified five potential attack scenarios in two problem
areas of the current architecture that would lead to a transaction compromise. A
contactless mobile payment protocol based on dynamic tokens was proposed to address
the identified security concerns and to guarantee the protocol objectives. The protocol
was then analysed for its security and objectives. Finally the protocol was subject to
mechanical formal analysis which did not find any feasible attacks within bounds.
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The e-commerce market is growing rapidly as well as the number of trans-
actions carried out each second globally. Another aspect is that, consumers’
growing interest in alternative payment methods other than credit/debit card
based payments. This is valid in both traditional Point of Sale environments
and e-commerce environments. In this chapter, we identify that establishing
fair-exchange while using an anonymous payment method such as Bitcoin is
difficult. Addressing this issue, we then propose a protocol that guarantees
strong/true fair-exchange while preserving the anonymity of the transacting
parties when Bitcoin is used as the payment method in e-commerce trans-
actions. Finally the solution is analysed for its security requirements.
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7.1 Introduction
Anonymity prevents merchants, payment processors, third party payment providers,
subcontractors, adversaries that compromise payment transactions, etc. from learning
consumer personal information, spending habits and financial details. This would also
help reduce fraudulent activity related to identity theft by not revealing any personally
identifiable information during a payment transaction. Currently the majority of pay-
ment methods used for e-commerce transactions do not provide guaranteed anonymity
for both the customer and the merchant at the same time. Although services such as
PayPal can be used to hide personal financial details from the merchants and Tokeni-
sation as we discussed in Section 2.1.4 can be used to replace the PAN with a surrogate
value.
Modern technological advancements have given a dramatic boost towards the evo-
lution of the Internet. A strong outcome of this global expansion of inter-networked
technology is the emergence of e-commerce. The e-commerce market is growing and is
expected to reach $4.058 trillion in 2020 [33]. In the last few decades there have been
a significant increase in the number of consumers opting in for online shopping as well
as the number of e-commerce transactions carried out globally every day [40, 200].
While Credit/Debit card payment schemes dominate a majority of the e-commerce
payment transactions, there are other alternative payment schemes such as Real Time
Bank Transfers, Oﬄine Credit, Direct Debit, eWallets, Mobile Payments and Digital
Cash which also provide a way to complete payment transactions at present [84, 200].
In a traditional Point-of-Sale (POS) transaction, the parties involved do not have to
be concerned much regarding the guaranteed delivery of the purchased product or the
guaranteed payment for the sold product and vice-versa. This is due to the fact that
the transaction is carried out in a face to face environment in a physical shop. Even
though, there is the possibility of misleading or misrepresentation of the physical goods
by the seller, adequate checks and visual observations can be carried out to identify
such issues. Furthermore, the consumer can make a simple payment by using cash for
the goods and services he/she purchased without handing in their personal or financial
details to the merchant and other third parties.
However, a buying and selling transaction in e-commerce is much different from
the previously explained. In an e-commerce environment there are issues related to
anonymity and fairness of transactions. In an e-commerce environment where trans-
acting parties do not see each other physically makes it possible for a dishonest party to
misbehave. In one hand, a merchant could simply not deliver the goods to a consumer
once the payment is received or claim the payment was never received. On the other
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hand, a consumer could simply disappear without paying a merchant once goods have
been received or deceivingly claim that the content was never received.
Therefore, a merchant may ask a consumer to provide personal identifiable infor-
mation such as: name, address, contact number, prior payment or even identity copies
before a product is delivered. This information would help the merchant for any dispute
resolution, take legal action for non payment or to minimise any financial loss. In such
an e-commerce transaction, a consumer might lose privacy by having needed to provide
personal and financial information to merchants, payment processors, third party pay-
ment providers, etc. Furthermore, most of widely used e-commerce payment methods
are also linked to personal identity of the account holder. Similarly, a consumer might
ask the merchant to provide contact details, business registration documents, etc. that
can be used in a dispute resolution for non delivery of product. The consumer may in-
volve his/her financial organisation to establish some sort of liability and accountability
of the merchant to prove that a payment was made to the merchant’s bank account.
Most of the current electronic payment methods, neither provide anonymity of
consumer to protect consumer privacy nor security of financial information to guarantee
the security of the transferred value at the same time. Instead, there is a trade-off
between these two aspects [84]. The concerns discussed above have led attempts to
finding a solution to give e-commerce users the freedom of making anonymous payments
without having to reveal personal details and to guarantee fair-exchange [208, 209, 207,
161].
Protocols that help realise anonymity and user privacy during payment transac-
tions are called Anonymous Payment Protocols which was introduced and discussed
in Section 2.3.1. Protocols that helps to establish fairness in e-commerce transactions
are called Fair-exchange Protocols. A discussion on fair-exchange protocols and intro-
duction of Weak and Strong fairness in e-commerce were given in Section 2.3.2. A
combined solution that would realise fairness as well as anonymity is called an Anony-
mous Fair-exchange Payment Protocol.
In the next section, we extend our discussion on anonymous fair-exchange and
identify an issue with using Bitcoin in e-commerce transactions.
7.2 Problem Statement
When we consider industry wide adoption of Anonymous Fair-exchange Protocols,
even though protocol design may guarantee anonymity and fairness, when it comes to
making anonymous payments in the real world this is a big challenge. This is because
of a number of factors such as: a majority of existing financial service providers use
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EMV based centralised payment solutions that do not provide anonymity, distributed
payment solutions that provide anonymity (cryptocurrencies) are either not recognised
by consumers or don’t have a market trading value to be accepted as a method of
payment by merchants, lack of public awareness and confidence, etc.
In recent years, Bitcoin is one of the few cryptocurrencies that has gone through
nearly a decade of maturity and gained increased public interest as an alternative
payment method. An introduction to Bitcoin was given in Section 2.2.2 of the thesis.
Bitcoin payments are anonymous in the sense that they cannot be linked to a real
identity of a user but payments are irreversible. At the time of writing Bitcoin payments
cannot be retrieved or cancelled. Due to this reason and payments being anonymous
it is difficult to guarantee fairness between two parties engaged in an e-commerce
transaction using Bitcoin. This is a major concern for a genuine consumer or a merchant
who has or would like to make and receive payments using Bitcoin but is reluctant to
do so due to the uncertainty of receiving content for payment or payment for delivered
content and vice-versa [144, 61, 107, 204, 112].
Current solutions such as “e-Bay Guarantee” and “PayPal Buyer Protection” for
non-Bitcoin transactions aims to provide a level of peace of mind for consumers. How-
ever, these methods have capped transaction values or involve lengthy dispute reso-
lutions. For Bitcoin users, however, there are no such options available to give peace
of mind in e-commerce payments. Bitcoin has now become a competitive player for
alternative payment methods with a considerable market capitalisation of $62 billion
as of September 2017 [57]. At the time of writing, there are no specifically designed
e-commerce protocols for Bitcoin that addresses aforementioned concerns and the work
we carry out here is one of the first Bitcoin-specific proposals that guarantees strong-
fairness and anonymity. Our main contribution of this chapter is the proposed fair-
exchange protocol that guarantees strong fairness while preserving the anonymity of
the transacting parties in section 7.3.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 7.3, we propose our
protocol and in section 7.4, a security analysis of the protocol is carried out. In Sec-
tion 7.5, we add an extension to our protocol to support the improved Zerocash system
for Zerocoin. Finally in Section 7.6, we conclude our discussion.
In the next section we present our proposed solution.
7.3 Proposed Protocol
The main contribution of the paper is an anonymous fair-exchange payment protocol.
The proposed protocol guarantees fair-exchange and anonymity by using Bitcoin. The
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proposed protocol realises strong fair-exchange and anonymity within Bitcoin users.
The solution keeps the involvement of a TTP to a minimum by using an Off-line TTP.
This makes our proposed solution an optimistic protocol as defined in Section 2.3.2.
The notation used during the explanation of the protocol is listed in Table 7.1 and
the protocol message flow between the transacting parties are illustrated in Figure 7.1.
We identify our main objectives of the protocol as follows.
1. The protocol should achieve strong fair-exchange while preserving anonymity of
the consumer and the merchant.
2. TTP should not be able to see the exchanged product or store a copy of it.
3. Guarantee security properties such as; confidentiality, integrity, message freshness
and non-repudiation.
4. Keep the involvement of the TTP to a minimum.
5. Disputes should be resolved within the protocol.
6. The protocol should support similar digital cash systems.
Figure 7.1: Proposed Protocol Message Flow.
There are three main phases of our proposed protocol. During the first stage of
the protocol “Pre Protocol” a number of prerequisites such as product registration,
product/price negotiation, TTP selection and product encryption are carried out. In
the “Main Protocol” which is the second stage of the protocol, key processes such as
product delivery, Bitcoin payment and decryption key delivery are carried out. If non
of the processes fails and things go according to plan, the protocol completes in the
above two stages. However, if a transacting party misbehaves, prematurely aborts or
a communication failure happens the third stage “Extended Protocol” is executed with
the involvement of the TTP . We make a number of assumptions listed in Section 7.3.1
for a successful run of the protocol.
128
7. Establishing True Fair-Exchange in Anonymous Bitcoin Payments
Table 7.1: Notation used in the Proposed Protocols
C : Consumer.
M : The Merchant.
TTP : The Trusted Third Party.
PV : The Product Verifier.
BP2P : The Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network.
Ti : Purchase/delivery transaction of product m by C and M .
Pseudo-ID-M : Unique Pseudonym-Identity of M registered with the PV .
Pseudo-ID-iX : Unique Pseudonym-Identity of X registered with the TTP , only
used during Ti.
K1 : Public encryption key of the public/private key pair escrowed with
TTP , later used by PV to encrypt m.
K−11 : Private decryption key of the public/private key pair escrowed
with TTP . The key pair is generated by M .
eK1{Z} : Encryption of data string Z using a public algorithm with K1.
PX : Public Encryption Key of entity X.
ePX{Z} : Encryption of data string Z using a public algorithm with the
public encryption key PX of entity X.
SX : Private Signature Key of entity X.
sSX [Z] : Digital signature outcome (without message recovery) from apply-
ing the private signature transformation on data string Z using the
private signature key SX of entity X.
VX : Public Signature Verification Key of entity X.
PwM : Public Encryption Key of M advertised online with m.
PiX : Public Encryption Key of entity X used only during Ti.
ePiX{Z} : Encryption of data string Z using a public algorithm with the
public encryption key PiX of X used only during Ti.
SiX : Private Signature Key of entity X used only during Ti.
sSiX [Z] : Digital signature outcome (without message recovery) from apply-
ing the private signature transformation on data string Z using
SiX of X only during Ti.
ViX : Public Signature Verification Key of X only during Ti.
ViXcert : Public Signature Verification certificate issued by the TTP . It
includes ViX corresponding to the Pseudo-ID-iX of entity X used
only during Ti.
BPX : Bitcoin Public Key of entity X (X’s Bitcoin address).
BSX : Bitcoin Private Key of entity X (X’s Signature key).
sBSX{Z} : Digital Signature outcome (without message recovery) from ap-
plying the private signature transformation on data string Z using
BSX of X.
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T -info : Other information relevant to a particular Bitcoin transaction.
TX : Bitcoin transaction from C to M , in the formation of a hash.
TX = h(T(X−1)||BPC ||T -info).
TX−1 : Previous Bitcoin transaction that has occurred in the past but
directly linked to TX in the formation of a hash.
Encryptcert : Encryption certificate issued by the PV . It includes a hash of the
encrypted product which has been encrypted by the PV using the
key indicated in the certificate.
TTPcommit : Commitment certificate issued by the TTP indicating involvement
in the exchange.
TTP -Pool : A pool of different TTP s. C & M agrees between one TTP from
this list to be involved in Ti.
PVcert : Product verification certificate issued by the PV .
ú−payment : Predefined time-out for M to send the decryption key, includes
time needed for Bitcoin transaction processing.
ú : Predefined time-out period agreed by involved parties. If a re-
sponse is not received within the time-out the sending party will
resend once more, in case a no reply, the sending party aborts the
protocol or involve the TTP if necessary.
ú−resolve : Time-out given to M by TTP to respond with the requested key
before sending the escrowed product decryption key to C.
A||B : Concatenation of A and B in that order.
h(Z) : Hash of data string Z.
N1X / N2X : First & second nonce issued by entity X.
X → Y : Z : Entity X sends message Z to entity Y .
7.3.1 Assumptions in the Proposed Protocols
A1 : M registers with PV by giving a Pseudo-ID-M , PM and VM which are only used
in communication between M and PV . The PV is a trusted entity that certifies
M ’s public verification key VM and keep a record of it to verify M ’s messages
signed using SM in future communication.
A2 : Both C and M register with TTP by giving a per-transaction pseudonym-identity
Pseudo-ID-iC and Pseudo-ID-iM . The TTP makes sure that each Pseudo-ID
is unique and has not been registered before. It should not be possible for TTP ,
C, M or external parties to deduce the real identity of C and M by examining
the Pseudo-ID.
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A3 : C’s and M ’s public verification keys ViC and ViM are certified by the TTP to
their pseudonym-identities Pseudo-ID-iC and Pseudo-ID-iM respectively. The
public certificates ViCcert and ViMcert are issued to each owner by TTP and can
later be used to verify each other’s digital signatures.
A4 : C and M have access to a Bitcoin wallet. M generates a one-time Bitcoin address
to be presented to C to receive payments and only if needed, C generates a one-
time Bitcoin address to receive any change back from the transaction also known
as a change-address.
A5 : C andM , in addition to pseudonyms, maintain anonymity by setting up Anonymity
Channels (uses cryptographic processes to change message origin details and pre-
vent eavesdropping) for communication.
A6 : We also assume that the following guidelines are adhered to: all cryptographic
keys are checked for validity before use, a standardised public key algorithm
(e.g. RSA) is used for encryption, data is padded according to recommended
best practice before encryption, hashes are generated using standardised secure
hash functions (e.g. SHA) and messages are signed using a standardised digital
signature algorithm (e.g. DSA).
A7 : The TTP is a trusted entity and will not collude with the PV , the M or the C.
A8 : The PV is a trusted entity, will not misrepresent the certified digital content and
will not collude with either the TTP , the M or the C. The PV makes sure that
the advertised product and the product description by M is exactly the same as
that the product PV is certifying.
7.3.2 Pre Protocol Stage
The messages in the pre protocol stage are listed in Table 7.2 and described in detail
below.
Firstly, the unique product-ID generated by M , product-price, product-description
and a public key PwM is advertised by the M online. The M can use his/her own web-
site or a third party listing service to advertise these details. The TTP -Pool which is
a list of potential TTP s that could be used in the transaction is advertised by the M .
As per our assumption A2, a C who wish to purchase a product, selects a TTP from
TTP -Pool and registers with it. The TTP selection process gives control to the C for
choosing a TTP than relying on a particular TTP proposed by the M .
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Table 7.2: Pre Protocol Stage
a. C →M : encryption||sSiC [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePwM{product-ID||Order||sSiC [h(Order)]||PiC ||
N1C ||ViCcert}
Order=Pseudo-ID-iC||TTP ||payment-method||product-price
b. M → TTP : encryption||sSiM [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePTTP {Transaction-ID||K1||K−11 ||
Pseudo-ID-iM ||N1M}
c. TTP →M : encryption||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePiM{K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM ||
sSTTP [h(K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM)]||Transaction-ID||
N1M ||N1TTP }
d. M → PV : encryption||sSM [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePPV {pseudo-ID-M ||product-description||m||
PM ||product-ID||N2M ||K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM
||sSTTP [h(K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM)]}
e. PV →M : encryption||sSPV [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePM{PVcert||Encryptcert||N2M ||N1PV }
PVcert=X1||sSPV [h(X1)]
X1=product-ID||product-description||eK1{m}
Encryptcert=X2||sSPV [h(X2)]
X2 = h(eK1{m})||K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM
f. M → TTP : encryption||sSiM [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePTTP {Transaction-ID||Pseudo-ID-iM ||
Pseudo-ID-iC||Encryptcert||N1TTP ||N3M}
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g. TTP →M : encryption||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePiM{TTPcommit||N3M ||N2TTP }
TTPcommit=Y1||sSTTP [h(Y1)]
Y1=Transaction-ID||Pseudo-ID-iM ||
Pseudo-ID-iC||h(eK1{m})
Message a: The C registers with TTP and creates a concatenation which includes;
product-ID, Order, a digital signature on the hash of Order using SiC , PiC only used
in Ti, fresh nonce generated by C and the TTP issued public signature verification
certificate.
The C then encrypts the concatenation using M ’s advertised public key. Then the
hash of this encryption is signed by C using SiC to create sSiC [h(encryption)]. C
sends both the digital signature and the encryption to M . We use the same notation
to represent digital signatures sent in each subsequent message. The digital signatures
can be verified by the M using ViCcert .
The Order includes; Pseudo-ID-iC registered with TTP used only during Ti, TTP
chosen and registered by C, Payment-method to indicate which digital cash system to
use and product-price.
Message b: As detailed in our assumption A2, after receiving C’s message, M
registers with the same TTP . A concatenation is created by M which includes; a unique
transaction ID generated by M for Ti, public and private key pair to be escrowed with
TTP , Pseudo-ID-iM registered with TTP used only during Ti and a fresh nonce.
M encrypts the concatenation using PTTP and signs the hash of the encryption
using SiM . M then sends both parts to the TTP .
Message c: Once the message is received, TTP verifies whether the public/private
key pair to be escrowed is in the correct format. If satisfied, TTP then creates a con-
catenation which includes; K1 , TTP , Pseudo-ID-iM (we refer to these as “the three
components”), TTP ’s digital signature on the hash of the three components, the trans-
action ID, M ’s nonce and a new nonce. After this, TTP encrypts the concatenation
using PiM and signs the hash of the encryption using STTP . Both parts are then sent
to the M .
Message d: After receiving TTP ’s message and registering with PV according
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to our assumption A1, M now needs to get product m certified and encrypted by
the PV using K1 escrowed with TTP . For this, M creates a concatenation which in-
cludes; pseudo-ID-M , product-description, m, PM , product-ID, new nonce, the three
components & TTP ’s digital signature on the hash of the three components. The con-
catenation is encrypted by M using PPV and signs the hash of the encryption using
SM only used with PV according to A1. Both the encryption and the signature are
then sent to PV .
Message e: PV after receiving the message, checks whether the product matches
its product-description. If it matches, PV encrypts m using K1 and generates a product
verifier certificate PVcert which includes X1 and a signed hash of X1 using SPV . X1
consists of the product−ID, product−description and encrypted product.
At the same time, PV also verifies TTP ’s digital signature on the three components
received in the previous message. If satisfied, PV generates an Encryption Certificate.
The Encryptcert includes X2 and a digital signature on the hash of X2 using SPV . X2
consists of a hash of the encrypted product and the three components verified to have
come from TTP . PV then creates a concatenation which includes; PVcert, Encryptcert,
N2M and N1PV . The concatenation is then encrypted using PM which is shared only
with PV . PV signs the hash of the encryption using SPV and before sending both
parts to M .
Message f: After receiving the message, M now creates a concatenation which
includes; the Transaction-ID, Pseudo-ID-iM , Pseudo-ID-iC, Encryptcert, N1TTP
and a new nonce. The concatenation is then encrypted using PTTP and the hash of the
encryption is signed using SiM . Both parts are then sent to TTP . It must be noted
that, with the Encryptcert, the TTP only receives a hash of the encryption but not the
actual encrypted product.
Message g: Lastly, once the message is received, the Encryptcert is verified by the
TTP . The verification indicates that the product was encrypted using key K1 escrowed
with TTP . Following this, a commitment certificate called that TTPcommit is issued
by the TTP . The TTP then creates a concatenation which includes; the TTPcommit,
M ’s previous nonce and N2TTP . The concatenation is encrypted by PiM and a signed
hash of the encryption using STTP is appended before sending both parts to M . The
TTPcommit includes Y1 and a digital signature of TTP by signing the hash of Y1 using
STTP . Y1 consists of the Transaction-ID, Pseudo-ID-iM , Pseudo-ID-iC and a hash
of the encrypted product.
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7.3.3 Main Protocol Stage
After successful completion of the pre protocol stage and examining the received
TTPcommit, M initiates the main protocol. The messages communicated in the main
protocol stage are listed in Table 7.3 and described in detail below.
Table 7.3: Main Protocol Messages.
1. M → C : encryption||sSiM [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePiC{product-ID||Invoice||sSiM [h(Invoice)]||
N1C ||N4M ||PVcert||TTPcommit||ViMcert ||ú}
Invoice={Transaction-ID||product-price||payment-method||
Pseudo-ID-iC||Pseudo-ID-iM ||TTP ||BPM}
2. C →M : encryption||sSiC [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePiM{Invoice||sSiM [h(Invoice)]||
sSiC [h(sSiM [h(Invoice)])] ||N4M ||N2C ||h(eK1{m})||ú−payment}
3. C → BP2P : {amount||BPC ||BPM ||sBSC [TX ||BPM ] ||TX ||T -info}
TX = h(T(X−1)||BPC ||T -info)
4. M → C : encryption||sSiM [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePiC{Invoice||N2C ||N5M ||h(eK1{m})||K−11 ||ú}
Message 1: Firstly, M creates a concatenation which includes; the product-ID,
a newly created Invoice, a digital signature by signing the hash of the Invoice using
SiM to indicate that M agrees with the terms of the transaction, N1C , new nonce,
PVcert, TTPcommit, TTP issued public signature verification certificate and a prede-
fined time-out. The concatenation is encrypted using PiC and a signed hash of the en-
cryption using SiM is appended. M then sends both parts to C. The Invoice consists
of the Transaction-ID, product-price, payment-method, Pseudo-ID-iC, Pseudo-ID-
iM , TTP and M ’s one-time Bitcoin address.
Message 2: After receiving the message, C decrypts it and retrieves ViMcert to
verify M ’s digital signature. The authenticities of PVcert and TTPcommit is verified by
C using PV ’s digital signature and TTP ’s digital signature respectively. The latter
assures that TTP has confirmed involvement in the fair-exchange. Before continuing
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with the transaction process any further, C then carries out two main verification steps.
Advertised Details = Details found in PVcert——————– 1
Computed h(eK1{m}) = h(eK1{m}) found in TTPcommit ——– 2
Firstly, product-ID and product-description mentioned in the PVcert is cross
checked with the details of the product C is willing to purchase as advertised by M . If
condition 1 shown above is satisfied, then C is certain that the encrypted product m
and its details as certified by the PV is the intended product that he/she is about to
pay for.
Secondly, C generates a hash of the encrypted product eK1{m} and compares
it with the hash obtained from TTPcommit. If both hashes match, it confirms that
the hash of the encrypted product eK1{m} matches the hash TTP has confirmed to
have the corresponding decryption key for. Then condition 2 shown above is satisfied.
This gives assurance to C that after making a payment, if M misbehaves, prematurely
aborts or communication fails, the product decryption key can still be obtained by
initiating the extended protocol. If and only if conditions 1 & 2 are satisfied, C
proceeds to message 2 or else C aborts the protocol and informs both M & TTP the
reasons.
Following this, C creates a concatenation which includes; Invoice, M ’s digital sig-
nature on the invoice, a digital signature by signing the hash of M ’s digital signature
sSiM [h(Invoice)] using SiC to indicate that C agrees with the terms of the transaction,
N4M , new nonce, hash of the encrypted product and a predefined time-out ú−payment.
C then encrypts the concatenation using PiM and appends a signed hash of the en-
cryption using SiC before sending both parts to M .
Message 3: Immediately after sending message 2, a Bitcoin payment to M ’s
Bitcoin address BPM is made by C. TX is a hash output representing the Bitcoin
transaction from C to M . The hash includes the previous transaction hash linking to
this transaction, Bitcoin public key of C and other transaction information relevant to
this transaction. Key components in the message broadcast to the BP2P includes; the
transferring amount, C’s one-time Bitcoin public key, M ’s one-time Bitcoin public key,
digital signature created by signing the transaction hash TX using C’s Bitcoin private
signature key BSC , TX and other information related to the transaction.
The broadcast transaction is then received by the miners in the Bitcoin network,
who then start creating a new block with the transaction information as follows. A
detailed introduction to Bitcoin and the mining process was given in Section 2.2.2.
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In brief, a Bitcoin miner computes a new block which includes the hash T(X+1) from
this transaction. In BP2P every miner engages in computing blocks simultaneously.
Due to this reason only the first valid block created is verified by other peers to be
genuine and a new record is added to the Blockchain. The Bitcoin network at the same
time checks whether the Bitcoins have been spent previously to detect double spending.
Message 4: M waits for C’s Bitcoin payment to be confirmed in the Blockchain.
This process and the time required was discussed in Section 2.2.2. After receiving the
payment, M now needs to send the product decryption key K−11 to C. For this M
creates a concatenation which includes; the Invoice, N2C , a new nonce, h(eK1{m}),
K−11 and a time-out. M then encrypts the concatenation using PiC and appends a
signed hash of the encryption using SiM before sending both parts to the C.
If the main protocol messages complete successfully then C decrypts the product
and M updates Transaction-ID as completed in his/her record.
7.3.4 Extended Protocol Stage
The extended protocol is executed in the event that M misbehaves by sending an
incorrect decryption key, prematurely aborts or a communication failure happens after
C making a Bitcoin payment. The protocol messages are listed in Table 7.4 and
described below.
Table 7.4: Extended Protocol Messages.
I. C → TTP : encryption||sSiC [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePTTP {BlockchainEvidence||Invoice||
sSiM [h(Invoice)]||N3C ||h(eK1{m})||TTPcommit||ú}
II. TTP →M : encryption||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePiM{BlockchainEvidence||Invoice||
sSiM [h(Invoice)]||KeyRequest||N3TTP ||ú−resolve}
III.M → TTP : encryption||sSiM [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePTTP {Invoice||K−11 ||N3TTP ||N6M ||ú}
IV. TTP → C : encryption||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePiC{Invoice||K−11 ||N3C ||N4TTP ||ú}
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Message I: C initiates the protocol by creating a concatenation which includes;
evidence from the blockchain showing the Bitcoin payment from the C to M , Invoice,
M ’s digital signature on the hash of Invoice received in message 1, a new nonce, hash
of the encrypted product generated by C, TTPcommit and a predefined time-out. C
encrypts the message using PTTP and signs the hash of the encryption using SiC before
sending both parts to the TTP .
Message II: TTP examines the evidence produced by C in message I. The TTPcommit
confirms that TTP is involved in the particular transaction and sSiM [h(Invoice)] con-
firms that M has agreed to the terms of Ti. The BlockchainEvidence is verified by
TTP by examining the Bitcoin blockchain which should confirm the Bitcoin payment
made from C to M . As a response to this, TTP creates a concatenation which in-
cludes; the BlockchainEvidence, Invoice, sSiM [h(Invoice)], a KeyRequest from the
TTP requesting for K−11 , a new nonce and a predefined time-out ú−resolve. TTP en-
crypts the concatenation using PiM and appends a signed hash of the encryption using
STTP before sending both parts to M .
Message III: If M has not maliciously disappeared after receiving C’s payment,
misbehaved or deliberately refused to communicate, then as soon as TTP ’s key request
is received, M checks the status of the Transaction-ID. If it has not completed, M
creates a concatenation which includes; Invoice, the product decryption key, N3TTP , a
new nonce and a predefined time-out. M encrypts the concatenation using PTTP and
signs the hash of the encryption using SiM before sending it to TTP .
Message IV: TTP proceeds to message IV as normal if a response to the key
request is received within ú−resolve. However, if M ’s response is not received then TTP
retrieves the product decryption key escrowed with itself and creates message IV. In
either scenario, TTP creates a concatenation which includes; Invoice, K−11 , N3C , a new
nonce and a time-out. The concatenation is then encrypted using PiC and a signed
hash of the encryption using STTP is appended before both parts are sent to the C.
After receiving the message, C retrieves the decryption key which gives access for
the C to successfully decrypt the purchased product.
7.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse our proposed protocol for its security requirements and to
see whether it achieves the objectives outlined in Section 7.3.
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7.4.1 Strong Fair-exchange
We start our analysis by evaluating the fairness guarantees provided by our proposed
protocol. It must be noted that, if a party aborts the proposed protocol before C makes
the Bitcoin payment in Message 3, fair-exchange is not affected as neither party gains
an advantage from the other. This means that M will not be made a Bitcoin payment
and C will not be able to decrypt the product.
In the particular transaction scenario where both C and M followed the protocol
without misbehaving or prematurely aborting, the protocol completes without an ex-
tended protocol stage. In our analysis we consider the following transaction scenarios
and evaluate the fairness of our proposal in such instances.
• M sends a wrong encrypted product: M gains no advantage by sending a
wrong product as C only proceeds to making a payment once conditions 1 &
2 are satisfied. C can detect any potential wrong products at this stage.
• M sends a wrong product decryption key: In this case, C initiates the
extended protocol by sending all relevant evidences to TTP as shown in Message
I to raise a dispute resolution. At the end of the extended protocol TTP forwards
C the correct decryption key.
• M after receiving payment demands more payment: In this instance,
C initiates the extended protocol. By looking in to evidence C has provided
in Message I, TTP would determine that M has agreed to the terms of the
transaction and the price by digitally signing the Invoice.
• M disappears after receiving payment or aborts: In such scenario, C
initiates the extended protocol to involve TTP for dispute resolution.
• C pays M less than the agreed amount: In this scenario, the decryption
key to the encrypted product is only sent to C if the full payment is received by
M . Due to this C doesn’t gain any advantage by making partial payments. If M
aborts the protocol at this stage where C has paid less then the agreed amount,
both parties have misbehaved. Therefore, both parties have failed to follow the
protocol and there is no fair-exchange to achieve. If C wants to raise a dispute
resolution with the TTP , then C needs to make the full payment.
• C pays M less and initiates the extended protocol: If C claims deceivingly
that the amount paid is what he/she agreed, then M could provide evidence upon
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enquiry by TTP in Message III. In this scenario, M provides the signed purchase
order sSiC [h(Order)] in Message c, and if received sSiC [h(sSiM [h(Invoice)])] in
Message 2, which both includes C’s digital signature agreeing to the terms of the
transaction. Therefore, the decryption key is not provided to the C.
• C collude with TTP : In A7 we assumed that the trusted TTP is a trusted
entity and will not collude with the C. Therefore, this concern is not realised
within our protocol assumptions. However, we discuss below the outcome if
the potential concern is realised. Since the choice of selecting a TTP from the
TTP − Pool is given to C, it is more likely for C to collude with TTP than M .
This may disadvantage M as TTP could send C the escrowed decryption key
before C’s Bitcoin payment to M . However, anonymity of M cannot be breached
this way as M never reveals the real identity to any of the parties involved in the
protocol.
• M collude with TTP : Similarly according to A7, this potential concern is
not realised within our protocol assumption. However, we discuss below the
outcome if the potential concern is realised. There is less chance for this to be
realised as the choice of selecting a TTP is given to the C. In such event, this
may disadvantage C as TTP could send C an incorrect decryption key in the
extended stage after C’s Bitcoin payment to M . However, anonymity of C is not
breached.
• C and M collude together: As both parties are dishonest there is no fair-
exchange to be achieved.
In our analysis above, it is evident that the protocol guarantees that in the event
of a transacting party misbehaving, the genuine party who follows the protocol doesn’t
incur any loss or have to go through a lengthy dispute resolution process with an ex-
ternal judge after the protocol. Instead, in our proposed protocol disputes are resolved
within the protocol run. All these properties constitute strong fair-exchange which is
established by our proposed protocol.
7.4.2 Anonymity
It must be noted that both C and M do not reveal their real identities or personal
details at any stage of the proposed protocol. Instead, per-transaction pseudo-IDs and
public/private key pairs are used by both parties. During the protocol, C communicates
with M and TTP using pseudo-ID-iC only used in Ti and does not communicate with
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PV . M communicates with C and TTP using Pseudo-ID-iM only used in Ti and with
PV using pseudo-ID-M for product registrations. Because of this reason anonymity
of C and M is not only guaranteed between each other but also to PV and TTP .
Attempts of collusion with PV or TTP to find the real identity of a party, would not
gain any benefit other than what they already know. e.g. C colluding with TTP to
identify M .
In addition to pseudonyms, according to our assumption in A5, both C and M
set-up anonymity channels for communication between each other and other parties.
This provides assurance that the communication channel that the protocol runs on
does not reveal any information related to the identities of the communicating parties.
It is common practise to use an anonymiser such as the TOR Browser while making
Bitcoin payments.
Furthermore, the payment made by C is sent to a one-time Bitcoin address gen-
erated by M . Similarly when making the payment, C generates a one-time Bitcoin
address to receive Bitcoins as change only if there are any. Another aspect to point out
is that any information related to Bitcoin transactions and addresses are not revealed
to the TTP unless the extended protocol is initiated.
Bitcoin addresses does not reveal the real identity of the user. However, as the
Bitcoin blockchain is a public ledger, all Bitcoin transactions are broadcast publicly,
which makes Bitcoin transactions completely transparent. This feature can be ex-
ploited in attempts to de-anonymise Bitcoin and to reveal the real identities of Bitcoin
users. For an example, with the advancements in computational power, machine learn-
ing and Data Analysis capabilities, it may be possible to link Bitcoin transactions to
real user identities [164, 137]. It must be noted that, none of these attempts has fully
broken the anonymity provided by the Bitcoin protocol. However, this raises a few con-
cerns over the anonymity of the users and the privacy of transactions in our proposed
protocol. Therefore, in Section 7.5, we add an extension to our protocol to support
Zerocoin/Zerocash system proposed in [141, 48] to provide improved privacy grantees
and full anonymity.
7.4.3 Privacy of Exchanged Product
In our protocol, neither product m is revealed nor given a copy to the TTP . Any in-
formation related to m is only revealed to the TTP after the execution of the extended
protocol. Even then the details included in Invoice are not sufficient for TTP to find
out what was exchanged.
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7.4.4 Security Properties
Confidentiality is guaranteed by using strong encryption on all protocol messages and
the use of nonces confirms message freshness. The unforgeability of the digital signa-
ture algorithm and the use of registered pseudonym-IDs provide non-repudiation. This
assures that a party cannot deny taking part in the protocol at a later stage. Mes-
sage integrity is provided by the digital signatures appended on each protocol message.
The predefined time-outs provide timeliness to the proposed protocol. This allows the
sender to resend a message once more if a response is not received, to complete the
protocol by aborting or to complete the protocol by resolving with the TTP without
letting the protocol go in to an infinite loop.
7.4.5 Other Properties
• Minimum involvement of TTP : Our proposed protocol uses an off-line TTP
by keeping its intervention to a minimum. The TTP is only involved with the
protocol if a transacting party misbehaves, prematurely aborts or a communica-
tion failure happens. This makes our proposed solution an optimistic protocol as
defined in Section 2.3.2.
• Dispute resolution: In our proposed protocol, any disputes related to the pay-
ment or exchange of digital content is resolved automatically within the protocol
run without manual intervention of an external judge or going through a long
dispute resolution process after the protocol run.
7.4.6 Support for Other Cryptocurrencies
In our proposed solution, we gave more emphasis on Bitcoin mainly because of the
identified problems in Section 7.2. Further more, other aspects such as the following
were also taken into consideration: at the time of writing, Bitcoin was the most popular,
widely used and the cryptocurrency that had the most market capitalisation. Even
though Bitcoin was selected as the payment method for the protocol, the protocol can
be extended to support other anonymous cryptocurrencies that are designed using a
public ledger/blockchain technology.
We now describe a generalised example of how the protocol can be extended to
support other cryptocurrencies designed with the concept of providing anonymity using
pseudonymous addresses and a public ledger.
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In Message a of the proposed protocol, C can inform M of the currency that he/she
would like to use in the payment-method. Following this, M can later send the relevant
address of the selected payment method in Message 1. C then makes a payment using
the selected payment system. If things go according to plan and M sends the decryption
key then the protocol completes successfully.
However, in the event of a party misbehaving, prematurely aborting the protocol
or in a communication failure, the extended protocol can be executed. Then C could
present evidence from the relevant cryptocurrency’s public ledger in Message I. This
evidence may include payment made from payer’s address to the address of the payee
available on the public ledger. This provides sufficient information for TTP to continue
with the dispute resolution without requiring further changes to the protocol.
In Section 7.5 we describe this further and extend our protocol to support Ze-
rocoin/Zerocash. There are a few differences in our extended protocol compared to
the generalised example. This is mainly because of how Zerocoin/Zerocash works to
provide increased anonymity as well as privacy of transaction details published in the
blockchain.
7.5 Extension to Support Zerocoin/Zerocash
The notation used in our extended protocol is listed in Table 7.5. To make cross-
referring easy for the reader, the notation we present is similar to the notation in
corresponding papers [48, 141].
Table 7.5: Notation used for Zerocoin/Zerocash Extension
ZP2P : Zerocash System integrated into Bitcoin P2P Network.
PRF : Pseudorandom function.
COMM : Statistically-hiding non-intractive commitment scheme.
zk-SNARK : zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowl-
edge.
rt : A root of Merkle tree at a given time.
apkx : Address Public Key of entity X (X’s Zerocoin address).
askx : Address Secret Key of entity X.
zx : A Zerocoin that is owned by entity X.
zoldx : A Zerocoin that is owned by entity X and is used to pour it’s value
to new coins.
vx : The value of entity X’s Zerocoin.
vpub : A non-negative public output value that can be used to pay a
target similar to a Bitcoin address as specified in a transaction
string info.
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ρx : A secret value that determines snx of entity X’s coin.
snx : A serial number derived as snx = PRF
sn
askx
(ρx).
cmx : A coin commitment of entity X’s coin (a string that appears in
the public ledger) constructed as kx = COMMrx(apkx ||ρx) and
cmx = COMMsx(vx||kx) where rx & sx are random.
txMint : A mint transaction record; when a new coin z with commitment
cm and value v has been minted.
piPOUR : A zk-SNARK proof that states; “Given rt, old snx, new commit-
ments cmx and cmy, I know coins z
old, new coins zx, zy and old
address secret key askx”.
txPour : A pour transaction is used to spend, split, merge or transfer own-
ership of anonymous coins to others. Pour records the pouring of
a old coin/two coins (zoldx ) with their corresponding serial num-
bers (snoldx ) into two new coins (zx, zy) with their commitments
(cmx, cmy) in the public ledger. It also records rt, vpub, info and
piPOUR.
In this section, we only present the changes in the protocol run that are required
to extend our protocol to support Zerocoin/Zerocash system. The modified protocol
messages are listed in Table 7.6 and described in detail below. The changes to our
previous protocol are shown in highlighted text.
Message f: At this protocol stage, M generates a new address key pair (apkm , askm)
and a secret value ρm in order for C to make a Zerocoin payment. After this, M
constructs a coin commitment cmm as:
km = COMMrm(apkm ||ρm) and cmm = COMMsm(vm||km) where rm & sm are ran-
dom. The coin commitment cmm is then included in Message f by M for TTP ’s record.
Message g: After receiving the message, TTP keeps a record of cmm and includes
the cmm in the commitment certificate TTPcommit generated by the TTP . By including
the cmm in TTPcommit gives assurance to C that TTP is aware of the corresponding
commitment of M ’s coin that is due to appear in the public ledger. The TTPcommit
is sent to C in Messages 1. C can also check the validity of cmm by reconstructing it
using secret values apkm , vm, ρm, rm, sm received in Messages 1.
Message 1: In the extended protocol, instead of including the Bitcoin address,
M now includes address public key apkm in the Invoice. Furthermore, secret values
vm, ρm, rm, sm are also included in the Invoice to provide required information for C
to make an anonymous payment to M .
In our protocol, we let M generate these details instead of C. There are two main
reasons for this approach. These are:
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Table 7.6: Protocol Extension to Zerocoin/Zerocash.
f. M → TTP : encryption||sSiM [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePTTP {Transaction-ID||Pseudo-ID-iM ||
Pseudo-ID-iC||Encryptcert||N1TTP ||N3M ||cmm}
g. TTP →M : TTPcommit=Y1||sSTTP [h(Y1)]
Y1=Transaction-ID||Pseudo-ID-iM ||Pseudo-ID-iC||
h(eK1{m})||cmm
1. M → C : Invoice={Transaction-ID||product-price||
payment-method||Pseudo-ID-iC||Pseudo-ID-iM ||
TTP ||apkm ||vm||ρm||rm||sm}
3. C → ZP2P : zm = (apkm ||vm||ρm||rm||sm||cmm)
zc = (apkc ||vc||ρc||rc||sc||cmc)
txPour = (rt||snold||cmm||cmc||piPOUR ||vpub||info)
I. C → TTP : encryption||sSiC [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePTTP {cmm||Invoice||sSiM [h(Invoice)]||
N3C ||h(eK1{m}) ||TTPcommit||ú}
II. TTP →M : encryption||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
encryption=ePiM{cmm||Invoice||sSiM [h(Invoice)]||
KeyRequest||N3TTP ||ú−resolve}
1. To keep the protocol simple by not requiring a key-private encryption scheme
to download these secret values in encrypted format from the public ledger as
specified in the paper [48]. The main reason for this is that we have already
established a secure channel in our protocol.
2. To make M generate the coin commitment and get it added to TTPcommit before
C makes a payment.
Message 3: Immediately after sending Messages 2, a Zerocoin payment using the
Zerocash system is made by C. Assuming C is a Bitcoin user, a new Zerocoin can be
minted by depositing a Bitcoin with a backing escrow pool in the Zerocash system. If
C is already a user that holds Zerocoins then the previous step of minting a coin is not
needed.
145
7. Establishing True Fair-Exchange in Anonymous Bitcoin Payments
Because C uses this newly minted coin to make new coins, we add the notation
old to it’s parameters. Firstly, C generates a new address key pair (aoldpkc , a
old
pkc
) and a
secret value ρoldc which determines coin z
old
c ’s serial number sn
old
c = PRF
sn
aoldskc
(ρoldc ). It
is assumed that these serial numbers are collision resistant.
C now generates cmoldc as:
koldc = COMMroldc (a
old
pkc
||ρoldc ) and cmoldc = COMMsoldc (voldc ||koldc ) where roldc & soldc
are random.
The minting outputs a new coin and a mint transaction:
zoldc = (a
old
pkc
||voldc ||ρoldc ||roldc ||soldc ||cmoldc )
txMint = (v
old
c ||koldc ||soldc ||cmoldc )
In the Zerocash system, to spend the newly created coin, C carries out a pour
operation which takes zoldc as input coin and pours it’s value into two fresh coins; zm
& zc.
C then uses zm to make M ’s payment and zc to pay any change back from the
transaction to him/her-self. To create these two coins C firstly, generates commitment
cmm for M ’s coin using the secret values received in Messages 1, such that; km =
COMMrm(apkm ||ρm) and cmm = COMMsm(vm||km).
C also at this point checks whether the constructed commitment matches the one
found in TTPcommit. C now generates the commitment for his/her own new coin such
that; kc = COMMrc(apkc ||ρc) and cmc = COMMsc(vc||kc) where rc & sc are random.
Following this, C produces a piPOUR proof according to [48] and the serial number sn
old
c
= PRF sn
aoldskc
(ρoldc ).
The pour operation outputs two new coins and a txPour that is appended to the
public ledger.
zm = (apkm ||vm||ρm||rm||sm||cmm)
zc = (apkc ||vc||ρc||rc||sc||cmc)
txPour = (rt||snold||cmm||cmc||piPOUR||vpub||info)
M who is expecting a Zerocoin payment from C can now start using the received
coin without having to scan the entire public ledger using the Receive algorithm be-
forehand as specified in [48]. This is possible because the cmm and the private values
was communicated to the M before receiving the payment.
After receiving the payment, M can now pour the value of the received coin to a
new coin owned by M using the pour operation. This makes the parameters related
to the coin such as the coin commitment only known to M . Furthermore the value
can be transferred to another owner in a similar way how C transferred the value to M .
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Messages I: If the payment is received successfully and the decryption key is
sent in Messages 4, then the protocol completes without going to an extended stage.
However, after C making a payment, if M misbehaves by sending an incorrect decryp-
tion key, prematurely aborts or a communication failure happens then the extended
protocol can be initiated. Here, C appends cmm and the new Invoice instead of
BlockchainEvidence in Messages I. It must be noted that the Invoice is only revealed
to the TTP if the extended protocol is initiated.
Messages II: After receiving C’s message, TTP verifies the cmm to see whether
it matches the one in TTPcommit.
Furthermore, TTP checks whether the cmm has appeared in the public ledger
already. For this task, TTP can use the secret values (vm, ρm, rm, sm) found in the
Invoice to query the blockchain.
If the cmm has been recorded in the blockchain, this gives assurance to TTP that
a payment was made to M ’s Zerocoin address corresponding to the coin’s commitment
cmm. If satisfied, TTP contacts the M as the next step in the dispute resolution by
sending the KeyRequest message which also includes cmm. In either scenario, whether
M forwards the product decryption key or not within the predefined time-out, TTP
retrieves the escrowed decryption key and forwards it to C.
7.5.1 Security and Anonymity
Our previous protocol was aimed at achieving strong fair-exchange while using Bitcoin
as the payment method. However, as identified in our analysis in Section 7.4, recent
work has shown that it may be possible to link Bitcoin transactions to real identities
[164, 137]. Addressing these concerns, our extended protocol supports Zerocash as a
payment method while providing improved transaction anonymity for users.
The protocol objectives as discussed in Section 7.4 are also achieved in our extended
protocol, even though a separate analysis is not mentioned here. In the extended
protocol, the corresponding payment transaction from C to M is not publicly available
in the ledger as in a Bitcoin transaction. It should also be noted that despite the fact
that C & TTP get to know M ’s secret values (vm, ρm, rm, sm) and commitment cmm,
coin zm cannot be spent by either of these two parties as address secret key askm is
only known by M . Furthermore, the output serial number snm = PRF
sn
askm
(ρm) is not
revealed at any stage of our protocol and because of this when M spends zm, it still
cannot be traced which provides additional anonymity to the transaction.
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7.5.2 Mechanical Formal Analysis
The main protocol stage proposed in Table 7.3 and the extended protocol stage pro-
posed in Table 7.4 were subject to mechanical formal analysis using Scyther [80]. The
main reason for choosing the main and the extended protocol stages for mechanical for-
mal analysis was because, in the fair-exchange between the merchant and the customer,
these phases of the protocol are critical for guaranteeing the security requirements. It
includes security sensitive stages such as: delivery of the encrypted digital content
and delivery of the decryption key to the customer. Therefore, providing the required
security levels at these stages is important.
The protocol was analysed using the Dolev-Yao adversarial model [87]. The fol-
lowing security claims were successfully verified during the protocol analysis: Aliveness
(Alive), Weak agreement (Weakagree), Non-injective agreement (Niagree) Non-injective
synchronisation (Nisynch) of the transacting entities and Secrecy of data (Secret) for:
m and K [81, 80]. In addition to the claim types defined above, the verify automatic
claims feature on Scyther was used to verify other claims [80].
Following successful execution of the script, the security of data in the claim events
were verified and Scyther did not find any feasible attacks. The Scyther script is
available in Appendix A.4 and can be downloaded from [7] and [6].
7.6 Summary
The chapter identified a problem associated with established fair-exchange while using
anonymous payment such as Bitcoin in e-commerce environments. We then investi-
gated background work related to fair-exchange and anonymity. Following this, we
proposed a protocol that achieves strong fair-exchange while preserving anonymity of
the transacting parties. In the protocol the involvement of the TTP is kept to a min-
imum by using an off-line TTP that only intervenes if something goes wrong. Any
dispute that arise during the protocol is resolved within the protocol run.
Furthermore, the TTP agreed between C & M does not get to see the exchanged
product or store a copy of it. We also present an extended protocol that gives support of
using other cryptocurrencies based on public ledgers/blockchains. Finally we outline a
concern in Bitcoin that raises anonymity concerns and propose an extension to support
Zerocash which addresses this issue while providing improved transaction anonymity
for users.
148
Chapter 8
Blockchain based Philanthropic
Model and Payment System
Contents
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.2 Benefits of Blockchain Solutions for Charities/NPOs and
Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8.3 The Blockchain Philanthropic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
8.4 Constraints in a Blockchain Based Solution . . . . . . . . . . 157
8.5 The Philanthropic Model in a Disconnected Environment . 158
8.6 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
8.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
In this chapter we focus our attention on exploring other payment scenarios
that can be enhanced by leveraging blockchain technology. We identify the
philanthropic sector as an industry that has huge potential to improve dona-
tion payments associated with humanitarian aid activities using blockchain
technology. In our research we identify challenges faced by charities and
propose a novel philanthropic model for donating foreign aid using the Bit-
coin blockchain as an example. We then propose a SMS based mobile pay-
ment solution to provision donations and to be used by beneficiaries in dis-
connected environments. The solution is finally analysed for its security
requirements.
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8.1 Introduction
The blockchain technology is one of the main innovations that came out of Bitcoin.
Since its introduction, blockchain technology is gaining rapid interest due to its dis-
tributed nature and strong security properties [202, 199]. However, the use of blockchains
is not limited to constructing decentralised cryptocurrencies, but also can be applied to
other innovative ideas such as smart contracts, recording asset ownerships, cross-border
payment solutions, trade finance, etc. [199, 196].
In this chapter we explore how the blockchain technology can be leveraged to pro-
vide services in the philanthropic sector, which provides invaluable social and human-
itarian services. A report by the UK Charities Aid Foundation [67] identifies that for
charities, blockchain technology can increase transparency, openness and trust whilst
reducing transaction costs and providing new opportunities for fundraising. The sec-
tor is very large: according to the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) - World Giving
Index 2015 report, around 1.4 Billion people donated money in that year [66]. The
findings were based on an ongoing research project that represents around 96% of the
world population in their study [66]. Furthermore, according to the Charity Commis-
sion Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16 (United Kingdom), the Charity Commission
regulated £70.93 Billion charity income [184], donated by governments, businesses and
individuals.
In the United Kingdom in 2015, the Charity Commission regulated £70.93 Billion
charity income [184], donated by governments, businesses and individuals. However,
public trust in charities is declining [108, 157, 75, 76, 197]. Former U.N. Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon’s closing remarks at high-level panel on accountability, trans-
parency and sustainable development was “Last year, corruption prevented 30 per cent
of all development assistance from reaching its final destination. This is a failure of
accountability and transparency” [192]. Negative media stories about charity manage-
ment (such as the investigation into mismanagement at Kids’ Company [186, 75]); and
general worries about how charities collect and spend donations have impacted on the
confidence that the general public has in the charity sector [157]. As a result there is a
groundswell of opinion that charities need to do more to improve their accountability
and transparency to donors: these aspects could be enhanced greatly if charities used
blockchain technology in their donor transactions, because transparency is inherent in
a distributed ledger approach [156, 86, 108, 67].
There are existing cases where donations in cryptocurrencies have provided charities
with advantages. For example, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) in the
UK has accepted Bitcoin since August 2015, hoping to attract new donors from a
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different demographic to its typical supporters [51]. Another example is a donation
tracking service (called GiveTrack) set up by the BitGive Foundation, that allows
donors and third parties to trace transactions in real time: this shows how donations
are spent, and provides some trust that the funds reach their intended destination
[29]. This is built on the fact that the blockchain is a public ledger available globally:
as every donation is associated with a Bitcoin address, therefore anybody with this
address can easily obtain a transparent audit trail for a particular donation.
The chapter identifies challenges that charities and Non Profit Organisations (NPOs)
face which could be addressed by the use of blockchain technology. These are: dona-
tion transparency, uniqueness, and provisioning; and reducing transaction costs. To
this end, we introduce a blockchain based philanthropic model, that utilises a web-
based donation platform where donations can be made either using Bitcoin or fiat
currency1.
This donation platform allows individual and corporate donors to choose which ar-
eas of the charity’s operations they wish to support. As Bitcoin transactions are public
and unique, this provides audit trails and feedback about how each individual dona-
tion was used, improving transparency and trust in the charity. The back-end payment
transactions are carried out using multi-signature Bitcoin payments to enhance secu-
rity. More advanced services can be offered using Smart Contracts via the Rootstock
platform [4]. Furthermore, it allows the charity to provide feedback about how each
individual donation was used. This model provides the charity with the advantages of
speedy transactions at reduced cost, donation transparency (and hence higher trust in
the charity) and an infrastructure that can be used for donation provisioning.
This generic philanthropic model is then used in a case study of foreign aid distribu-
tion in a geographical environment with poor Internet infrastructure, lack of supported
devices and unbanked 2 beneficiaries. Here the priority is to get financial aid to ben-
eficiaries efficiently and securely, whilst minimising the potential for fraudulent trans-
actions. This case study illustrates how the proposed philanthropic model could work
even when the basic technological infrastructure necessary for a blockchain solution
(i.e. Internet connectivity and supported devices) is not available.
Examples of such disconnected environments include warzones, disaster areas, or
economically deprived areas of the world. There are many operational and security
problems in distributing financial aid in these challenging conditions as conventional
internet-based money transfer may not be possible and physical cash handling may be
fraught with danger [64]. In the proposed scheme, the charity will maintain hosted
1Fiat currency is a currency declared by government regulation as legal [130].
2Unbanked means not having access to a bank or financial institution [190].
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Bitcoin Wallets for charity workers, beneficiaries and merchants: Bitcoin transactions
can be done using low-cost security tokens (distributed per-user), basic mobile phones
and an SMS mobile payment system utilising an existing GSM network.
The main contributions of the chapter are: 1) a new philanthropic model that lever-
ages the Bitcoin blockchain for charitable donations / donation provisioning and 2) an
SMS based Bitcoin mobile payment system that can be used in an oﬄine environment.
The chapter is structured as follows. Benefits of blockchains for a charity/NPO are
identified in Section 8.2 and a new philanthropic model that addressed these challenges
is introduced in Section 8.3. Constraints of blockchain solutions are discussed in Sec-
tion 8.4. In Section 8.5, a use case of applying the proposed philanthropic model to
provide humanitarian aid in a disconnected environment is discussed. The proposed
scheme is evaluated in Section 8.6. Finally in Section 8.7, the discussion is concluded..
8.2 Benefits of Blockchain Solutions for Charities/NPOs
and Donors
In this section, useful features that blockchain technology can bring to charities/NPOs
and donors are discussed. An introduction to Blockchain technology and Bitcoin was
given in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
Charities need to do more to improve their accountability and transparency to
donors: these aspects could be enhanced greatly if charities used blockchain technol-
ogy in their donor transactions, because transparency is inherent in the distributed
ledger approach [86, 108, 67, 51, 29]. A blockchain solution would provide the follow-
ing benefits for charities and donors:
1. Donation transparency: We define this as the publicly available audit trail
of a particular donation made by an individual donor that details exactly where the
donation went and whether it reached the intended charitable activity. Every donation
is associated with a Bitcoin address, therefore anybody with this address can easily
obtain its publicly available audit trail detailing exactly where a particular donation
went. Currently, there is no mechanism for a donor to obtain an audit trail of their
donation. Providing donation transparency would help enhance the donor’s donation
experience and the trust that he/she has in the charity.
2. Reducing transaction costs: A global charity’s operational costs may involve
costly international transaction fees and interchange3 that may have to be passed on to
3Interchange fee is a cost that is paid by the acquirer to the card issuing bank. The transaction
value is paid to the merchant after deducting the interchange [187].
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the donor: donors may also incur additional international transaction fees from their
payment provider. This could negatively affect a potential donor’s willingness to make
donations. The global average cost for sending remittances worldwide was 7.42% in the
third quarter 2016 [188]: low transaction costs are a feature of blockchain payments
which can be seen when compared with other payment methods in Table 8.1, so this
would be beneficial for both donors and the charities.
Table 8.1: Comparison of Transaction Fees
Transaction Method Fee BTC Fee USD Fee GBP Speed
Bitcoin(average 645 bytes)a 0.0001 $0.25 £0.20 roughly 50 minutes [56]
Western Unionb - $14.83 £8.90 less then 1 hour
Western Unionb - $11.50 £6.90 next day
MoneyGramb - $16.50 £9.90 less then 1 hour
Riab - $10.00 £6.00 same day
a Bitcoin transaction fees are calculated on transaction size, not monetary value [53].
b Based on remittance transfer of 120 GBP from the United Kingdom to Uganda [189].
3. Donation speed: All Bitcoin transactions are broadcast immediately in the Bitcoin
peer-to-peer network. Each transaction that is included in a valid mined block and
added to the blockchain is called a confirmation. A single confirmation takes just over
seven minutes (also called median confirmation time) [53, 56]. With each subsequent
block mined, the number of confirmations for that particular transaction increases by
one. Confirmations prevent double spending: the more confirmations there are, the
more assurance is given to the transaction. It is common practice to wait until at least
six confirmations have been added to the blockchain [147], taking roughly fifty minutes
[56]. Depending on the nature of the transaction or the value, it may not be necessary to
wait for six confirmations: a transaction could be considered to be complete after only
one or two confirmations. This is fast compared to existing money transfer methods
which could take several days [202]: see Table 8.1 for examples. These confirmations
also provide a mechanism for the donor to be able to verify if and when a payment was
received.
4. Donation provisioning: Provisioning the donations to beneficiaries can be a ma-
jor challenge, especially in difficult environments. For example, humanitarian financial
aid distribution in warzones can be severely hampered if the country’s banking system
is subject to sanctions; the use of Bitcoins would bypass the need to involve the banking
system and ensure that donations reach their intended target, without requiring the
charity to transport large amounts of cash [67].
To capitalise on these benefits, and harness the desirable security properties of
blockchain solutions, we now discuss our proposal for a new blockchain philanthropic
model.
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8.2.1 Blockchain Properties
In addition to the benefits discussed above, the technology provides the following se-
curity features inherent to blockchains.
Immutability: Blockchains use cryptographic primitives such as: secure hashing and
digital signatures to chronologically record every transaction on the blockchain. This
security feature makes it practically impossible for an attacker to manipulate a record
that has already been recorded onto the blockchain, leaving an immutable historical
record of transactions.
Trust: In a blockchain based architecture, trust assumptions are not placed on one
particular entity, instead trust is placed on the underlying cryptography which keeps
the blockchain secure. This feature makes a blockchain an ideal platform to interact
with entities that do not have established trust relationships.
Reliability: Form a security point of view, a blockchain keeps a shared distributed
edger without storing the ledger in a centralised location. This prevents the ‘single point
of failure’ problem as the information recorded in the ledger is distributed throughout
the peer-to-peer network. This feature makes a blockchain reliable against denial of
service attacks. Furthermore, blockchains leverage consensus mechanisms to establish
a majority vote when it comes to updating the ledger with a new block. The shared
distributed ledger can be considered as a single record of truth.
Transparency: Blockchains such as the Bitcoin, publish every transaction on a public
ledger. This provides a transparent audit trail of transactions, ownership of assets, etc.
passing from one entity to another. This feature can be used to validate information
recorded on the blockchain, prevent double spending, etc.
8.3 The Blockchain Philanthropic Model
We propose a system where a donor can make their donation in Bitcoin via a Donor
Platform, direct to the Bitcoin addresses for individual charity projects. The charity
then uses these donated funds to allocate financial aid to individual beneficiaries using
hosted Bitcoin wallets that the charity maintains centrally. Beneficiaries can then
perform Bitcoin transactions for day-to-day activities. However, as we shall see later in
this chapter, not everyone will have the technical infrastructure available to use web-
based methods for transactions, and we will also extend the proposal for use in oﬄine
geographical areas.
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8.3.1 Donor Platform
The web-based donor platform is a public interface between the charity and the blockchain.
We consider the charity to have expert understanding of how to efficiently utilise their
received donations, so the charity selects causes / projects for donors to choose from.
Donors select projects from this list before making a donation in Bitcoin or fiat cur-
rency: the charity can choose how ‘granular’ the web portal list can be: it could range
from one Bitcoin address per beneficiary through to a central Bitcoin address for the
charity as a whole. Whenever the expense target of a particular beneficiary or a group
is reached, the entry is removed and the advertised list is updated. An example list
for the donation platform is illustrated in Figure 8.1. Bitcoin donors can obtain the
Bitcoin address of the charity/ project then use any Bitcoin wallet/client to donate,
or use fiat currency that gets converted to Bitcoin automatically by using an online
exchange. Once a donation is made the donor can check the Bitcoin transaction cor-
responding to the donation on the Bitcoin blockchain. The donor can also query the
Bitcoin blockchain to find out whether the donated funds have been used or not.
Figure 8.1: Example List for the Donation Platform
We propose the use of two different methods for processing Bitcoin payments for the
charity: Multi-Signature Addresses and Smart Contracts. These will now be described.
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8.3.2 Bitcoin Transaction Methods
We propose that donations can be used by the charity for donation provisioning and
subsequent SMS payment processing via one of two Bitcoin payment methods: Multi-
Signature Addresses and Smart Contracts. When using the RSK Smart Contract, the
charity must convert Bitcoins to SmartBTC as described below.
8.3.3 Multi-Signature Addresses
In this option, the Bitcoin addresses of the charity / project are constructed using a
methods called multi-signature process. Here, in order to authorise a Bitcoin trans-
action more than one private key is needed. For example, a 2-of-3 multi-signature is
when a Bitcoin address is associated with three private keys and at least two out of
the three private keys are needed to authorise a Bitcoin transaction. In our proposal,
the multi-signatures are processed using ‘Pay To Script Hash’ (P2SH) transactions.
First, the multi-signature generation involves using a Full Redeem Script which
includes details of the three public keys. This is then hashed to generate a hashed
Redeem Script which becomes the P2SH multi-signature. The address the donor makes
a donation to is this multi-signature address. All the three key holding entities share
the Full Redeem Script between them. The Redeem Script can be used to verify the
correctness of the transferred amount and whether the transfer has been sent to the
correct multi-signature. Furthermore, the Redeem Script can be used to identify how
many signatures are needed to make a payment. To spend the received Bitcoins, the
recipient has to provide the full Redeem Script. Some services use this technique to
enhance security of hosted Bitcoin wallets e.g. Bitgo [26].
8.3.4 Smart Contracts
A Smart Contract can be defined as a set of instructions represented in computer
code published on a distributed network, that receives inputs, execute instructions
and provide outputs. The multi-signature scheme described above can be classed as a
very low level smart contract, but it doesn’t have the capability to carry out further
instructions in addition to simple Bitcoin payment transactions. A smart contract could
give the charity additional functionality to extend its offerings for both the beneficiaries
and donors through features such as: issuing donations to the beneficiaries routinely
or whenever they are low in cash, issuance of small micro-finance loans to certain
beneficiaries / merchants, record keeping of repayments, donation requests to donors
and sending automatically generated audit reports of a charity activity to a regular
donor is now possible with the smart contract.
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For this added functionality, a more advanced smart contract is needed, but as the
Bitcoin blockchain was initially invented as a distributed payment platform, running
advance smart contracts on the Bitcoin network is not possible. A suitable platform to
run smart contract would be Rootstock (RSK) [4]. RSK is a solution that adds func-
tionality to run advanced smart contracts on the Bitcoin network. RSK is a sidechain
that is based on a 2-way peg mechanism [4]. The 2-Way peg is a method to convert
Bitcoin Currency (BTC) into Smart Bitcoin Currency (SBTC) and vice-versa. When
a user intends to convert BTC to SBTC, some BTC are locked in Bitcoin and the same
amount of SBTC is unlocked in RSK and vice-versa [4]: this results in a major advan-
tage that it matches Bitcoin to its native currency SBTC in the sidechain, whereas in
other sidechains the native currency is not mapped to Bitcoin.
The instructions to be included in the RSK smart contract can be coded using So-
lidity which is an object-oriented programming language. The smart contract is then
published in the RSK network. This means that the contract exists on every node
joining the network, including miners. The instructions on the smart contract can be
executed by the charity by broadcasting a message to the RSK network. Similar to
the Bitcoin network, a small transaction fee is paid to execute the smart contract. The
charity can pre-define which party is liable for this transaction fee. To provide addi-
tional security and manageability of the donated funds, similar to the multi-signature
process in Bitcoin, a smart contract can also be instructed using programmable logic
to receive two or more signatures before a transaction can be executed and broadcast
to the peer to peer network.
8.4 Constraints in a Blockchain Based Solution
This section discusses potential constraints that need to be considered before using the
proposed blockchain philanthropic model in the real world.
Blockchain based schemes have two main constraints, such as: 1) requiring a well
established connection to the Internet as blockchain architectures are based on peer-
to-peer networking and new transactions are broadcast to the network. 2) requirement
for compatible devices such as computers, tablets or smart phones. This is because to
make a Bitcoin transaction a number of cryptographic processes needs to be completed.
These include: secure hash generation, generating digital signatures and also storing
cryptographic keys securely. So devices that are capable of carrying out at least these
functions are required.
There are online wallet providers who will keep the most up-to-date blockchain to
verify and forward transactions on behalf of registered users, using a multi-signature
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process for added security: these online wallets are also called Hosted Wallets. However,
a user who wants to make a payment needs to be online in order to access their online
wallet using a web browser or via a smart phone application.
People in a geographical area, community or even a country where there is not
sufficient network infrastructure to provide a reliable Internet facility would find it
difficult to use a hosted wallet. A report from the International Telecommunications
Union has identified that more than half of the world’s population is not using the
Internet [111]. Therefore, a solution that uses basic devices and an already existing
communication infrastructure (i.e the mobile phone network) is needed. This will have
the advantage that it does not require the users to have an Internet connection: there
is more GSM network coverage than Internet access in most countries around the
world [201, 111], and the use of mobile phones within the GSM network coverage is
considerably higher compared to other communication technologies [111]. Our proposal
is discussed in the next section.
8.5 The Philanthropic Model in a Disconnected Environ-
ment
In this section, we discuss how the blockchain philanthropic model can be applied to the
following use case: humanitarian aid in disconnected environments such as warzones,
disaster areas, or economically deprived areas of the world. A charity/NPO will face
many operational and security problems distributing financial aid in these challenging
conditions. In an environment with poor Internet infrastructure, resource-limited de-
vices and an unbanked community, conventional internet-based money transfer will not
be possible and physical cash handling is fraught with security issues.
In Section 2.2.3 of the thesis, we identified a few solutions that were attempting to
integrate Bitcoin payments to SMS based payment systems. As we can see, none of
these existing solutions is suitable for the oﬄine environment under discussion. There-
fore, we propose a novel SMS based mobile payment system that gives capability of
making Bitcoin payments. The proposed payment system acts as a gateway to transact
with the blockchain, using Bitcoin wallets hosted on beneficiaries’ behalf by the charity.
Oﬄine beneficiaries can then make and receive Bitcoin payments using SMS messaging
on basic “feature” phones along with a One Time Password (OTP) security token. The
use of the security tokens guarantees that only a authorised user can send an SMS to
make a payment, providing some assurance to the genuineness of the transaction.
Any payment system must meet basic security requirements and deal with potential
adversaries. Before the proposal is described in depth, these will now be discussed.
158
8. Blockchain based Philanthropic Model and Payment System
8.5.1 Security Requirements of the Proposed System
We identify the below mentioned security requirements to be satisfied by the proposed
system.
1. Confidentiality: Sensitive information should not be disclosed to unauthorised
parties, whether during processing, in transit, or at rest.
2. Integrity: Information must not be tampered with by unauthorised parties when
it is in transit or at rest; the system must perform its tasks without unauthorised
manipulation.
3. Authentication: All participants in a transaction must be authorised and all
transaction data must be genuine.
4. Non-repudiation: None of the participants in a transaction can subsequently
deny taking part in it.
5. Availability: A service should not be denied to authorised entities: for example,
through Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
8.5.2 Adversarial Model
In a humanitarian aid setting, the adversarial model the proposed solution will en-
counter is as follows [98]:
1. State Level Attackers (SL): Adversaries with high level skills/resources em-
ployed by government agencies to attack commercial or government systems.
State sponsored cyber attacks on humanitarian operations have been recorded.
Depending on the political situation in the charity’s area of operation, these at-
tackers might aim to destabilise area/ disrupt operations by targeting the donor
platform, the LO/HQ/BPS or the SMS system via the MNO/ GSM attacks.
2. Cyber Criminals (CC): are organised groups who attack systems for money,
who also have high levels of skill and resources. These may wish to target the local
SMS system where transactions are initated, or the BPS where they are processed,
in order to make fraudulent transactions. Cyber criminals might also target the
web server where the donation platform is hosted to change published content
such as: inserting Bitcoin addresses belonging to the criminals by replacing the
charity’s Bitcoin addresses.
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3. Hacktivists (Ha): have moderate skills and resources and use digital tools to
mount attacks for ideological reasons. A hacktivist might not approve of the
charity’s ethos and objectives, so may aim to vandalise the donation platform,
but should not be able to affect the blockchain: they are unlikely to attack local
SMS system
4. Insiders (In): may have low levels of technical skill and resources, corrupt users,
charity workers or merchants can be particularly dangerous if they have privileged
access to data.
8.5.3 Proposed SMS based Bitcoin Payment Scheme
We now discuss the proposed SMS based payment scheme. The charity first creates
Hosted Wallets for the beneficiaries. During a secure registration process at the local
office, the beneficiaries are issued with OTP tokens that will be used to make payment
requests. The proposed scheme interacts with a number of entities that we describe
below. The relationship between entities is illustrated in Figure 8.2.
• Bitcoin Payment Server (BPS): this is part of the Charity’s technical in-
frastructure that manages the hosted Bitcoin Wallets on behalf of beneficiaries.
It securely holds Bitcoin keys for each account holder and is connected to the
Bitcoin/RSK peer-to-peer network. It also checks and signs payment requests
received from the SMS-Gateway, and once these have been authorised by one
of the other key holders, the BPS broadcasts them to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer
network.
• Blockchain: the distributed ledger shared between the nodes connected to the
Bitcoin peer-to-peer network.
• Charity Local Office (LO): the Charity has a local office in the disconnected
environment. The LO registers phone numbers of users during a secure registra-
tion process, and manages distribution of OTP security tokens.
• Charity Head Quarters (HQ): The Charity HQ may not be in the same
geographically area of the disconnected environment. It has connectivity to the
Internet and it is a secure server that holds relevant Bitcoin private keys for all
payers.
• Charity Head Quarters Backup Server (HQB): this is a secure backup
server which also holds relevant Bitcoin private keys for all payers.
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Figure 8.2: Philanthropic Model and SMS Payment System Architecture
• One Time Password (OTP) Token: this is a cheap Hash-based One Time
Password (HOTP) security token [134] that needs to be used every time an SMS
transaction is made. The algorithm that is used to generate the OTP is syn-
chronised between the BPS and each individual security token. Sample OTP
generation algorithms can be found in [143, 101].
• SMS-Gateway: server that sends and receives SMS transmissions to and from
the telecommunication network. All SMS messages used in the proposal are
within the standard 160 character length. The SMS-Gateway is connected to
the telecommunication network and the BPS, and the BPS is connected to the
Bitcoin peer-to-peer network.
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• Donor Platform Donors select Bitcoin addresses from a web based donor plat-
form, and can use a Bitcoin wallet/client or fiat currency to donate.
• Payer/ Recipient Users of the system can make payments (Payer) to any other
registered user (Recipient).
Additionally, we make the following assumptions in our proposed scheme:
1. Charity Head Quarters (HQ): The charity provides humanitarian aid for
beneficiaries in disconnected environments. The charity operates internationally
and revenue comes from donations made via a web-based donor platform. It is
a reputable and trusted entity, with secure premises and online access/ backup
servers which may be geographically distant from the aid environment.
2. Donors: Potential donors have capability of accessing the Internet in order to
make donations via the donor platform.
3. Donor Platform: Hosted on a secure web server adhering to industrial standard
security controls to prevent attacks such as: Denial of Service, website defacing,
content manipulation, etc.
4. Bitcoin Payment Server (BPS): Secure server dedicated to process Bitcoin
payments. The server prevents attacks by adhering to industrial standard security
controls. Strong encryption is used to securely store all the cryptographic keys
to minimise the risk of data breaches.
5. Phones: All users of the system possess simple mobile phones (‘feature phones’).
The knowledge of security code/access PINs to use the mobile phones are only
known to their associated owners. The local existing GSM network can be used
for SMS messages.
6. Secure Registration: During a secure registration process at the LO, the fol-
lowing procedures take place:
• employees, potential beneficiaries and local merchants will register their mo-
bile numbers and be issued with cheap Hash-based One Time Password
(HOTP) security tokens [134] to use with the proposed system. Sample
OTP generation algorithms can be found in [143, 101].
• Demonstrations and required training for using the payment system is pro-
vided to the beneficiaries during registration.
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• the mobile numbers and OTP security token IDs of the employees and ben-
eficiaries are passed on to the Bitcoin Payment Server (BPS) (via an SMS-
Gateway if necessary).
• mobile numbers are assigned a Bitcoin wallet (stored online on the BPS) to
be used in subsequent transactions.
• all registration details are forwarded to the BPS (encrypted using the LO’s
private key), in batches if the LO’s internet connection is intermittent
7. Security Token: This is a cheap hardware security token that is used every
time an SMS transaction is made. When the user requests (“event-driven”), the
token device generates a HMAC-Based (HOTP) passcodes. These codes remain
valid until used by the authenticating application. Time-Based (TOTP) tokens
generate new codes automatically after a set period of time: this approach is not
suitable for use with SMS messages that may be subject to potential delays in the
messaging system. Standardised HOTP algorithms such as RFC4226 [166] can
be used to generate OTPs. The OTPs are normally 8 digits or 6 alphanumeric
characters long. The same OTP of a user’s transaction can also be generated by
the BPS.
8. Trust: The SMS-Gateway and BPS are assumed to be trusted & secure. Mobile
phones are not.
9. Bitcoin Wallet Addresses: All the Bitcoin wallet addresses for users of the
system are generated and all the back-end payment transactions based on Bitcoin
are made using a 2-of-3 multi-signature transaction process. Three separate keys
from three different entities are used to create the Bitcoin address: the key holding
entities are the BPS, charity HQ and HQB. This ensures that a payment request
cannot be broadcast to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network by the BPS on its own.
8.5.4 Processing a Bitcoin Payment Request
Payments can be made from charity worker to beneficiary, beneficiary to merchant,
or merchant to merchant. Merchants could use an existing Bitcoin address, registered
and associated with a short Merchant ID by the BPS, used instead of PhP / PhR in
transactions. The SMS payment message flow of the scheme is shown in Figure 8.3
and the notation used in the following descriptions is shown in Table 8.2. The security
credentials for each entity are shown in Table 8.3 and the content of each SMS messages
used is shown in Table 8.4. For simplicity of exposition, the following description shows
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Figure 8.3: SMS Payment Message Flow
the Head Office (HQ) providing the second Bitcoin key.
Stage 1: Payment Request: The Payer (P) types an SMS which includes payment
instructions (PayReq SMS ) in order to make a payment and sends it to the local phone
number provided by the charity. The same phone number is used by all the charity
workers, beneficiaries and merchants in the geographical area. When the GSM network
receives an SMS payment request, it is forwarded to the charity’s BPS via the SMS-
Gateway.
Once the message is received, the BPS retrieves Bitcoin wallets for both Payer
and Recipient. Following this the BPS checks whether the TrAmt is not greater than
BALP , pseudo-randomly generates a three-digit number, unique TrNo and requests
for the Payer’s OTP by sending AuthReq SMS.
To generate the OTP, the Payer presses a button on the OTP token. Following
this, the Payer sends the Auth SMS containing the newly generated OTP to authorise
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Table 8.2: Notation used in Proposed SMS Payment Scheme
Notation Description
AddrX Bitcoin Multi-signature Address for entity X
BPS / PhX Bitcoin Payment Server(entity) Phone Number of entity X
BALX Bitcoin balance in Account ACX for entity X
EK(Z) Encryption of data Z with key K
X→Y Message sent from X to Y
HQ / HQB Head Quarters (entity) / Head Quarters Backup Location (en-
tity)
LO / P / R Local Office (entity) / Payer(entity) / Recipient(entity)
OTPX One Time Password generated by entity X
PKX/ SKX Public/ Secret Key pair of entity X
SX / TrHash Bitcoin Private Key of entity X (signing key) / Transaction
Hash
TrAmt / TrNo Transaction Amount / Transaction Number
TXID Unique Transaction ID of a transaction recorded in the
blockchain. Also referred to as the Transaction Hash (TrHash)
(Z)SignK Signature on data Z with signature key K
TrFee Transaction Fee paid to the Bitcoin miner
RawTr Raw Transaction created for signing
ParTr Partial Signed Transaction created after signing RawTr
ComTr Complete Signed Transaction created after signing ParTr
ReSc Full Redeem Script used for the Bitcoin multi-signature address
RSKHash Rootstock Transaction Hash
RSK-AddSC RSK Smart Contract Address, unique for the contract and never
changes
RSK-AddX−Y RSK public key (RSK address) of entity X kept securely with
entity Y
SRSK−X−Y RSK private key of entity X kept securely with entity Y
Gas Transaction fee paid to execute instructions on the smart con-
tract
the transaction.
Once the message is received by the BPS, it checks the TrNo to be correct and gen-
erates the OTPBPS and compares to the received OTPP . If the two OTPs match, then
the BPS checks that the transaction amount TrAmt is not greater than the Payer’s
balance BALP . If any the above mentioned checks fail, TransDenied SMS is sent to
the Payer declining the transaction. If all checks are passed then the BPS proceeds to
making a Bitcoin payment, using one of the two proposed options.
Stage 2: Bitcoin Transaction Processing
• Option 1: Multi-signature Process: We now discuss the first method how a
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Table 8.3: Credentials Used in Proposed SMS Payment Scheme
Entity Keys and Other Assets
Payer/ Recipient No keys, PIN for phone, HOTP token (no PIN) for making
payments
BPS SP−BPS ,AddrP−BPS , AddrR−BPS , PKLO, PhX , OTPX
HQ SP−HQ, SRSK−HQ, ReSc
HQB SP−HQB, SRSK−HQB, ReSc
LO SKLO, Physical OTP tokens, phone numbers (pay-
ers/recipients), plus registration details/ OTP allocation de-
tails
Donor SDonor/ VDonor
Donor Platform AddrProject
Table 8.4: SMS Payment Messages
Message Content
PayReq SMS PhP , TrAmt, PhR
AuthReq SMS TrNo, AuthReq
Auth SMS PhP , TrNo, OTPP
TransDenied SMS PhP , TrNo, PhR, Denied
PayConf SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhR, BALP , TXID
RecConf SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhP , BALR, TXID
PayConfRSK SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhR, BALP , RskHash
RecConfRSK SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhP , BALR, RskHash
Bitcoin transaction in our proposed payment scheme can be processed. To pro-
cess the payment request using multi-signature process, the BPS first constructs a
Raw Transaction (RawTr). The RawTr includes the Full Redeem Script (ReSc),
the receiver’s multi-signature address where the payment is going to, TrAmt and
TrFee. At least two key holding entities needs to sign the RawTr before a valid
transaction to be broadcast to the peer to peer network can be generated. The
RawTr is first signed by the BPS using the corresponding Payer’s private key
SP to generate the partially signed transaction (ParTr). The (ParTr) is then
forwarded to the to the HQ for signing.
BPS→HQ: ParTr = (ReSc,AddrR,TrAmt,TrFee)SignSP
Before authorising the payment request, the ParTr is first verified by the HQ
to validate whether the payment amount and the number of signatures needed
is correct. After these checks are successfully validated by the HQ, it signs the
ParTr using the private Bitcoin key SP−HQ to generate the Complete Signed
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Transaction ComTr, which is then sends this back to the BPS.
HQ→BPS: ComTr =(ParTr)SignSP−HQ
Once the message is receive, the BPS broadcast the ComTr to the Bitcoin peer
to peer network. Once broadcast, in order to trace the particular transaction
on the blockchain a unique transaction-id (TXID) can be used. The broadcast
transaction is then received by the network of Bitcoin miners and the first miner
that published the valid block in the Bitcoin blockchain which also includes the
transaction also gets paid the specified transaction fees TrFee for the payment.
The first block that gets added to the blockchain is the first confirmation of
the transaction. Before sending the confirmation SMSs, the BPS waits for the
transaction to be confirmed in the agreed number of blocks.
• Option 2: Smart Contract Process: The second method to process a Bitcoin
transaction in our proposed scheme is by using a smart contract. Here, we extend
the capability of the proposed system to show how the Bitcoin multi-signature
transaction process can be replaced by a Smart Contract for Bitcoin transac-
tion processing. The BPS calls the Smart Contract and authorises the TrAmt
and the fee for executing the transaction also called Gas is paid by using the
SRSK−P−BPS .
BPS→RSK: RSK-AddSC ,RSK-AddP ,RSK-AddR,TrAmt,Gas
After the message being broadcast in the RSK network, the HQ or the HQB calls
the smart contract. This acts as the second set of instructions needed by the smart
contract to execute the transaction. The paid amount TrAmt and the transaction
fee Gas is authorised by the HQ/HQB by using the SRSK−P−HQ/HQB.
HQ/HQB→RSK: RSK-AddSC ,RSK-AddP−HQ,RSK-AddR,TrAmt,Gas
The smart contract after successfully receiving instructions from both BPS and
HQ/HQB, executes the transaction to transfer the value TrAmt to the recipient.
As a result, unique transaction details related to the transaction are recorded
instantly on the RSK blockchain in the format of a hash (RskHash). Transactions
are recorded in the RSK blockchain instantly, therefore, the BPS does not need
to wait for a transaction confirmation.
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Stage 3: Payment Finalisation: Following successful processing of the Bitcoin
transaction using one of the methods we discussed above, the BPS updates the payer
and the recipient balances. Then the BPS sends confirmation messages via the SMS-
Gateway: PayConf SMS or PayConfRSK SMS to the Payer and RecConf SMS or
RecConfRSK SMS to the Recipient. Included in the confirmation SMSs are the unique
IDs: TXID or RskHash that can be used to trace the transaction on the Bitcoin or the
RSK blockchains.
8.6 Analysis
In Section 8.5.3 we discussed how the proposed SMS-based payment scheme can be used
by the charity to provision donations and how it can be used by the beneficiaries to
carry out friction-less day-to-day payment transactions in a disconnected environment.
In this Section, we discuss SMS security and analyse the proposed SMS-based payment
scheme against the security requirements identified in Section 8.5.2.
A summary of targets that adversaries may attack along with suggested counter-
measures is shown in Table 8.5.
8.6.1 SMS Security Issues
The SMS system has well documented security issues. The SMS service is vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle attacks and spoofing because SMS messages are not encrypted
by default. Interception/redirection using false base stations in GSM networks, eaves-
dropping at the Short Message Service Centre (SMSC), and SS7 hacking [97] are a few
attack methods. SMS fuzzing techniques (the “SMS of Death”) can also be used for
denial of service and other attacks [145]. Adversaries such as: SL, CC and In might
target the SMS system aiming to make fraudulent transactions. Even though these
issues are not addressed directly in our proposed scheme, measures have been included
which provide some deterrent to would-be attackers.
In the proposed scheme, the use of OTP prevents an attempts of replay attacks. Fur-
thermore, because the charity sends out the AuthReq SMS before any payment, alerts
the users of any potential fraudulent transaction. The TXID/RSKHash included in
the confirmation SMSs provide further assurance and can be used to cross check with
the Bitcoin/RSK blockchain. The inclusion of the TrNo on the confirmation messages
means that during a face-to-face transaction, Payer and Recipient can verbally compare
the value as an extra level of assurance that the transaction is correct. The methods
we use in our solution provides a higher level of security compared to other SMS based
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Table 8.5: Attack Targets, Adversaries and Countermeasures
Target SL CC Ha In Countermeasure
Donor Platform y y y Hosted on a secure web server adhering
to industrial standard security controls to
defend against : DDoS, website defacing,
content manipulation
HQ/HQB/BPS
(DDoS)
y y HQ/HQB has secure premises and backup
servers: BPS managed under industrial
standard security controls and best prac-
tices to prevent attacks.
HQ/HQB/BPS
(privilege esca-
lation)
y y y Use of security controls such as: access
control, routine web-application vulner-
ability assessment/patching and storing
keys encrypted
SMS
(MNO/GSM)
y y GSM/SMS security issues partially miti-
gated by OTP 2FA and TXID/RSKhash
on confirmations
SMS spoof y y y OTP/TXID/RSKhash gives some assur-
ance that payment is genuine
SMS replay y y y OTP prevents replay attacks
Blockchain/RSK
(DDoS)
y y DDoS attacks not viable in distributed
ledger, and integrity is innate in
blockchain solutions
Bitcoin schemes. For an example, the Coinapult SMS scheme requires the user to send
an SMS containing a security code sent by the payment service in a previous SMS
which provides limited assurance that the transaction is legitimate.
8.6.2 Security Requirements
Confidentiality
• Security of Bitcoin private keys: The Bitcoin private key for a corresponding
Bitcoin address allows the private key holder to transfer those Bitcoins to any
new address. If this private key or the Bitcoin wallet that securely stores this key
is lost or not accessible, then the Bitcoin value recorded to that Bitcoin address
can be considered to be lost. This is because without the corresponding private
key the Bitcoins cannot be transferred. The proposed scheme uses 2-of-3 multi-
signature process. This avoids the risk involved in losing a Bitcoin private key
by allowing any two out of the three private key holders to generate a combined
signature in order to transfer the Bitcoins to another address.
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• Donor anonymity: Because the proposed scheme accepts donations in Bitcoin,
a donor who wishes to remain anonymous can make the donation in Bitcoin.
However, this may introduce management issues for the charity. This is because
some anonymous donations may need special reporting and investigation due to
possible money laundering/fraud regulations or other suspicious financial activity.
For example, in the UK, anonymous donations over £25,000 have to be reported
as a “serious incident” [185]. This could be resolved by a charity policy stating
that donations over a certain amount need personal identification to be registered
with the charity.
• Server attacks (HQ/HQB/BPS): As identified in our adversarial model in
Section 8.5.2, attackers such as SL and CC will aim at infiltrating security keys,
transaction data and identity information. Furthermore, Ha may wish to find
embarrassing data, manipulate content to cause reputational damage. The coun-
termeasures recommended for overcoming these threats are shown in Table 8.5.
Integrity
• Blockchain: All transactions are chronologically recorded in the blockchain us-
ing cryptography. If an attacker were to change any record in the blockchain
which is a globally shared distributed ledger, the attacker has to change the par-
ticular block where the transaction is recorded as well as all the consecutive blocks
that are recorded after that. This is considered practically impossible. Therefore,
it ensures the integrity by providing an immutable record of past transactions.
• RSK blockchain: One of the drawbacks of using new peer-to-peer networks is
getting wide spread adoption, which helps to improve robustness of the system.
The RSK blockchain, uses the existing miners in the most popular Bitcoin peer-
to-peer network mining. This provides reliability and robustness of the mining
process. Furthermore, the RSK blockchain is also based on proof-of-work similar
to Bitcoin to make the process of mining fair. Also, the distributed ledger uses
SHA256 hashing and chain of signatures to prevent double-spending similar to
Bitcoin. RSK uses a checkpointing service provided by a federation of well-known
and respected Bitcoin community members [4].
• Server attacks(HQ/HQB/BPS/Donor Platform): CC may target the do-
nation platform with the intention of changing the charity’s Bitcoin addresses
with addresses belonging to the criminals. The content of the servers may be
tampered and vandalised by Ha. There might be attempts of tampering content
by SL to undermine the credibility of the charity. Furthermore, CC, SL might
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tamper transaction records at the BPS to make fraudulent transactions. See
Table 8.5 for a list of countermeasures.
• SMS replay attacks: Potential attackers including: SL, CC and In might
attempt to replay SMS messages for fraudulent transactions. Our proposed so-
lution counters replay attempts by requesting the payer to include the OTP in
the Auth SMS message. Once received the BPS before authorising a payment
verifies whether the sent OTP is correct. Any attempts to replay previous OTPs
will fail.
• Unauthorised donation trading: If the donation made in Bitcoin is provi-
sioned directly to a wallet owned by the beneficiary, there may be the risk of the
beneficiary trading the received Bitcoins to gain financial profit, instead of using
it for spending the money on buying necessities. The donors would not want
this kind of use of their donations and it would also bring bad reputation to the
charity. The proposed SMS based payment system provides protection against
unauthorised trading of received donations by using not issuing the donations to
a Bitcoin address owned by the beneficiary. If the beneficiary wants to buy some-
thing or transfer some funds to another beneficiary the SMS payment process
must be used and the reconciliation is done by the BPS.
• Non-Repudiation: Every transaction is carried out using digital signatures and
confirmed transactions are recorded on the blockchain. The blockchain provides
an immutable audit-trail for every transaction, thus an entity that has partici-
pated in a transaction cannot deny involvement at a later stage.
Authentication
• Authenticating the payment request SMS: As the payment scheme is based
on SMS, additional authentication of the payer and the payment request is re-
quired: OTP security tokens are therefore used as a two-factor authentication
method. Only the rightful owners are able to operate the tokens as the tokens
are pass-code protected. The charity’s Bitcoin payment server authenticates the
user by verifying the OTP included in the SMS. This means that in the event of
a phone being lost or stolen, an attacker will not be able to make a valid trans-
action without having the security token and knowing its pass-code. Network
delays will not cause adverse effects on the authentication process as the OTP
is valid until the BPS receives and processes it. This provides some protection
against spoofing attacks by adversaries such as Sl, CC and In.
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• Mobile phones: As per our assumption, the handsets are protected by PIN
codes. This act as a barrier to attackers who steal the phone. Even a phone is
lost or stolen, to construct a valid transaction request the OTP token and the
knowledge of its passcode is needed.
• Transaction number: In a point-of-sale transaction, where a beneficiary is
purchasing a product from a merchant, both parties can compare the Transaction
Number received on confirmation messages before a purchased product is handed
out. This provides an additional layer of assurance to the users.
• Social engineering: This is a targetted attack that is aimed at obtaining priv-
ileged access to data at HQ/BPS. To defend against such attacks staff handling
systems or engage in day to day organisational processes are required to go
through security awareness training. However, in our proposed solution we use a
multi-signatures process for processing transactions and therefore, an insider at
the BPS/HQ/HQB is not able to transmit a transaction alone.
Availability
• Recovering lost Bitcoins: In our proposed solution a multi-signature transac-
tion processing mechanism is used. In the unfortunate event of any one of the
three Bitcoin private key holders losing their key the remaining two parties can
recover the Bitcoins by generating a combined signature and transferring those
Bitcoins to another address.
• DDoS attacks: For attackers such as SL and Ha, the donor platform, HQ/HQB
and BPS are attractive targets for carrying out DDoS attacks. The countermea-
sures we recommend can be found in Table 8.5. However, any DDoS attacks on
the blockchains are not viable because the architecture, proof-of-work and the
distributed nature of blockchain provides innate security against such attacks
[168, 52, 153, 147].
8.7 Summary
The work carried in this chapter first identified challenges faced by charities/NPOs
currently, in particular how strengthening public trust in charities and NPOs, could
increase donation revenues and help provide a better service for the targeted benefi-
ciaries. We then identified advantages of blockchain based solutions for charities and
discussed how these can be employed, even with their potential constraints.
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As our first contribution of this chapter, we proposed a new philanthropic model
that addresses the identified challenges while leveraging the Bitcoin blockchain through
use of a donation platform. For our second contribution of the chapter we proposed
a novel SMS based mobile payment system that can be used by charity workers and
beneficiaries in a challenging oﬄine environment. A useful feature is that the SMS
based mobile payment system runs on the existing GSM network and does not require
an Internet connection.
It also uses a OTP based dual authentication method in order to provide assurance
that only a genuine payer can make a payment. The system also provides a payment
received and payment confirmation SMS messages for the payer and payee. The pay-
ment processing on the proposed scheme can be done by either a 2-of-3 multi-signature
transaction process with the Bitcoin network, or a smart contract for advanced func-
tionality utilising the RSK network. The use of multi-signature process addresses the
issues such as authorisation before payment and recovery of lost Bitcoins. The proposed
SMS-based payment scheme was then evaluated for its security.
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The thesis investigated both the EMV based centralised payment and Bitcoin /
blockchain based distributed payment architectures. We were able to identify a number
of weakness and potential issues that raise payment security concerns. Addressing
these concerns in the previous chapters the thesis proposed a number of solutions that
improve the security of both centralised and distributed payment transactions. In this
chapter we summarise our main contributions of the thesis and conclude the discussion
by suggesting future directions.
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9.1 Summary and Conclusion
The main aim of the thesis was to enhance the security of centralised and distributed
payment transactions. This included, investigating security aspects of centralised and
distributed payments and proposing improvements to address identified security con-
cerns and limitations. To facilitate the main aim of the thesis, three main objectives
were identified in Section 1.2. The three main objectives of the thesis are:
Objective-1: Investigate payment transactions in both centralised and distributed
payments while showing more emphasis on new/emerging payment technologies.
Objective-2 Identify potential weaknesses and concerns in payment technologies that
pose a threat to the security of payment transactions.
Objective-3 Propose improvements that address these identified weaknesses and con-
cerns to enhance the security of payment transactions.
In this thesis, all three objectives were successfully achieved. We discuss below how
the objectives of the thesis were achieved in our six main contributions of the thesis.
To achieve Objective-1, the thesis explored new and emerging payment technolo-
gies used in both centralised and distributed payment systems. The payment technolo-
gies we investigated include: EMV Chip&PIN, Contactless Card/Mobile Payments,
Tokenisation, Digital Currencies and Blockchain. More specifically, in the first and
second contributions, the thesis investigated the EMV Chip&PIN and the EMV OPV
process. In the third and fourth contribution, the thesis investigated the EMV Tokeni-
sation used in Chip&PIN, Contactless Card and Mobile Payments. The investigation
in to payment technologies in contributions one, two, three and four were carried out
under improvements for EMV based centralised payments in the thesis.
The fifth contribution, investigated digital currencies, fair-exchange, anonymous
payments, bitcoin and blockchain. The sixth contribution, investigated blockchain
technologies, distributed ledger technologies, smart contracts, donation payments, in-
ternational remittance, mobile and SMS payments. The investigation in to payment
technologies in contributions five and six were carried out under improvements for
bitcoin/blockchain based distributed payments in the thesis.
The improvements proposed in this thesis are divided into two main categories. The
first main category that we explore is the EMV based centralised payments. Under
this category, we investigated the architectures of EMV based centralised payments,
identified potential weaknesses and proposed a number of improvements. The first
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payment technology that we investigated was the EMV OPV process used in card
based payment transactions.
In our first contribution, Objective-2 was achieved by identifying a number of
potential attack scenarios that pose a threat to the security OPV process. One of the
main reasons for these concerns is the indelible trust assumptions placed on a number
of entities in the payment architecture. Addressing these security concerns, we then
proposed a protocol and improvements that enhance the security of OPV process. Fur-
thermore, three encryption methods that can be used to protect the PIN and provide
end-to-end security between the payment card and the issuing bank were presented.
We also explained how the OPV process can be linked with the online transaction au-
thorisation process to prevent a type of replay attack that we identify. The proposed
improvements achieved Objective-3 in this contribution. We then subject our pro-
posed protocol to mechanical formal analysis and found no feasible attacks. Finally the
proposed improvements were implemented to obtain potential performance penalties
that the existing OPV process has to bear if our improvements were applied.
The OPV process that we discussed above is carried out in different instance to the
online transaction authorisation. However, in our second contribution, we extended our
work to explore a second method that the EMV OPV process can be deployed in. In the
second method, the OPV and the online transaction authorisation is carried out in the
same set of messages. We called this second method, Unified Authorisation. Achieving
Objective-2, in our research, we were also able to identify a number of potential attack
scenarios in the Unified Authorisation method that pose a threat to the security of OPV
process and the overall payment transaction. Addressing the security concerns in the
Unified Authorisation, we proposed a protocol that improve the security of OPV and
the associated payment transaction. The proposed improvements achieved Objective-
3 in this contribution. We then analysed our protocol and implemented the proposed
improvement in Unified Authorisation to identify potential performance penalties.
Our work on OPV has identified a number of potential attack scenarios that could
lead to significant financial loss if realised. Moreover, the attacks we described can be
considered difficult to detect. This is because the authorisation entity would not be able
to identify whether the OPV-based transaction was actually made by the cardholder
or the adversary at the compromised intermediary. This would mean that, by the
time that the compromise is detected, the adversary might be in a position to cause
significant damage in terms of financial fraud. Therefore, we strongly suggest that the
proposed improvements must be considered by financial institutions, payment schemes,
payment solution providers, etc. when deploying EMV OPV in a geographical region.
Another important aspect of EMV payment architecture is the transaction authori-
176
9. Conclusion and Future Work
sation. In this thesis, we introduced an inherent weakness associated with EMV trans-
actions and discussed how PAN compromise has led to significant financial losses for
financial institutions. We then introduced EMV Tokenisation which is being adopted
by the payment industry as a solution to PAN compromise. In our third contribu-
tion, Objective-2 is achieved by identifying a bottleneck in the new tokenisation
architecture which prevents the usability of secure tokenised payments in oﬄine envi-
ronments. We also discussed scenarios where having the capability of carrying out fully
oﬄine tokenised payments are beneficial for both merchants and consumers. Achieving
Objective-3 of the thesis, we proposed a contactless mobile payment protocol based
on EMV tokenisation that supports fully oﬄine transactions while preserving security
guarantees. In addition to this, the protocol provides end-to-end encryption to the
tokenised payment transaction communication between the mobile and the payment
terminal. Furthermore, we extended our protocol to show how ambient sensing can
be used even in an oﬄine environment to detect and prevent token relay attacks. The
proposed protocol was then subject to mechanical formal analysis for its security and
after a successful run of the analysis no feasible attacks were identified. Finally, a prac-
tical implementation of the proposed protocol was carried out to obtain performance
measurements. During our implementation, the mobile payment application was pro-
visioned to an embedded hardware secure element of a Nokia 6131 mobile phone.
Even though the primary use of EMV tokenisation is to prevent PAN compromise,
it also provides a number of other benefits such as: being able to use the token cryp-
togram for managing financial risks, confining a payment to a single payment channel,
appointing a TSP to authorise payments on behalf of the issuing bank, using features
such as ambient sensing to prevent relay attacks, etc. We believe that by using our
protocol to provide oﬄine capability to secure tokenised payments, this payment tech-
nology can expand to untapped markets and improve wider adoption in the payments
industry. Besides this, to our knowledge the work carried out in this thesis is the first to
propose an oﬄine contactless payment protocol based on tokenisation with mechanical
formal analysis and practical implementation, at the time of writing.
In our fourth contribution, we then focused our attention to the security aspects of
tokenised payments. After investigating the current tokenisation payment architecture,
we were able to identify five main attack scenarios that pose a threat to the security
of tokenised payments especially when a static-token is used in every transaction. By
identifying these attacks, we were able to achieve Objective-2 of the thesis under
this contribution. Addressing these security issues we propose a protocol that uses
Dynamic Transaction Tokens (DTT) to improve the security of payment transactions
that are based on EMV tokenisation. More significantly, the protocol provides mutual
177
9. Conclusion and Future Work
authentication between the mobile and the terminal, prevents the attacks by using DTT
that is unique to a particular transaction and provides end-to-end encryption between
the terminal and the TSP as well as the terminal and the mobile. The protocol was
then subject to mechanical formal analysis for its security and protocol weaknesses or
attacks were identified.
In our proposed DTT based solution, the authorisation entity can gain valuable
insights of a potential transaction even before a transaction request arrives at the TSP.
This is because a DTT is issued upon request of a particular transaction and due to
this the TSP can obtain accurate risk assurance levels for a transaction and detect
any fraudulent activity. Therefore, we suggest that our identified attack scenarios are
considered by payment solution provides, financial institutions, payment networks and
other relevant parties when rolling out static-token based solutions. By proposing an
improved protocol, we were able to achieve Objective-3 of the thesis under this con-
tribution. As an alternative, we suggest our proposed solution based on DTT to be
considered to provide improved security assurance to tokenised payment transactions.
The second main category that we explored in this thesis is the Bitcoin/blockchain
based distributed payments. In our fifth contribution, achieving Objective-2, we
investigated the architectures of distributed payment systems and identified potential
drawbacks in distributed payment transactions. In our research one of the issues we
identified is the problem of establishing fairness in anonymous payment transactions
in e-commerce environment. More significantly, Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that is
widely used to provide anonymous payments and has the largest market capitalisation
at the time of writing. Because of the anonymous nature of Bitcoin payments, however,
guaranteeing fair-exchange during e-commerce transactions is a major problem.
The blockchain technology is expected to be a disruptive technology in the payments
industry by opening new pathways to payment innovation. In such times where the
market is looking forward for a wider adoption of payment solutions based on blockchain
technology, issues such as not being able to establish fair-exchange in e-commerce can
be considered a deterrent. Therefore, addressing the aforementioned issue, we proposed
an anonymous fair-exchange payment protocol that establishes strong-fairness in an e-
commerce transaction when anonymous Bitcoin is being used as a payment method.
The involvement of a TTP in certain scenarios can be considered a bottleneck. In
our proposed protocol we keep the involvement of a TTP to a minimum by using a
oﬄine TTP that only intervenes in the protocol if a transacting party misbehaves,
prematurely aborts the protocol or a communication failure happens.
Furthermore, we then outlined a few issues related to the transaction link-ability in
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Bitcoin and showed how the protocol can be extended to support Zerocoin/zerocash to
provide improved anonymity and security guarantees. We explained how the protocol
can be used with other cryptocurrencies based on blockchains. By using our proto-
col to facilitate in an e-commerce transaction which involves anonymous payments,
transacting parties (both the merchant and the consumer) can engage in the payment
transaction with confidence as it provides a guaranteed fair-exchange and dispute res-
olution within the protocol run. The proposed improvements achieved Objective-3
in this contribution. We strongly believe that using methods such as our protocol can
remove reluctance/uncertainty of using cryptocurrencies as a method of payment in e-
commerce transactions and help achieve wide adoption of blockchain based payments.
The use of blockchain technology is not limited to e-commerce payment transac-
tions. The technology can be used in other payment related scenarios. In our research
we identified that the philanthropic sector as one of the potential industries to benefit
immensely by leveraging the blockchain technology. We then investigated the current
philanthropic sector and identified that the public trust on charities are declining and
negative media coverage such as [186] has impacted public confidence in charities. One
of the main reasons for this is lack of accountability and transparency on how charities
collect and spend donations[157].
Following this, in our last contribution, we carried out research to identify how
blockchain technology can help charities address these issues and improve donors’
trust in the charity sector. We then proposed a novel philanthropic model based on
blockchain technology which can be used by a charity to address challenges such as: do-
nation transparency, reduce transactional cost, donation speed, donation provisioning,
etc. The donation platform on the philanthropic model lets a donor make a donation
in Bitcoin or fiat currency to a selected charity activity. The donor has transparency to
his/her donation with the use of Bitcoin public ledger. Furthermore, distributed pay-
ment systems such as Bitcoin does not rely on third-party payment clearing services,
it can support lower transactional fees especially for cross-border payments. There-
fore, the philanthropic model significantly reduces the unnecessary transaction cost
of donations. By identifying these weaknesses and concerns, we were able to achieve
Objective-2 of the thesis under this contribution.
We then discuss how our novel philanthropic model can be applied for humanitarian
aid in a disconnected environment. We identified that poor Internet infrastructure and
resource-limited devices as main constraints in using a blockchain based solutions in
such an environment. Addressing these issues, we propose an SMS-based mobile pay-
ment system that uses the existing GSM network. We use OTPs generated by OTP
token devices to authenticate SMS-based transaction requests. The proposed payment
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system acts as a gateway to transact with the Bitcoin blockchain. The proposed sys-
tem provides the capability for the charity to provision the received donations to the
beneficiaries. Furthermore, the payment systems also allows the beneficiaries to make
secure Bitcoin payments for their day to day transactions by using feature phones,
issued OTP tokens and simple SMSs.
In our solution we describe two methods how Bitcoin transactions can be processed
in the SMS-based payment system. Firstly, we show how Bitcoin multi-signature pro-
cess can be used to process transactions. The 2-of-3 multi-signatures provides assurance
that a single key holder alone cannot generate a valid transaction. This provides a level
of authority as to how the charity could manage payment authorisations. Furthermore,
in the unfortunate event of a party losing their Bitcoin private key, the remaining two
parties are able to recover the Bitcoins. The second method we use to process Bit-
coin transactions is by using a smart contract. In our approach, we show how the
same multi-signature process can be applied in a smart contract. As the Bitcoin net-
work is initially invented as a distributed payment platform, it does not support smart
contracts. Therefore, we use the Rootstock network and show how Bitcoin payment
transactions originating from our SMS-based payment system can be processed. In
both processing methods, the payer and the payee receive payment confirmation SMSs
from the charity. The proposed solution is then analysed for its security requirements.
By proposing a novel philanthropic model and a SMS-based mobile payment system,
we were able to achieve Objective-3 of the thesis.
Another aspect that needs to be considered when it comes to cryptocurrencies based
solutions is the price volatility. It must be noted that the Bitcoin exchange value has
shown dramatic volatility since early 2013 where the Bitcoin market price has ranged
from $12 USD to an all time-high of $19,900 in December 2017. It can be considered
that the volatility of Bitcoin exchange value poses a financial risk for the charity.
However, using Bitcoin might be the only viable option in an environment where the
banking system/economy may have collapsed. The proposed payment system is aimed
at a closed eco-system where payments are made within a constrained geographical
environment. This to some extent minimises the effects of Bitcoin price volatility. As
a long-term solution to this problem, however, the charity can use a private blockchain
solution that replaces the Bitcoin blockchain to give more control over exchange rates.
In our conclusion, we discussed how the three main objectives of the thesis were
successfully achieved in each of our six main contribution of the thesis. A summary of
the key findings of each contribution is listed in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1: Summary Table of Contributions
Contribution.
Payment
Technology
Identified Security Concerns,
Attacks and Limitations
Proposed Solutions and Improve-
ments
1. EMV OPV * Two potential attack scenarios
in segmented authorisation: correct
PIN in OPV message and OPV re-
sponse message.
* Indelible trust assumptions placed
on intermediaries.
* Protocol and improvements that en-
hance the security of OPV by address-
ing the identified attacks.
* Provided end-to-end encryption, re-
play prevention and other security
guarantees.
2. EMV OPV * Two potential attack scenarios
that compromise the security of
OPV in unified authorisation: cor-
rect PIN in OPV message and PIN
block replay in OPV request.
* Protocol and improvements that en-
hance the security of OPV by address-
ing the identified attacks.
* End-to-end encryption, binding of
OPV and transaction authorisation for
replay prevention
3. Tokenisation * limitations in making secure to-
kenised payments in oﬄine environ-
ments.
* Protocol which provides capability of
making secure tokenised payments in
oﬄine environments.
4. Tokenisation * Five potential attacks: over charg-
ing, capturing static token, captur-
ing unpredictable number, adver-
sary replays an authorisation and re-
playing an authorisation response.
* Contactless mobile payment protocol
that uses DTT to provides: security
against the five attacks.
* Provided end-to-end encryption, mu-
tual authentication and other security
guarantees.
5. Blockchain * Providing fair-exchange in e-
commerce when anonymous pay-
ment methods are used.
* Concerns related to Bitcoin trans-
action linkability.
* Protocol that guarantees true fair-
exchange when Bitcoin is used as an
anonymous payment method.
* Extended the protocol to provide im-
proved security and anonymity.
6. Blockchain * Issues in the current philanthropic
model: donation transparency, cost,
speed of getting the donations to
beneficiaries, provisioning received
donations to beneficiaries in discon-
nected environments.
* Novel philanthropic model that
address these challenges by using
blockchain technology.
* SMS based mobile payment systems
to provision donations and to be used
by the beneficiaries for day to day pay-
ments.
9.2 Suggestions for Future Research
In this section, the thesis makes suggestions for future work and research directions.
The potential suggestions are categorised under each contribution area. The sug-
gestions for future work and research directions related to enhancing the security of
OPV are as follows.
It would be beneficial to understand and evaluate the security of the current key
sharing schemes between the payment terminal providers and their payment terminals
(at merchants’ premisses). In the evaluation, aspects such as: trust assumptions,
liability guarantees, security solutions used and compliance with payment card industry
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standards should be taken in to account.
Furthermore, evaluating the payment architecture for contactless payment systems
with respect to issues similar to those presented in this study would be another area
for future work.
Our next recommendation for future research directions would be the investigation
of the proposed next generation EMV specification. The proposed new changes would
mean that there will be significant architectural and security framework changes to
how EMV based centralised payment are carried out. Understanding how the changes
would impact key entities in the payment industry would be beneficial.
The suggestions for future work and research directions related to enhancing the
security of tokenised payments are as follows. We would like to explore and evaluating
the security of other transaction scenarios related to tokenised based payments. One
such example would be: making an oﬄine token payment while only the terminal
is online-capable. We would like to investigate how our protocol can be extended
to support such payment scenario. Another area is to include additional transaction
modes and expand our threat model to include the mobile being compromised by an
adversary.
Furthermore, we would like to implement the proposed fully oﬄine protocol pro-
posed on a 32bit secure element on a modern smart phone to compare performance
variations. Another point to note is that, most modern smart phones with embedded
secure elements have access to their secure elements restricted by manufacturers and
finding a device that provides access to the secure element would be challenging. The
last research direction we identify is exploring how similar protocols can be designed
to work with Host Card Emulation.
The suggestions for future work and research directions related to enhancing the
security blockchain based payments and transactions are as follows. More significantly,
in relation to anonymous fair-exchange, we would like to make improvements to our
protocol in order to support exchange of physical products. In such research attempts,
a key challenge will be how to deliver the physical products to the recipient’s address
without compromising the user anonymity. While using centralised payment methods,
few e-commerce retailers including Amazon, provide public delivery cabinet services to
collect delivery items. Here, the recipients collect their delivered items using PIN codes
sent by the retailer.
As we have already explained in the thesis, providing strong fair-exchange without
any arbitration is considered extremely difficult or sometimes impossible. Therefore,
another viable area of research would be to investigate the possibility of further reducing
the involvement of a significant TTP by using distributed TTP s. Moreover, this aligns
182
with the principles of distributed networks where no trust assumptions are placed on
a particular party, rather the trust is placed on the security and robustness of the
distributed network/blockchain.
Our next future directions are in relation to the use of blockchains in the philan-
thropic industry. We would like to investigate the possibility of applying our blockchain-
based philanthropic model in an ad-hoc network that replaces the existing GSM net-
work. This would further extend the benefits of using the payment system proposed
as part of the philanthropic model in an environment without GSM network coverage
or where the local communication system has collapsed.
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Appendix A
Source Code - Formal Analysis
Script
The scripts modeled for mechanical formal analysis in the thesis is included
in Appendix A.
A.1 CasperFDR Script in Chapter 3
The protocols proposed in Chapter 3 are modeled as follows:
A.1.1 Symmetric System
#Free variables
SC, CI: Agent
Dh, Pb, Rp, Cvr; Num
Cun, Aun: Nonce
InverseKeys = (EnMaKey, EnMaKey), (SessionEnMaKey, SessionEnMaKey)
#Protocol description
0. -> SC : SC [CI!=SC] <iMsg :={Dh, Pb, Cun,SessionEnMaKey,Rp}{EnMaKey}>
1. SC -> CI : SC, iMsg
2. CI -> SC : {DH,Cvr, Aun, Cun}{SessionEnMaKey}
#Actual variables
SCard, CIssuer, ME: Agent
DH, PB, RP, CVR: Num
CUN, AUN, NMalicious: Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SC,CI, Cun) knows EnMaKey
RESPONDER(CI,SC, Aun) knows EnMaKey
#System
INITIATOR(SCard, SIssuer, CUN)
RESPONDER(SIssuer, SCard, AUN)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = ME
IntruderKnowledge = {SIssuer, SCard, ME,
GMalicious, NMalicious}
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#Specification
Aliveness(SI, SC)
Aliveness(SC, SI)
Secret(SC, EnMaKey, [CI])
Secret(Sc, SessionEnMaKey, [CI])
A.1.2 Asymmetric System
#Free variables
SC, CI: Agent
Dh, Pb, Rp, Cvr; Num
Cun, Aun: Nonce
EKey: Agent->PublicKey
DKey: Agent->SecretKey
InverseKeys = (VKey, SKey), (SessionEnMaKey, SessionEnMaKey)
#Protocol description
0. -> SC : SC [CI!=SC] <iMsg := {Dh, Pb, Cun, SessionEnMaKey, Rp}{EKey(CI)}>
1. SC -> CI : SC, iMsg
2. SC -> CI : {Dh, Cvr, Aun, Cun}{SessionEnMaKey}
#Actual variables
SCard, CIssuer, ME: Agent
DH, PB, RP, CVR: Num
CUN, AUN, NMalicious: Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SC,CI, Cun)knows EKey
RESPONDER(SC,SI, Aun) knows DKey(CI), EKey
#System
INITIATOR(CIssuer, SCard, CUN)
RESPONDER(SCard, CIssuer, AUN)
#Functions
symbolic EKey, DKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = ME
IntruderKnowledge = {CIssuer, SCard, ME, NMalicious, DKey(ME), EKey}
#Specification
Aliveness(CI, SC)
Aliveness(SC, CI)
Secret(SC, SessionEnMaKey, [CI])
A.2 Scyther Script in Chapter 5
The protocol proposed in Chapter 5 is modeled as follows:
usertype Data;
hashfunction h;
usertype SessionKey;
const Cert: Function;
secret Cert1: Function;
protocol ot2(SE,T)
{
role SE {
fresh nse: Nonce; fresh PDOL: Data;
var nt: Nonce;
fresh OTT: Data; fresh TSPsig: Data;
macro DAD = nt2, OTT;
fresh K: SessionKey; fresh nse2: Nonce;
var X: Ticket; var nt2: Nonce;
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recv_1(T,SE, T,nt,Cert1(T));
send_2(SE,T, {SE,T,nse,nt,PDOL,K}pk(T));
recv_3(T,SE, {T,SE,nse,nt2,X}K);
send_4(SE,T, {SE,T,nse2,nt2,DAD,TSPsig}K, {h(DAD)}sk(SE),Cert(SE) );
claim(SE, Alive);
claim(SE, Secret, K);
claim(SE, Niagree);
claim(SE, Nisynch);
claim(SE, Secret, OTT);
claim(SE, Secret, X);
}
role T {
var nse: Nonce; var PDOL: Data;
fresh nt: Nonce; fresh TTQ: Data;
fresh amount: Data; fresh nt2: Nonce;
fresh CurrencyCode: Data;
var K: SessionKey; var Y: Ticket;
macro m1 = amount,CurrencyCode;
var TSPsig: Data; var nse2: Nonce;
send_1(T,SE, T,nt,Cert1(T));
recv_2(SE,T, {SE,T,nse,nt,PDOL,K}pk(T));
send_3(T,SE, {T,SE,nse,nt2,m1}K);
recv_4(SE,T, {SE,T,nse2,nt2,Y,TSPsig}K, {h(Y)}sk(SE),Cert(SE) );
claim(T, Alive);
claim(T, Secret, K);
claim(T, Niagree);
claim(T, Nisynch);
claim(T, Secret, Y);
}
}
A.3 Scyther Script in Chapter 6
The protocol proposed in Chapter 6 is modeled as follows:
usertype Data;
hashfunction h;
usertype SessionKey;
const Cert: Function;
secret Cert1: Function;
protocol ot1(SE,T,TSP)
{
role SE
{
fresh nse: Nonce;
var nt: Nonce;
fresh K: SessionKey;
var nt2: Nonce;
fresh nse2: Nonce;
var ntsp: Nonce;
var W: Ticket;
var Y: Ticket;
fresh nse3: Nonce;;
recv_1(T,SE, T,nt, Cert1(T));
send_2(SE,T, {SE,T,nse,nt, K,TSP}pk(T),{h({SE,T,nse,nt, K,TSP}pk(T))}sk(SE),Cert1(SE));
recv_3(T,SE, {T,SE,nse,nt2,W}K,{h({T,SE,nse,nt2,W}K)}sk(T));
send_4(SE,TSP, {SE,TSP, nse2,Cert1(T),W}k(SE,TSP));
recv_5(TSP,SE, {TSP,SE, nse2,ntsp,Y}k(SE,TSP));
send_6(SE,T, {SE,T, nse3,nt2,Y}K);
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claim(SE, Alive);
claim(SE, Secret, K);
claim(SE, Niagree);
claim(SE, Nisynch);
claim(SE, Weakagree);
}
role T {
fresh nt: Nonce;
var nse: Nonce;
var K: SessionKey;
fresh nt2: Nonce;
fresh nt3: Nonce;
var nse3: Nonce;
var ntsp2: Nonce;
var Token: Nonce;
var DTT: Data;
var Ks2: SessionKey;
macro DTD = TSP,T,ntsp2,nt3,Token,DTT,Ks2;
fresh nt4: Nonce;
var ARC: Data;
var ntsp3: Nonce;
send_1(T,SE, T,nt, Cert1(T));
recv_2(SE,T, {SE,T,nse,nt, K,TSP}pk(T),{h({SE,T,nse,nt, K,TSP}pk(T))}sk(SE),Cert1(SE));
send_3(T,SE, {T,SE,nse,nt2, {T,TSP,nt3}pk(TSP)}K,{h({T,SE,nse,nt2,{T,TSP,nt3}pk(TSP)}K)}sk(T));
recv_6(SE,T, {SE,T, nse3,nt2,{DTD}pk(T),{h(DTD)}sk(TSP)}K);
send_7(T,TSP, {T,TSP,ntsp2,nt4,DTT}Ks2);
recv_8(TSP,T, {TSP,T, ntsp3,nt4,ARC}Ks2);
claim(T, Alive);
claim(T, Secret, K);
claim(T, Niagree);
claim(T, Nisynch);
claim(T, Secret, DTT);
claim(T, Weakagree);
}
role TSP {
var nse2: Nonce;
var nt3: Nonce;
fresh ntsp: Nonce;
fresh Token: Data;
fresh DTT: Data;
fresh Ks2: SessionKey;
fresh ntsp2: Nonce;
macro DTD = TSP,T,ntsp2,nt3,Token,DTT,Ks2;
var nt4: Nonce;
fresh ntsp3: Nonce;
fresh ARC: Data;
recv_4(SE,TSP, {SE,TSP, nse2,Cert1(T),{T,TSP,nt3}pk(TSP)}k(SE,TSP));
send_5(TSP,SE, {TSP,SE, nse2,ntsp,{DTD}pk(T),{h(DTD)}sk(TSP)}k(SE,TSP));
recv_7(T,TSP, {T,TSP,ntsp2,nt4,DTT}Ks2);
send_8(TSP,T, {TSP,T,ntsp3,nt4,ARC}Ks2);
claim(TSP, Alive);
claim(TSP, Secret, Ks2);
claim(TSP, Secret, ARC);
claim(TSP, Niagree);
claim(TSP, Nisynch);
claim(TSP, Weakagree);
}
}
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A.4 Scyther Script in Chapter 7
The proposed main and extended protocol stages in Chapter 7 are modeled as follows:
A.4.1 Main Fair-exchange Protocol
usertype Data;
hashfunction h;
usertype SessionKey;
const Cert: Function;
secret Cert1: Function;
protocol fe(M,C)
{
role M
{
fresh nm1: Nonce;
fresh Pid: Data;
fresh Invoice: Data;
fresh PVc: Data;
fresh TTPcom: Data;
fresh t: Data;
fresh m: Data;
fresh K: SessionKey;
macro m1 = Pid,Invoice,{h(Invoice)}sk(M),nm1,PVc,{m}K,TTPcom,Cert1(M),t;
var nc: Nonce;
var tp: Data;
macro m2 = Invoice,{h(Invoice)}sk(M),{h({h(Invoice)}sk(M))}sk(C),nm1,nc,h({m}K),tp;
fresh nm2: Nonce;
macro m3 = Invoice,nc,nm2,h({m}K),K,t;
send_1(M,C, {m1}pk(C), {h({m1}pk(C))}sk(M));
recv_2(C,M, {m2}pk(M),{h({m2}pk(M))}sk(C));
send_3(M,C, {m3}pk(C), {h({m3}pk(C))}sk(M));
claim(M, Alive);
claim(M, Secret, K);
claim(M, Secret, m);
claim(M, Niagree);
claim(M, Nisynch);
claim(M, Weakagree);
}
role C
{
var nm1: Nonce;
var Pid: Data;
var PVc: Data;
var Invoice: Data;
var TTPcom: Data;
var m: Data;
var t: Data;
macro m1 = Pid,Invoice,{h(Invoice)}sk(M),nm1,PVc,{m}K,TTPcom,Cert1(M),t;
fresh nc: Nonce;
var m: Data;
fresh tp: Data;
macro m2 = Invoice,{h(Invoice)}sk(M),{h({h(Invoice)}sk(M))}sk(C),nm1,nc,h({m}K),tp;
var K: SessionKey;
var nm2: Nonce;
macro m3 = Invoice,nc,nm2,h({m}K),K,t;
recv_1(M,C, {m1}pk(C),{h({m1}pk(C))}sk(M));
send_2(C,M, {m2}pk(M),{h({m2}pk(M))}sk(C));
recv_3(M,C, {m3}pk(C), {h({m3}pk(C))}sk(M));
claim(C, Alive);
claim(C, Secret, K);
claim(C, Secret, m);
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claim(C, Niagree);
claim(C, Nisynch);
claim(C, Weakagree);
}
}
A.4.2 Extended Fair-exchange Protocol
usertype Data;
hashfunction h;
usertype SessionKey;
const Cert: Function;
secret Cert1: Function;
protocol fe(M,C,TTP)
{
role C
{
var nm0: Nonce;
var m: Data;
macro m0 = {m}K, nm0;
fresh nc1: Nonce;
fresh t: Data;
fresh BE: Data;
fresh Invoice: Data;
fresh TTPcom: Data;
fresh m: Data;
macro m1 = BE,Invoice,{h(Invoice)}sk(M),nc1,h({m}K),TTPcom,t;
var K: SessionKey;
var nttp2: Nonce;
var nc1: Nonce;
macro m4 = Invoice,K,nttp2,nc1,t;
recv_1(M,C, {m0}pk(C), {h({m0}pk(C))}sk(M));
send_2(C,TTP, {m1}pk(TTP),{h({m1}pk(TTP))}sk(M));
recv_5(TTP,C, {m4}pk(C), {h({m4}pk(C))}sk(TTP));
claim(C, Alive);
claim(C, Secret, K);
claim(C, Secret, m);
claim(C, Niagree);
claim(C, Nisynch);
claim(C, Weakagree);
}
role TTP
{
var nc1: Nonce;
var t: Data;
var Invoice: Data;
var TTPcom: Data;
var m: Data;
var BE: Data;
macro m1 = BE,Invoice,{h(Invoice)}sk(M),nc1,h({m}K),TTPcom,t;
fresh nttp1: Nonce;
fresh KR: Data;
fresh tr: Data;
macro m2 = BE,Invoice,{h(Invoice)}sk(M),KR,nttp1,tr;
var K: SessionKey;
var nm1: Nonce;
macro m3 = Invoice,K,nttp1,nm1,t;
fresh nttp2: Nonce;
macro m4 = Invoice,K,nttp2,nc1,t;
recv_2(C,TTP, {m1}pk(TTP),{h({m1}pk(TTP))}sk(M));
send_3(TTP,M, {m2}pk(M),{h({m2}pk(M))}sk(TTP));
recv_4(M,TTP, {m3}pk(TTP), {h({m3}pk(TTP))}sk(M));
send_5(TTP,C, {m4}pk(C), {h({m4}pk(C))}sk(TTP));
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claim(TTP, Alive);
claim(TTP, Secret, K);
claim(TTP, Secret, m);
claim(TTP, Niagree);
claim(TTP, Nisynch);
claim(TTP, Weakagree);
}
}
role M
{
fresh nm0: Nonce;
fresh m: Data;
fresh K: SessionKey;
macro m0 = {m}K, nm0;
macro m2 = BE,Invoice,{h(Invoice)}sk(M),KR,nttp1,tr;
var BE: Data;
var Invoice: Data;
var KR: Data;
var nttp1: Nonce;
var tr: Data;
fresh nm1: Nonce;
fresh t: Data;
macro m3 = Invoice,K,nttp1,nm1,t;
send_1(M,C, {m0}pk(C), {h({m0}pk(C))}sk(M));
recv_3(TTP,M, {m2}pk(M),{h({m2}pk(M))}sk(TTP));
send_4(M,TTP, {m3}pk(TTP), {h({m3}pk(TTP))}sk(M));
claim(M, Alive);
claim(M, Secret, K);
claim(M, Secret, m);
claim(M, Niagree);
claim(M, Nisynch);
claim(M, Weakagree);
}
}
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